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Abstract 
No major country in the world is as reliant on migrant remittance flows as is the Philippines, 
with some 8-11 million workers overseas sending $17 billion back home each year.  As 
important as these flows are to the Philippine economy, the export of labor has never been 
part of a coherent development strategy.  At least 13 major government agencies are 
involved in matters pertaining to overseas Filipino workers, but the result is more of a 
patchwork of overlapping roles than a systematic regulatory regime. My thesis examines 
relations between these agencies and the approximately 1,500 recruitment agencies that 
are the key private-sector actors in facilitating overseas migration from the Philippines.  
Despite the importance of these agencies, no previous research has examined their role, 
their associational ties, or the nature of their relations with a range of government actors.  
Theoretically, my research contributes to debates within political economy on what roles 
the private sector and government have in pursuing and achieving national economic 
development objectives.  Beyond this primary contribution, my research also provides 
insights into debates on alternative development strategies in developing states, the politics 
of international labor migration, and bilateral labor relations between states.  The research 
for my thesis was gathered primarily across five months of fieldwork in the Philippines.  
While there, I was able to utilize multiple methods of investigation including interviews with 
politicians, bureaucrats, NGOs, business leaders, and international organizations as well as 
significant archival research.  My thesis topic intersects with many research areas, including 
not only the politics of development and government-business relations but also state-
society relations, structures of governance, foreign policy making, and international 
diplomacy.   
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Importance of Migration in the Philippines 
When arriving at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport in Manila it only takes a few 
minutes to figure out that the Philippines takes overseas labor migration very seriously.  
There are exclusive processing areas in the customs departure and arrival areas dedicated 
for the sole use of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs).  The international airport is also 
equipped with OFW-only waiting rooms and a special Labor Assistance Center where the 
Philippines Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), the Overseas Workers Welfare 
Administration (OWWA), and the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHILHEALTH) all 
provide departure and arrival services for workers on their way to, or coming home from, 
jobs overseas.  Once beyond the airport there are constant reminders of the ‘migration 
culture’ that exists in the Philippines today.  From the billboards advertising international 
calling plans and mobile phone remittance schemes to the thousands of taxi cabs 
emblazoned with advertisements for OFW web portals, there are frequent reminders that 
this is a country geared for the international labor market.  While there may be other 
countries that send more migrant workers overseas (specifically, China, India and Mexico) 
no major country is more dependent on the export of labor than is the Philippines.   
The objective of this thesis is to explore the interaction between government and business 
in the overseas employment program in the Philippines.  There will be a strong emphasis on 
program policies, the policy-making process, and how various program actors interact with 
each other.  This thesis will straddle several disciplinary fields and sub-disciplinary areas 
including politics, international political economy, public administration, international 
relations, migration studies, and development studies.  It is anticipated that the arguments, 
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discussions, and findings of this thesis will be particularly valuable to policy makers and 
bureaucrats in the Philippines as well as scholars and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) working on migration or remittance issues in the Philippines.  Despite the focus on 
the Philippines it is also expected that the findings of this thesis will contribute to 
understanding of similar issues in other states engaged in overseas labor migration.  A key 
component of the argument put forward in this thesis is that the overseas employment 
program is being under-utilized for national economic developmental outcomes and that, by 
studying the interaction between government and business, recommendations can be made 
to improve program efficiency and integration into the national economy.  This can thereby 
enhance the program’s relative effects on national economic development.  The approach 
proposed to accomplish this (in Chapter Two) is a strategy that derives a certain inspiration 
from the development model pioneered by the East Asian tigers, namely Japan, Korea, and 
Taiwan.   
This thesis is very much a macro view of the current Philippine economy, the overseas 
employment program, and the plan for national economic development.  By looking at the 
convergence of these three elements, at the macro level, a clear understanding will emerge 
of how these three areas must be brought together if meaningful progress is ever to be 
made.  This chapter is arranged to provide an introduction to overseas labor migration from 
the Philippines, to introduce the key players involved, to briefly introduce the parameters 
set for the scope of this thesis, and to set forth the structure of the subsequent chapters.  
Because this thesis adopts a very different approach to studying overseas labor migration in 
the Philippines as compared to those that have traditionally been utilized by scholars, a 
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section in this chapter has been dedicated specifically to explaining what issues will not be 
explored at length in subsequent chapters.   
The Philippines is distinct in its approach toward international labor migration for a number 
of reasons.  Unlike many labor sending countries, overseas migration in the Philippines 
developed with official government encouragement rather than simply as a spontaneous 
organic phenomenon.  More history will be provided later in the chapter, but suffice it to 
say the Philippine government has actively encouraged overseas migration since the early 
1970s.  Proof of the importance the government places on overseas migration from the 
Philippines can be seen in the size and scope of the bureaucracy tasked with managing 
various aspects of the program (see Chart 1.1 below).   Over the program’s nearly 40-year 
history what was once intended to be a temporary option for unemployed and 
underemployed workers has become a major contributor to the Philippine economy 
through the remittances that workers send home.   
Scope of Philippine Migration 
Although concrete statistics on the scope of how many Filipinos are involved in overseas 
labor are hard to pin down, one cannot overstate the massive scale of the phenomenon.  
Estimates of the total stock of OFWs usually range between eight and twelve million, 
depending on the source.  The POEA put the total at 8,187,710 as of December 2008, with 
other groups estimating that this excludes an additional three million illegal 
(undocumented) OFWs.1  The numbers of workers deployed has risen steadily each year 
                                                          
1
 Yvette Collymore, “Rapid Population Growth, Crowded Cities Present Challenges in the Philippines,” 
Population Reference Bureau, last modified June 2003, http://www.prb.org/Articles/2003/RapidPopulation 
GrowthCrowded CitiesPresentChallengesinthePhilippines.aspx. 
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with the annual totals exceeding one million each year since 2006.2  In 2008, the number of 
deployed newly hired or re-hires reached a staggering 1,236,013 which, according to the 
POEA, meant an average of 3,377 deployments per day.3 
In discussing the scope of migration from the Philippines it is useful to explore labor 
statistics, especially those related to the national workforce in comparison with the 
deployment figures given above.  In order to truly understand the importance of the 
overseas employment program to the Philippines, some review of relevant statistical data is 
necessary to put the scale of the issue into the national context.  The National Statistics 
Office (NSO) specifies two figures when referring to the national workforce.  First the total 
number of individuals over the age of fifteen who are included as qualifying for the 
workforce, currently at 59,327,000 people for 2009.  Secondly, one must consider the ‘Labor 
Force Participation Rate,’ which for 2009 stood at 64 percent.  From these two numbers the 
actual labor force total given for 2009 equals 37.9 million.4  Other important figures to 
consider when looking at the labor picture in the Philippines are the unemployment rate 
(7.5 percent in 2009) and the underemployment rate (19.1 percent in 2009).5  What is not 
clear from these figures is where exactly OFWs are counted in the process, if at all?  If the 
POEA’s 2008 figure of 8,187,710 legal OFWs is used and divided by the estimated 2008 total 
labor force, 37.1 million, we see that if OFWs are included in the formulations for the latter 
statistic, they account for 22 percent of the total labor force.  If OFWs are not counted then 
they represent an additional 22 percent on top of the official labor force statistic and are 
                                                          
2
 Philippines Overseas Employment Administration, Table 1. Deployment of OFWs by Type of Hiring, 2008 – 
2007, http://www.poea.gov.ph/stats/2008_stats.pdf. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Carmelita N. Ericta, 2009 Annual Labor and Employment Status, National Statistics Office – Republic of the 
Philippines, last modified January 21, 2010, 
http://www.census.gov.ph/data/pressrelease/2010/pr1038tx.html. 
5
 Ibid. 
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artificially skewing domestic labor figures, especially the unemployment rate.  Because of 
the large number of OFWs abroad, this causes some amount of ambiguity in reported 
national labor statistics. 
Another area of considerable importance to an overall understanding of the scope of 
migration in the Philippines is the issue of remittances.  Worldwide remittances are playing 
an ever increasing role in the economic strategies adopted by people trying to build a better 
life for their families.  The importance of remittances to Filipinos and the Philippines can 
hardly be overestimated, and is one of the very things that has attracted me to Philippine 
migration politics as a research topic.  The Philippine economy today is one designed to 
exploit the constant stream of foreign currency entering the country.  Everywhere one can 
see billboards and advertisements for newer, faster, and more secure ways of receiving 
money from friends and loved ones overseas.  The proliferation of malls selling imported 
goods and foreign based fast food chains are just two examples of how increased access to 
foreign currency has changed the nature of the Philippine economy. 
Chart 1.1 Top Ten by Country: Workers' remittances, compensation of employees, and 
migrant transfers, credit in US Dollars (as of November 2009) 
    
2008 Remittances 
(millions) 2008 GDP (millions) 
Remittances as % 
of GDP 
Population (2008 
Estimates in millions) 
1 India $49,977 $1,215,992 4.11% 1,139  
2 China $48,523 $4,521,827 1.07% 1,324  
3 Mexico $26,035 $1,094,480 2.38% 110.6  
4 Philippines $18,642 $173,602 10.74%  90.1  
5 France $16,596 $2,831,794 0.59%  64.1  
6 Spain $11,835 $1,593,912 0.74%  45.5  
7 Germany $10,884 $3,623,686 0.30%  82.1  
8 Korea, Rep. $10,732 $931,402 1.15%  48.6  
9 Poland $10,447 $529,400 1.97%  38.1  
10 Belgium $10,285 $507,020 2.09%  10.7  
*Source: World Bank: Key Development Data & 
Statistics 
 
6 
 
As seen above in Chart 1.1, at 18.6 billion dollars in 2008 the Philippines ranks fourth 
worldwide in terms of total remittances behind India, China, and Mexico, but ahead of 
France, Spain, and Germany.   Although India and China both take in over double the annual 
remittance revenues of the Philippines, it is conceivable that in the coming years, especially 
considering its rapid population growth, the Philippines could catch up with and even 
displace Mexico.  Once one moves to beyond the ‘2008 remittance’ column of Chart 1.1, 
some interesting discrepancies in the picture begin to emerge.  In terms of 2008 GDP for 
example, there is a massive discrepancy between the top three annual GDP figures and the 
Philippines, at $173 billion.  Population figures add value to the picture as well, where we 
can see that the top two countries for remittances receiving also happen to be the world’s 
two most populous countries.  Perhaps the most telling figure from Chart 1.1, in respect to 
the scope of migration’s importance to the Philippines, is what we see when remittance 
figures are compared as a percentage of national GDP.6  None of the top ten remittance 
receiving countries come close to the Philippines in terms of how important remittances are 
to the state’s total GDP.  Nigeria, Romania, and India come in at less than five percent.  
Other countries in the world beat the Philippines when comparing remittances as a 
percentage of GDP, but these states are usually small, with Samoa, Lesotho, and Tonga cited 
as frequent examples (see Chart 1.2 below). 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 Remittances into the Philippines accounted for 10.74 percent of GDP in 2008. 
7 
 
Chart 1.2 25 Countries with highest remittance income as a % of GDP 
in 2008 
Rank Country Name 
Remittances 
as % of GDP 
GDP 
(current 
US$ in 
Millions)  Population 
1 Tajikistan 49.3 5,161 6,691,416 
2 Lesotho 37.3 1,600 2,127,412 
3 Moldova 31.3 6,054 3,570,107 
4 Tonga 27.1 348 102,910 
5 Bermuda 26.3 6,067 64,200 
6 Kyrgyz Republic 24.0 5,139 5,277,900 
7 Lebanon 23.9 30,079 4,166,915 
8 Samoa 23.8 568 181,809 
9 Nepal 21.7 12,572 28,905,358 
10 Haiti 21.4 6,407 9,736,332 
11 Honduras 20.6 13,881 7,302,742 
12 Kosovo 18.5 5,641 1,795,000 
13 El Salvador 17.5 21,431 6,129,628 
14 Jordan 16.7 22,696 5,787,000 
15 Jamaica 15.3 14,245 2,687,200 
16 Bosnia and Herzegovina 14.8 18,512 3,774,164 
17 Guyana 14.5 1,922 751,578 
18 Nicaragua 12.8 6,372 5,635,577 
19 Albania 11.5 12,968 3,181,397 
20 Guatemala 11.4 39,136 13,690,846 
21 Bangladesh 11.2 79,554 145,478,300 
22 Senegal 11.2 13,210 11,787,123 
23 Philippines 10.7 173,602 90,173,139 
24 Togo 10.7 3,163 5,776,837 
25 Cape Verde 10.0 1,550 487,371 
*Source: World Bank: Key Development Data & Statistics 
Why Focus on the Recruitment Industry? 
Year after year the numbers of Filipinos seeking work abroad continues to increase, 
resulting in a remarkable proliferation in the number and size of recruitment agencies 
wishing to be involved in the lucrative business of placing workers around the globe.  Ever 
since the late 1970s, private recruitment agencies have been the enablers of overseas labor 
migration from the Philippines.  Recruitment agencies are normally classified as either land-
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based or sea-based (manning), although some recruiters are involved in both areas.  All 
recruitment agencies regardless of specialization are required to hold the relevant operating 
licenses obtained through the POEA.  Despite the perception of the comparatively high 
start-up capital requirements, foreign ownership rules, and strict licensing guidelines 
implemented by the POEA, in April 2009 the number of licensed land-based agencies stood 
at 1,010, and sea-based 361.7  In addition to these licensed agencies, there are an unknown 
number of unlicensed recruiters who operate outside the rules of the POEA.  Many take 
advantage of prospective OFWs looking for job opportunities, who are willing to pay fees 
up-front in order to secure employment abroad, by taking their money and failing to deploy 
them abroad as agreed.  Because they operate outside of the legal system, prosecution in 
such cases is nearly impossible. 
When discussing Philippine migration policy making there is a small group of key actors 
involved in the process: the President, Congress, the POEA, Department of Labor and 
Employment (DOLE), Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), National Economic Development 
Authority (NEDA), the recruitment industry, civil society groups, and the migrants 
themselves.  In addition to domestic policy making there are also multilateral and bilateral 
policy processes and negotiations between the DFA, the POEA, DOLE, the Overseas Worker 
Welfare Administration (OWWA), the recruitment industry, and equivalent organizations in 
migrant worker destination states.  Despite the variety of actors involved in policy 
processes, both foreign and domestic, the recruitment industry more than any other group 
                                                          
7
 POEA newspaper list of licensed recruiters; the required escrow deposit for anyone wishing to legally 
participate in the overseas employment program is 1 million pesos (approximately US$23,000).  While this 
figure might seem like a relatively low sum by international standards for starting up a business, this amount is 
significant because this cost does not contribute in any way toward the setup of the new business but instead 
sits in an account waiting to compensate OFWs that are deployed by the agency and then file suit against them 
with the National Labor Relations Commission. 
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is responsible for interpreting policy and turning those policies into workable business 
realities.  In other words, they make migration from the Philippines possible.  In spite of 
their key role in making migration happen, the recruitment industry is a convenient 
scapegoat for the long list of problems and abuses that occur under the umbrella of the 
Philippine overseas labor program.  Some of the consternation is no doubt deserved, but in 
an industry of nearly 1,500 licensed businesses and an unknown number of illegal agencies 
there are of course both good and bad apples.  Throughout this thesis, interviews and 
archival records will show that despite the many examples of mistreatment and abusive 
polices there are indeed agencies that place a great deal of importance on the wellbeing and 
happiness of the workers they deploy abroad. 
It is perhaps the negative image that is portrayed in the Philippines of abusive recruitment 
agencies exploiting hapless destitute would-be laborers and the popular idea that the 
industry has a cabal-like control over policy makers, ultimately shaping policies which 
reinforce their position as the enabler of overseas labor migration, which, from the 
perspective of the industry’s critics, allows them to continue abusing the OFW while 
enriching themselves.  Does the recruitment industry really wield as much power in the 
policy-making process as is commonly believed?  Throughout the subsequent chapters, the 
clear answer that will emerge is “no.”  Philippine migration policy is in fact shaped by a 
diverse range of interests and tension arising from a variety of actors.  While it does have 
some influence, the recruitment industry does not have any more clout in policy-making 
circles than do the NGOs, who are their most ardent critics.  If for no other reason, the 
recruitment industry in the Philippines is important to study because of the important role it 
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plays in a pre-eminent element of the Philippine economy today and into the foreseeable 
future. 
Primary Focus: Government-Business Relations 
For the purposes of this thesis the term ‘business’ is specifically referring to the recruitment 
industry in the Philippines.  This paper will focus specifically on the relationship between the 
recruitment industry and the government in overseas labor migration policy making.  More 
precisely, ‘government’ for the purposes of this thesis will be divided into two discussions: 
the relationship between the recruitment industry, the Congress, and the executive branch 
as well as the relationship between the recruitment industry and the overseas migration 
bureaucracy (POEA, OWWA, DOLE, DFA).  Thus, future references to ‘government’ are 
referring to the executive, the Congress, and the bureaucracy, unless otherwise specified.  
Although other actors in policy-making process are certainly important, the tension 
between the recruitment industry, which is affected greatly by policy and directly impacted 
by its implementation, versus the policy-making politicians and those in enforcement roles, 
is central.  This analysis will prove valuable to our understanding of how policies have been 
shaped previously, and what forces will prevail on migration policies in the future.   
There is a rich literature on the topic of government-business relations, particularly in 
regard to national economic development.  Since the program’s inception the standard 
position taken by national politicians has been to deny that overseas migration is a primary 
development strategy, but instead a ‘stop-gap, short-term’ measure.  In this thesis the 
framework used in national development focused studies of government-business relations 
will be applied to the Philippine overseas employment program.  A more detailed discussion 
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of the theoretical underpinnings of government-business relations and how they are to be 
applied to this thesis will be given in Chapter Two.   
Unsurprisingly, during the Marcos years the executive branch took the lead in shaping 
Philippine migration policy.  President Corazon Aquino, Marcos’ immediate successor, 
basically continued to exercise control of the program, though with more input from 
Congress and civil society.  However beginning with the Flor Contemplacion affair of the 
mid-90s until today, the Congress has taken over as primary law-giver on overseas migration 
policy matters.  The president does still issue executive orders related to overseas migration 
from time to time, but not to the same extent they were used by President Marcos and 
President Corazon Aquino.  The discussion related to the relationship between the 
executive, legislative branch and the recruitment industry will focus primarily on national 
migration policies, specifically, how they are created, what input is given from the industry, 
and how the interactions between the government and private sector influenced the 
direction policy has taken.  Some secondary issues to be explored under this topic include: 
clientelistic politics in recruitment as well as in legislative and executive migration policy 
making, cronyism and corruption in migration policy making, and the place of migration in 
national development policy. 
Since the 1970s there have been dedicated bureaucratic entities in place to manage the 
overseas employment program in the Philippines.  These organizations do not of course 
write the laws which govern the overseas employment program, but they do enforce those 
laws as well as enact specific policies and guidelines which allow the program to be 
implemented successfully.  In essence organizations like the POEA, OWWA, and the DFA are 
the gatekeepers of overseas migration through which both the recruitment industry as well 
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as individual prospective migrants must pass if they wish to deploy workers and seek job 
opportunities abroad.  In this context my government-business relationship discussion will 
focus on the interaction and tensions between the recruitment industry and the 
government bureaucracy that governs them and the program under which their business 
operates.  The rules and policies of the POEA for example require that specific 
organizational and structural components be in place in order for individual recruiters to 
participate in the program.  Lately, additional tensions have arisen between the bureaucracy 
and the recruitment industry over the movement toward more state-to-state ‘government 
controlled’ employment schemes, which the recruitment industry sees as a conflict of 
interest for the POEA as well as a direct threat to their livelihood.  As one of the 
bureaucracy’s primary responsibilities is to protect OFWs, this thesis will also explore the 
predatory practices that exist in the recruitment industry and how policies, as well as 
regulatory practices and capacity, either encourage or discourage predatory behavior.   
By utilizing this dual approach of exploring government-business relations through 
executive/legislative branch vis-à-vis the recruitment industry and also the bureaucracy vis-
à-vis the recruitment industry, a diverse picture emerges as to how migration policy is 
formed, what the objectives of policy initiatives are, and who ultimately benefits (see Figure 
1.1 below).  Ultimately, whether looking at the larger national picture or at cases of 
individual migrants, overseas employment migration from the Philippines is a program in 
which people are placing their hopes of building a better life.  With some planning, these 
efforts could be harnessed to pursue national economic development through both 
individual and collective initiatives.  The Philippine government has been slow to admit that 
the overseas employment program has any relation to the national development plan, but 
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loudly proclaim pride when the Philippine program of overseas labor migration 
management is held as a model to be emulated by other countries wishing to establish a 
labor migrant sending program.8  It is also for this reason that the development-focused 
nature of the government-business relations literature seems particularly applicable to the 
Philippine overseas labor migration program. 
Figure 1.1: Government-business relations research design matrix 
 
Research Focus 
Because of the massive scale of overseas labor migration from the Philippines, there are a 
long list of problems and abuses throughout the system and at virtually every step in the 
process.  Consequently, policy makers are continually refining the program and making 
subtle or even drastic changes to aspects of the program itself.  Throughout the many 
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 Center for Migrant Advocacy, “The Philippines: A Global Model On Labor Migration?,” Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung,  2
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 ed., June 2009,  
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efforts made to improve the program over the years, the underlying premise motivating 
reforms has been the need to provide protection for workers through all stages in the 
process.  That is, workers should be protected during the recruitment process, during the 
sending process, for the duration of their overseas labor contract, and during the 
repatriation stage after the completion of their contract.  With this in mind there has been 
an arms race of sorts among the various actors in the policy-making process, as they try to 
prove that their ‘worker protection’ credentials are the most impressive.  Each group has 
tried to identify themselves as the friends and protectors of the OFW and the one most able 
to pursue their best interest.  If all parties involved in policy making are looking out for the 
protection of the OFW, who is left to approach policy making from an alternative 
perspective, such as leveraging overseas migration for national development, or the goal of 
one day eliminating the need for workers to go abroad for work at all?  In other words, can 
the pursuit of worker welfare based overseas labor migration policy be viewed in part as a 
noble distraction from meaningful policy steps that could utilize this remarkable program 
for the benefit of the entire country? 
In this thesis I argue that in order for the overseas employment program, and the policies 
which guide the program, to be successful in contributing to national development there 
needs to be a shift in policy.  Most crucially there needs to be a new cooperative effort 
between government policy makers, economic development planners, and the recruitment 
industry in situating the overseas employment program within the national economic 
development strategy without diminishing from important policy strides that have been 
taken in the field of worker welfare.  Furthermore, I argue that consultation, cooperation, 
and strategic planning between government and business is a vital component in an 
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effective national development strategy.  I also argue that despite its bad reputation the 
recruitment industry is not solely to blame for the many problems with the overseas labor 
program, but is a politically convenient scapegoat for the government and other actors to 
blame.   
Beyond the Scope of this Thesis 
There has been a great deal of academic attention in recent years given to the issue of 
gender as it relates to Philippine overseas migration.  James Tyner, Dierdre McKay, and 
Katherine Gibson, for example, have all addressed various aspects of gender politics as 
related to Philippine overseas migration.  Discussions of the ‘feminization’ of migrant labor 
from the Philippines have rightly been a topic for exploration by political scientists, 
sociologists, and geographers.  Some such as Katherine Gibson have focused on economic 
development through using migrant remittance investments to form community based 
businesses, often run by returned female migrants.  McKay has done extensive research 
with OFW women’s groups in destination locations such as Hong Kong and Singapore.  
Generally speaking the numbers paint a fairly balanced gender picture of deploying OFWs.  
In 2008, of the 338,266 OFWs deployed as ‘new hires,’ 174,928 were male and 163,338 
were female.9  Thus the number of newly deployed workers is roughly split fifty-fifty 
between the genders.  There are of course numerous social, economic, and familial 
implications to both men and women leaving the country each year, as they often do so at 
the expense of those they are leaving behind in their roles as fathers and mothers.  
                                                          
9
 Philippines Overseas Employment Administration, Table 17. Deployed Overseas Filipino Workers - New hires, 
2008, Top Ten Skills by Sex, accessed June 26, 2012, http://www.poea.gov.ph/stats/2008_stats.pdf. 
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Although this dimension to the broader issue is tremendously important, it will not be the 
focus of this research.   
Numerous studies have been undertaken on overseas labor migration from the Philippines 
by a cross section of scholars from a variety of disciplines.  With very few exceptions, the 
vast majority of these studies have focused on the human and social costs of the program.  
Without any desire to belittle or diminish in any way the value of these studies, in essence, 
these studies are looking at various aspects of the immensely important issue of worker 
welfare.  One cannot discuss overseas labor migration in any depth without encountering 
the issue of worker welfare, which perhaps explains (beyond its more obvious importance) 
the widespread academic interest in the topic.  What makes this thesis unique among 
previous studies of overseas labor migration in the Philippines is that worker welfare does 
not have a central role in the primary veins of inquiry being undertaken.  Yes, worker 
welfare will be explored here and there, but only as it relates to the policies governing the 
program or the actors (which includes OFWs themselves) involved in that policy-making 
process itself.   
This distinctive approach will offer a different perspective on many issues that have been 
often researched, but always from a worker welfare perspective.  It is hoped that, by 
exploring the policy-making process from government-business and economic development 
perspectives, new options will emerge for policy makers to chart an alternative course for 
both the overseas employment program and the national economy as a whole.  In 
anticipation of criticism of this new approach, it is important to be absolutely clear that in 
approaching these issues in this way I do not diminish the importance of enhancing welfare 
for workers.  I share the view of many advocates and scholars alike that OFWs deserve 
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better protection than they now enjoy, and hope that through my distinctive approach to 
the central questions of this thesis meaningful progress toward correcting those welfare 
deficiencies will be rectified.  In the following section a brief overview of the history of 
overseas labor migration from the Philippines will be given.   
Brief Chronology of Overseas Migration from the Philippines 
Early Philippine Migration (Pre – 1974) 
Although this thesis focuses on government-business relations in Philippine migration policy 
during the past 35 years, the Philippines has a rich overseas migration history prior to the 
Marcos administrations revision of the Philippine labor code in 1974, which established the 
foundation for current policy.  From 1521 when Ferdinand Magellan ‘discovered’ the 
Philippines and claimed the archipelago for Spain, Filipinos had a tradition of working 
abroad.  After Miguel López de Legazpi established the first permanent Spanish settlement 
in 1565, Filipinos worked for the Spanish as shipbuilders, as able seamen and ultimately 
powered what came to be known as the Manila Galleon Trade.  These early Filipino migrant 
laborers made two round trips annually bringing silks and spices from Asia to Acapulco, New 
Spain (present day Mexico) for transfer on to Europe, and returning with tons of raw silver, 
and minted silver and gold coins. 10  The Manila Galleon Trade continued for over two 
hundred years from 1565 until Mexican independence in 1815.11   
In 1898 the U.S. annexed the Philippines from Spain following the Spanish-American War.  
Joaquin Gonzalez has classified external Philippine migration into three distinct waves, 1900 
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 Benito Legarda Jr., “Two and a Half Centuries of the Galleon Trade,” Philippine Studies Historical and 
Ethnographic Viewpoints 3, no. 4, (1955). 
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 Richard H. Dillon, “The Last Plan to Seize the Manila Galleon,” The Pacific Historical Review 20, no. 2 (1951): 
123. 
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to the early 1940s, late 1940s to early 1970s, and early 1970s to today.  During the first 
wave President McKinley’s policy of “benevolent assimilation” provided scholarships for 
young Filipinos to pursue college educations in the U.S., although these scholarship 
programs were targeted specifically at wealthy youths and were intended to curry favor 
with powerful elite families.12  After the initial wave of students Filipinos came as 
agricultural workers primarily to Hawaii, Alaska, and the Pacific coast.  Gonzalez explained: 
Between 1900 and 1930, Hawaii-based plantation owners were recruiting 
thousands of Filipino manongs [working men] to harvest sugar and 
pineapple.  At America’s most northern frontier, approximately 5,000 Filipino 
workers were contracted yearly for Alaska’s flourishing fish canneries.  Later 
on, the demand for Filipino contract labour shifted to agribusiness-related 
assignments in the states of California and Washington.  Close to 50,000 left 
the Philippines for the U.S. mainland’s Pacific coast to work as fruit and 
vegetable pickers.  In the vast orchards and fields of California and 
Washington, they harvested and packed apples, grapes, oranges, lettuce, 
tomatoes, etc.13  
Prior to 1974 the primary piece of domestic Philippine overseas labor migration legislation 
was Act 2486, passed in 1915, which established an arrangement where by recruiters paid 
fees to both national and provincial governments for the right to recruit adult Filipinos.  The 
recruiters primary obligation to contracted Filipino workers was to provide return passage 
home after the contract terms had been filled, or in case of accident or illness.14 
The second wave consisted primarily of workers bringing their families and relatives to the 
U.S. and Filipino war veterans who were allowed citizenship in the U.S. due to their military 
service.  By the 1950s and 1960s, there began to be a demand in East Asian neighbor 
countries for artists, barbers, musicians, and loggers in addition to the continued migration 
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 Joaquin L. Gonzalez III, Philippine Labour Migration: Critical Dimensions of Public Policy, (Singapore: Institute 
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314. 
19 
 
to the U.S.15  Smaller numbers of workers also left during this period for Western Europe, 
Canada and Australia.  The Philippine government, both before and after the American 
period, had very little involvement in the sending of migrant workers.  During these early 
years overseas migration from the Philippines was an informal affair and highly subject to 
individual choice.  In the 1960s and 1970s Filipino seamen began to deploy in great numbers 
for a variety of international shipping companies.  Land-based migrants also began to deploy 
as contract workers, commonly referred to as overseas contract workers (OCWs), with large 
batches of deployments processed through DOLE in 1971, 1972 and 1973.  Between the late 
1960s and 1974 increasing numbers of private recruitment agencies came into existence to 
fill the growing demand for overseas employment opportunities.  By 1974 most Filipinos 
who went abroad for work found employment and deployed overseas through recruitment 
agencies. 
Modern Philippine Migration: The Third Wave (1974- present) 
The post-1974 period has seen migration take center stage in many aspects of Philippine 
social, financial, cultural, and political life.  Two years after the declaration of martial law in 
1972, a new national labor code established a formal government-controlled framework for 
sending contract workers overseas.  Initially the 1974 labor code banned recruitment 
agencies from deploying workers, whose deployments were instead to be managed by the 
three new public agencies established in the labor code: the Overseas Employment 
Development Board (OEDB), the Bureau of Employment Services (BES), and the National 
Seamen’s Board (NSB).  By 1978 the new agencies proved unable to keep up with the 
exponential growth in the numbers of contract workers deploying overseas.  Consequently 
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that same year Marcos issued Presidential Decree 1412, which re-authorized the private 
recruitment industry to participate in sending contract workers abroad. 
In 1982, President Marcos consolidated the three agencies originally created in the 1974 
labor code, into the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).  This new 
agency took on the combined roll of its three predecessors with a mandate of “promoting 
and monitoring the overseas employment of Filipino workers…and to protect their rights to 
fair and equitable employment practices.”16  The POEA thus became the lead agency in 
charge of overseas labor migration, though other agencies such as the DFA, and DOLE 
maintained a role.  Following Marcos’ ouster in 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued 
Executive Order No. 247, or Reorganizing the Philippine Overseas Employment 
Administration and For Other Purposes (July 1987), through which the POEA was to 
“enhance its effectiveness in responding to changing market and economic conditions and 
to the call of the national development plan for the strengthening of the worker protection 
and regulation components of the overseas employment program.”17  It was widely 
perceived that President Aquino’s issuance of EO 247 was also an attempt to overturn what 
were seen as corrupt Marcos-era policies (more on this in Chapter Three) related to the 
governance of the overseas worker program. 
The next major milestone in the evolution of the Philippine overseas worker program came 
after the execution of OFW Flor Contemplacion in Singapore March 17, 1995.  In response to 
public outcry over her death the Philippine Congress pushed through Republic Act 8042, 
which was aimed squarely at increasing protections for OFWs.  This legislation redefined 
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many aspects of the process but had particular emphasis on the structures and resources of 
support that needed to be implemented to serve OFWs in destination states.  The long-term 
implications of RA 8042 will be discussed at length in Chapter Four. 
Further reform came in 2010 with a new law introducing a new liability insurance scheme 
for OFWs as well as revisions of many parts of RA 8042.18  In March 2010 President Arroyo 
failed to sign Republic Act No. 10022, which meant that it automatically became law.  RA 
10022 amends much of RA 8042 and introduces new programs like mandatory insurance for 
newly hired OFWs.  The circumstances surrounding the creation of RA 10022 were 
particularly important because by the end of the policy-making process both civil society 
groups and the recruitment industry, who traditionally oppose each other, united in 
opposition to its adoption, albeit for somewhat different reasons.  In the lead-up to the bill’s 
passage, opposition centered around the program which requires OFWs to have overseas 
worker insurance while working abroad.  The process and debates associated with 
mandatory OFW insurance, and the passage of RA 10022, provide an excellent case study 
for how Philippine migration policy is planned, shaped, and implemented, and will be dealt 
with at length in Chapter Five.   
Overview of Chapters 
The structures of chapters in this thesis explore government-business relations through 
both contemporary and historical migration policy-making case studies.  Throughout the 
chapters are embedded discussions of institutional arrangements, key interests of relevant 
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actors, policy arrangements, and current policy initiatives.  Chapters One through Five are 
arranged chronologically with Chapter Five covering the most recent events. In Chapters Six 
and Seven case studies of government-business relations are used, while Chapter Eight ties 
together findings and proposes future areas of research inquiry.  Throughout all the 
chapters there is a strong focus on both policy, and how the often antagonistic dynamic of 
government-business relations impacts particular policy developments over time and into 
the future.  In addition to the afore-mentioned explanation of the multi-disciplinary nature 
of this thesis, the issues surrounding the overseas employment program are complex and 
require analysis at multiple levels.  Unlike some government programs and policies, the 
overseas employment program is a domestic program that is inherently international, which 
means that on some matters the language of international relations and diplomacy will be 
useful to implement, while on other matters the language of public administration would be 
more appropriate.  The unique challenge this domestic-yet-international program creates 
will be overcome by exploring each part (the foreign and domestic) of the program 
individually, following this with macro level analysis of the program and national policy as a 
whole.   
Chapter Two provides the theoretical foundations for the study, based on analysis of the 
government-business relations framework.  This chapter will explore the historical centrality 
of external resources in the Philippines, and how modern remittances gained through 
overseas migration accords with this traditional reliance.  A brief discussion on the 
distinctiveness of the recruitment industry in the Philippine economy will be undertaken 
with a comparative look at other sectors of the economy.  In the process of exploring 
previous scholarship conducted on the relationships between government and business in 
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national economic development, some comparative examples of the developmental paths 
taken by Japan, Taiwan, and Korea will be explored.  From the case studies in this chapter, 
the acute need in the Philippines for a well-trained, empowered, central economic planning 
authority will become clear.  Lastly this chapter will situate this thesis within the broader 
discussion of government-business relations and the political economy of development. 
In Chapter Three a discussion is undertaken of the policy and legal framework of Philippine 
migration policy between 1974 and 1995.  It further explores the roles and actions of both 
the government (as previously defined) and the recruitment industry in creating and 
implementing the migration policies of that era.  The legal foundations for current migration 
policies are explored with special emphasis on the policy approaches pursued during the 
Marcos years and the immediate post-Marcos years.  This chapter will further discuss the 
institutional development of the migration bureaucracy, and how these institutions 
impacted both the program generally, and further complicated the government-business 
relationship.  There will also be a discussion of the role of sending agreements, as well as a 
brief discussion of other policy actors and their impact on policy. 
Chapter Four examines the period roughly from 1995 to 2001.  A great deal of attention will 
be given to the policy/legal framework of the Migrant Workers Act of 1995, a bill designed 
to better protect OFWs while working abroad.  A discussion of circumstances surrounding its 
creation and the various actor interests pursued during its rapid movement through the 
legislative process will illustrate the complexities of migration policy making in the 
Philippines.  As a case study, the 1995 act will illustrate a moment in time when 
government-business relations were under considerable strain as the government sought to 
shift blame away from themselves due to the public outcry over the execution of OFW Flor 
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Contemplacion in Singapore.  The ramifications of the act’s passage will be reviewed, as will 
the subsequent legal challenges made against the law in the Supreme Court.   
Covering 2002 to the present, Chapter Five explores the inception, creation, negotiations, 
and passage of a major revision to the Migrant Workers Act of 1995.  Although the material 
covered is the final chapter in the chronology of the thesis, this bill will be used as a case 
study to understand how current migration policies are being pursued, what interests are 
being manifested, whose policy perspectives are being adopted, whose are being ignored, 
and what motivates the current policy direction.  This case study demonstrates how far the 
migration policy-making process has come since the program’s inception in the early 1970.  
It further suggests what policy directions might be anticipated in the future.  The chapter 
also examines the impact of the global financial crisis on overseas migration and how policy 
makers have responded.   
Chapter Six deals with government-business relations on the international side of migration 
policy making.  Internationally, policy is being pursued through the signing of bilateral labor 
agreements between the Philippines and destination states.  This chapter will use several 
bilateral labor agreements as case studies to explore how government-business relations 
impact both the position of the Philippine government and their approach to these 
agreements.  The complex state of the Philippines’ negotiating position will be explored as 
well as the position of destination states in ongoing efforts to forge new bilateral labor 
agreements.  As the overseas employment program is inherently international, an 
explanation of both government and business responsibilities abroad will be provided, 
exploring how these responsibilities are tied to specific domestic or bilateral policies. 
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In Chapter Seven I will conduct a comparative analysis of government-business relations in 
migration policy by using the Republic of Korea as a case study.  Background of Korea’s 
migrant sending program will be given with special emphasis on the reasons for starting the 
program and how it was ultimately discontinued.  Beyond Korea, further comparisons will 
be made to the migrant sending programs in Indonesia.  By comparing the migration 
policies, and their place within the wider national economic development strategy, a model 
will be provided for how migration programs can be utilized for developmental outcomes. 
I will conclude my remarks in Chapter Eight by drawing together points discussed in all 
previous chapters, in order to draw broad actionable possibilities as well as to highlight 
areas of possible future research.  My conclusions will illustrate the dire need for policy 
makers to place the overseas employment program into the larger context of national 
economic development in the Philippines.  Policy recommendations provided in previous 
chapters will be condensed into a series of “necessary steps” for the policy makers.  The 
future of migration from the Philippines will be discussed in addition to prospects for either 
ending or enhancing the program and the structures which govern them.  Final conclusions 
will be placed within the context of the global debate on both migration for development, 
as well as the role of government-business relations in development.  In the end Chapter 
Eight offers recommendations for the future of overseas labor migration in the Philippines 
and how this remarkable program can work to the benefit of the entire nation. 
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Chapter Two: Maximizing Migration: Theoretical Approaches to Government-Business 
Relations in the Philippine Overseas Employment Program 
While conducting research for this project in Metro Manila I visited the Bureau of Labor and 
Employment Statistics (BLES) in Intramuros, the ancient Spanish walled fort city.  During the 
Spanish colonial era only Spaniards or mixed race ‘mestizos’ were granted entry to 
Intramuros, but on the day of my visit no one objected to my entry.  My goal was to retrieve 
any available statistical data on the recruitment industry in the Philippines, specifically 
sectoral data on revenues generated in the recruitment/manpower sector of the domestic 
economy.  I knew that recruitment industry data related to the sending and receiving of 
migrant workers was maintained by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration 
(POEA), but I wanted domestic data on the recruitment industry as it related to the national 
economy, or in other words as a sector of the national economy.  I presumed that a large 
industry, with approximately 1,500 licensed companies responsible for substantial direct 
and indirect (remittances) contributions to the national economy, will be tracked by the 
nation’s leading labor and employment statistical body.  After spending the better part of a 
day searching the archive, however, I was informed by the archivists that BLES did not have 
what I was looking for.  They recommended that I return to the POEA.  As Filipinos were 
denied entry into Intramuros during the Spanish era, a large sector of the domestic 
economy which employs thousands of Filipinos has been denied entry into official 
calculations of national employment and labor statistics. 
Premise for using the Government-Business Relations Framework  
This exclusion problem highlights confusion in the Philippines over how to classify the 
recruitment industry, or manpower sector as it is sometimes called.  Part of the confusion 
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likely comes from the two-level nature of the industry.  Most researchers, politicians, NGOs, 
and average citizens focus on what the industry does, but not what they are.  There are 
approximately 1,500 licensed land-based and maritime licensed recruiters operating in the 
Philippines.1  In addition to providing jobs abroad to over one million Filipinos per year, the 
industry provides thousands of jobs domestically as well as contributing to the national 
economy through taxes on revenues and profits.  This thesis will approach the recruitment 
industry in the same way other researchers have approached the study of key industrial 
sectors in other states.  Just as a development scholar might focus on the political economy 
of the high-technology manufacturing sector or sugar cultivation to understand their role in 
national economic development, I will focus on the recruitment industry’s role in national 
development through the lens of the government-business relations framework. 
As mentioned in Chapter One, the modern program of overseas worker migration did not 
start as a national development plan, although as of 2012 it has the appearance of such a 
plan.  Some have even gone as far as referring to the Philippines as a global model in using 
migration for national development.2  Research on remittances in the Philippines has 
proliferated in recent years, and with good reason.  In 2008, for example, remittances 
accounted for over 11 percent of national GDP.  The importance of migration and the 
resulting remittances to the national economy was brought into sharp focus in December 
2008 when President Arroyo, facing the global financial crisis, issued an administrative order 
instructing that “the POEA should be challenged by the challenging overseas employment 
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environment into crafting aggressive overseas employment strategies that defy the trend of 
a constricting job market.”3  She further instructed that the POEA to “execute a paradigm 
shift by refocusing its functions from regulation to full-blast markets development efforts, 
the exploration of frontier, fertile job markets for Filipino expatriate worker.”4  These 
statements are significant in that the official line from the presidential palace and other 
government sources generally denies the permanence or development-focus of the 
program.   Rather overseas migration is typically treated as one of many options available to 
Filipinos.  The ‘migration-is-a-choice’ framing is particularly exasperating to the millions of 
Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) who would prefer to earn good wages without needing to 
go abroad to work.  This thesis will be approached with the view that the overseas 
employment program is an integral component of the larger national development 
strategy.5 
Why should the government-business relations framework be used to explore the 
relationship between migration and development?  The key argument of the government-
business relations framework is that cooperation and coordination between the private and 
public sector is necessary for economic prosperity and developmental outcomes.  Scholars 
such as Peter Evans and others have argued that this collaborative relationship between the 
private and public sectors is a necessary component of what he calls the “developmental 
state.”6  Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s a great deal of academic attention was paid 
to this topic.  Scholars interested in comparative political economy have argued that the fast 
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industrializing states in East Asia, namely the Republic of Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore 
and less often Hong Kong, are quintessentially developmental states.  Through a 
combination of careful coordination, high level communication, and state management, 
these states have achieved remarkable economic progress in the years since World War II.  
Evans described the objective of government-business relations as an attempt to unravel 
the “state’s role in the earlier developmental agenda-industrial transformation and... to 
provide an analytical portrayal of the institutional characteristics that separated states 
which were more successful at this task from those that were less successful.”7  With a few 
minor adjustments I wish to apply this framework to my examination of government-
business relations within the overseas employment program as well as the relationship 
between the overseas employment program and national development.  While the 
government-business relations theorists equate ‘development’ with industrialization, for my 
purposes ‘development’ will be conceptualized as any improvement in the national 
economic outlook of the state especially in regard to improved economic ‘options’ for 
economic planners.  This will allow for the overseas employment program to reach its fullest 
potential.  To be clear, this project will not argue that migration in the Philippines is or is not 
a viable development strategy, but instead that as a program already in place it could be 
better utilized for developmental outcomes.  The application of the government-business 
relations framework helps to elucidate the case. 
Defining Government 
Government for the purposes of this research refers to the legislative, executive, and 
judicial branches of the national government as well as the bureaucracy.  The executive 
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branch has historically taken a lead role in policy formulation of the overseas employment 
program.  Since the introduction of the labor code in 1974 by President Marcos, the 
program was managed largely by presidential decree and executive orders.  It was not until 
1995, nearly ten years after the removal of Marcos, that the legislative branch took over the 
lead role in migration policy making.  The judicial branch has had very limited involvement in 
migration policy, although they have weighed in from time to time in a few important cases 
involving migrant workers.   
For the purposes of this thesis the primary bureaucratic entity of concern is the POEA, 
although the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Department of Foreign Affairs 
(DFA), Overseas Worker Welfare Administration (OWWA), National Economic Development 
Authority (NEDA), BLES, Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO), and the Central Bank also 
have important roles related to the overseas employment program.  Chart 2.1 below 
provides additional information on how bureaucratic responsibilities in the implementation 
of the overseas employment program are dispersed.  As seen in chart 2.1, the POEA takes 
on the role as primary body in charge of managing the overseas employment program.  
Despite its role as ‘lead agency’ the POEA’s advice and expertise is often ignored by the 
legislature as we will see in the case study described in Chapter Six.   
Much attention in the literature has revolved around the nature and quality of the 
bureaucracy.  Evans has argued that “the state’s ability to support markets and capitalist 
accumulation depended on the bureaucracy being a corporately coherent entity in which 
individuals see furtherance of corporate goals as the best means of maximizing their 
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individual self-interest.”8  Japan, Korea, and Taiwan are frequently cited as having 
competent and developmentally oriented bureaucracies.  These states all share a tradition 
of a highly professional bureaucracy able to “pick its staff from among the most talented 
members from among the most talented members of the most prestigious universities.”9  
Evans takes the importance of the bureaucracy one additional step, emphasizing the 
importance of the informal networks created among those coming up the bureaucratic 
ranks.  He argues that “meritocratic recruitment via elite universities and the existence of a 
strong organizational ethos creates the potential for constructing...solidary interpersonal 
networks within the bureaucracy.”10  Professionalism and competence seem to be key 
determinants in the bureaucracy’s ability to act independently.  Citing the example of the 
Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) Evans argues:  
If MITI were not autonomous in the sense of being capable of independently 
formulating its own goals and able to count on those who work within it to 
see implementing these goals as important to their individual careers, then it 
would have little to offer the private sector.  MITI’s relative autonomy is what 
allows it to address the collective action problems of private capital, helping 
capital as a whole to reach solutions that would be hard to attain otherwise, 
even within the highly organized Japanese industrial system.11 
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Chart 2.1: Philippine Overseas Employment Program Organizational Chart 
  
Source12  
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Whether discussing the POEA or any other part of the national bureaucracy, the Philippines 
has a long way to go in order to achieve the same level of competence.  Exactly what steps 
should be taken to improve the Philippine bureaucracy are beyond the scope of this 
research, though some examples of structures in place in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan will be 
given hereafter and might serve broadly as a useful role model. 
Beyond its lack of a meritocratic recruitment system, the Philippine bureaucracy is plagued 
by even more basic structural problems which act as impediments to reaching the levels of 
competence emphasized by Evans.  Paul Hutchcroft explains that “while all states possess 
patrimonial features to some degree, it is clear that there is a particularly large gap between 
the Philippine state and the archetypal bureaucratic state, where there is one objective law 
for all and administration is conducted without respect for persons.”13  Both Hutchcroft and 
Evans draw upon Weber’s notion that “advanced forms of capitalism require an 
administrative and legal structure able to promote ‘political and procedural 
predictability’.”14  Overall it would seem that the Philippine ‘oligarchy-dominated 
bureaucracy’ is burdened by the patrimonial nature of politics in the Philippines.   
However, the POEA has made great strides at managing the overseas employment program 
in a coherent and focused way.  There are three contributing factors to the relative success 
the POEA has achieved since its formation in 1982.  First, it could be argued that the POEA 
had little choice but to improve its own operation as the overseas employment program has 
grown bigger year by year, seeing an ever greater number of workers processed through its 
doors.  This motivation-by-logistics has seen the responsibilities of the agency increase in 
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addition to the rapid rise in workload requisite with the ever increasing numbers going 
abroad for work.  Second, the program is a highly visible area of government policy that 
touches the lives either directly or indirectly of tens of millions of Filipinos, and is thus a 
motivating factor for politicians to demand a more responsive bureaucracy.  News stories of 
worker abuses abroad, or program mismanagement domestically, generally reflect badly on 
Malacañang and the legislature rather than the POEA itself.  Politicians in the legislature and 
executive then apply pressure to the POEA and related bureaucratic entities to improve 
processes.  Evidence of this can be seen in the behaviors of politicians seeking office.  A few 
senators have even taken to campaigning overseas in addition to taking firm positions on 
related issues that are important to OFWs.  The recent efforts to extend voting rights to 
OFWs also highlights the ever increasing political clout the overseas employment program 
has in Philippine politics.  Public perception thus motivates politicians into action which 
generally means new operating policies for the POEA.  A third reason for the POEA’s success 
has been institutional expertise developed through a clearly mandated set of 
responsibilities.  The POEA is good at what it does, because it has a narrow set of defined 
responsibilities.  Many of the failings in the program as a whole happen in the policy overlap 
areas, or the areas between which the POEA shares responsibility with related agencies.  
This third point will be discussed later in the chapter. 
Defining Business 
Many of the case studies described in the government-business relations literature deal 
with industries or economic sectors with relatively few participants, but private sector 
participants in the overseas employment program in the Philippines are both diverse and 
numerous.  In the case of the overseas employment program, as previously mentioned, 
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there are approximately 1,500 licensed recruitment agencies of all sizes actively deploying 
contract workers around the world.  In order to approach this large industry I will draw upon 
the ‘typology of business’ for government-business relations study developed by Haggard, 
Maxfield, and Schnieder.15  Their typology breaks down five distinct framings or 
classifications that help theorize ‘business’ as a concept.  The categories of their typology 
include capital, firm, sector, association, and network.   
The first category, business-as-capital reviews how and by whom investment is made, how 
the government can be affected by said investment and how government policies can 
encourage or discourage further investment.  Some scholars have focused intensely on “the 
constraining effects of uncoordinated private-investment decisions on government decision 
making.”16  The capital aspect involved in the recruitment industry should not be 
understated.  It is ultimately investment by the recruitment industry in developing new job 
markets for overseas workers that generates growth both in industry revenues as well as in 
terms of total workers deployed overseas, ultimately affecting national remittance figures.  
Recruitment agencies profits are not only determined by the number of deployments they 
make, thus their perpetual search for new markets for workers, but also by finding better 
paying jobs for OFWs, as they are more profitable than low-skill, low-pay jobs.  Haggard et 
al. describes the strategic dilemma of cooperation between business-as-capital and 
government when the aforementioned lack of ‘political and procedural predictability’ exists 
in a state. 
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If business and government are able to cooperate and reach stable 
compromises, the restraining effects of private control over investment 
decisions and capital movements can be mitigated.  One problem in reaching 
such understandings is that each player is uncertain about the other’s future 
behaviour.  If government makes concessions with respect to taxation, 
regulation, or wages, investors may not respond.  Conversely, private agents 
may fear that political calculations will prevent the government from keeping 
its commitments to sustain a profitable business environment.17 
This uncertainty sentiment, especially from the recruitment industry as we will see in future 
chapters, is a particularly potent motivating factor in how recruiters conduct business and 
approach investment.  The industry generally views policies as punitive to business, thus 
fostering an atmosphere of fear.  This may ultimately be a contributing factor to many of the 
less generous or attractive aspects of industry practices. 
The next model, business-as-sector, emphasizes the “structural sources of divergent 
business interests” when viewing single sectors within the economy or multiple economic 
sectors within economies as a whole.18  Haggard et al. explains that “the implicit model of 
politics in most sectoral approaches is one of rent seeking, lobbying, or “vulgar” pluralism in 
which policy favors are exchanged on the political market for various forms of support; 
institutional mediations are of limited significance.”19  Although difficult to uncover, these 
conditions exist between the recruitment sector and government much in the same way 
they exist throughout the Philippine bureaucracy, and all levels of government.  One 
difference however in the recruitment sector compared with other economic sectors 
studies by scholars is the high number of actors.  With approximately 1,500 recruitment 
agencies there is a wide range of competing interests, and sector consensus toward 
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government policy is rarely universal.  The large and fragmented pool of participants in the 
sector creates a collective-action obstacle to the methods employed by sectors with a lower 
number of large participants who each exercise a greater share in the collective sectoral 
will.  Low entry barriers are the primary reason for the high number of participants in the 
recruitment industry.  Many returned OFWs use their overseas earnings, and newly 
acquired overseas connections, to set up their own agencies when they return home.   
The Business-as-firm model deals with the “size, horizontal diversification, and patterns of 
financing” of the business research subjects.  This mode of inquiry has its roots in the large 
conglomerates that exist in East Asian economies, such as the Korean chaebol.20  These 
mega-firms are diversified across a broad range of industries, not all of which are necessarily 
related or complementary.  Because these large firms account for significant portions of a 
state’s economy they also can wield tremendous political power.  Size then is also key to 
this research model.  I have already discussed how the lack of key powerful firms in the 
recruitment sector can be attributed to the high number of participant firms which acts a 
control over any one agency becoming dominant or excessively large.   
In light of the fragmentation within the recruitment sector and the subsequent collective 
action challenges this fragmentation causes, the business-as-associations approach is 
particularly useful.  Haggard et al. provides two reasons for adopting an ‘association’ based 
focus to the study of government-business relations:  
First, business associations can maximize the positive effects of government-
business collaboration by limiting the pursuit of particularistic benefits.  
Second, associations can promote collective self-governance of business, or 
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private-interest governance, that can be equally if not more efficient and 
effective than direct state intervention or regulation.21 
 
There are two main recruitment (manpower) associations in the Philippines, Filipino 
Association for Mariners’ Employment Inc. (FAME), and the Philippine Association of Service 
Exporters Inc. (PASEI).  Fame focuses exclusively on maritime (sea-based or ‘manning’) 
recruitment agencies while PASEI focuses primarily on land-based recruitment.  Although 
these two associations account for the bulk of the industry, not all recruiters have chosen to 
join them.  PASEI, for example, has around 700 members leaving nearly 300 land-based 
licensed recruitment agencies unaccounted for.   
Haggard et al. utilize Mancur Olson’s work to address the issue in that “common interests 
do not necessarily lead to effective organization or concerted political action because of the 
free-rider problem.”22  In understanding business-as-association relations between the 
recruitment sector and the state the issue of free riders within associations is particularly 
important.  The issue of size and scope once again become key to our understanding.  In 
contrast to the situation within the recruitment industry scholars have argued that small 
associations are best for successfully translating collective will into collective action.  In 
contrast to the large number of firms in the recruitment industry,  
Smaller numbers of firms, especially large firms, can monitor each other and 
either sanction free riders or absorb the costs of organization…however, the 
relationship between size and business organization may not be linear.  
Where business is highly concentrated, economic ministers and capitalists 
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controlling a large proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) can all sit at 
the same dinner table.23 
This is clearly not possible with the recruitment industry as it exists today, nevertheless, the 
associations could potentially overcome the free-rider problem and achieve more effective 
policy outcomes through their collective-action efforts with the state. 
One drawback to the business-as-association approach is its failure to include coverage for 
informal networks, otherwise known as the business-as-network model.  This model is 
highly appropriate to be used in a Philippine context as it focuses on ‘social constructions of 
trust and collaboration’.24  The Philippines has complex social networks of kinship ties, 
patrimonial relationships, and reciprocity that exist across all spectrums of Philippine society 
from political and business relationships to family social contexts.25  Hutchcroft has explored 
the clientelistic nature of politics in the Philippines, though his conclusions fit just as easily 
beyond the political spectrum into business and social situations.26 
It is important next to bring in Evans’ second attribute necessary for developmental state 
bureaucracies after Weberian structures, what he calls ‘embedded autonomy’. 27 Evans’ 
“notion of embedded autonomy encompasses both the networks linking bureaucrats and 
capitalists (thus “embedded”) as well as the internal organizational characteristics of the 
bureaucracy that give it independence.”28  Embeddedness then is synonymous with network 
(in this sense government-business), and a vitally important concept when seeking to 
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understand both the bureaucracy and the private sector.  Both must be given a sufficient 
level of autonomy to conduct their affairs according to their best ability, but both need to be 
embedded in networks that bind them together.  When embedded autonomy is present in 
the bureaucracy and business “trust and cooperation can emerge where interaction is 
repeated, information on participants is abundant, relations are multifaceted, and 
participants do not discount the future too much.”29  Successful network relationships: 
can promote the two-way flow of information between government and 
private sector, which in turn enhances policy design and subsequent 
adjustment.  To the extent that networks build reciprocity and trust, they 
benefit the economic policy process by lowering transactions costs between 
government and business and minimizing the likelihood of policy stalemates.  
Networks are also beneficial to the extent that they increase transparency 
because this raises the costs of individual rent seeking.30   
Trust is seriously lacking in government-business relations in the overseas employment 
program, much in the same way that predictability is lacking.  The politically sensitive nature 
of a government-controlled program that deploys workers beyond the scope of its own 
jurisdiction is a persistent obstacle to changing the nature of the government-business 
relations from one that is highly adversarial to one of cooperation and communication.31 
Of the five models described by Haggard et al, this research will rely heavily on a 
combination of the business-as-association and the business-as-network models.  To a 
lesser extent the business-as-capital and the business-as-firm models will be used primarily 
in their focuses on firm size and investment decision making.  As the business-as-sector 
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approach seems geared more toward sectors with a few very large key players, the model 
for this project seems less useful.   
Situating the Philippine State: Predatory, Developmental, or Intermediate  
In conjunction with the government-business relations literature, scholars have attempted 
to create a typology of how state structures and practices interact for developmental 
outcomes.32  Evans argues that there are three distinct types that the states fall into when 
assessing how ‘developmental’ they are structurally and procedurally.  He cites Zaire 
(modern day Democratic Republic of the Congo) under Mobutu as a “textbook case of a 
predatory state in which the preoccupation of the political class with rent-seeking has 
turned society into its prey.”33  As Hutchcroft demonstrates, the Philippines clearly has some 
common characteristics with the “kleptopatrimonial” nature of Mobutu era Zaire, but to a 
much less severe extent with the possible exception of the Marcos era.34  On a kleptocracy 
scale with zero representing a totally un-kleptocratic state, and ten representing Mobutu 
era Zaire, the Philippines would likely fall somewhere in the 5-7 range.   The post-Marcos era 
has seen kleptocratic activities decentralized and accessible by a broader set of elites, but 
unfortunately not completely removed from political life, as we saw with the Presidency of 
Joseph Estrada.35  For Evans, predatorily structured states are antithetical to development 
as leaders have little motivation in organizing the state to meet development objectives 
rather than self-enrichment.   
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The Evans typology refers to the ‘ideal-type’ arrangement of state structures as ‘the 
development state’.  Developmental states are those with a balanced mix of provident 
governance, national economic goal setting, and strict adherence to the rule of law in 
conducting both public and private affairs between business and government.  In his case 
studies on Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, Evans emphasizes the need for provident governance 
in order to truly be a model developmental state.  These three states have enacted policies 
over a series of decades with an eye to overall national development goals.  In other words, 
there has been consistency over a long period of time in economic development policy 
which has informed the actions of both the state apparatus as well as the business 
community.  In the Korean case, Evans points to the  
relatively privileged position held by a single pilot agency, the Economic 
Planning Board (EPB).  Headed by a deputy prime minister, the EPB was 
chosen by Park [Chung Hee] to be a “superagency” in the economic area.  Its 
power to coordinate economic policy through control of the budgetary 
process is enhanced by mechanisms like the Economic Ministers Consultation 
Committee and by the fact that its managers are often promoted into 
leadership positions in other ministries.36 
Similar situations existed in Japan with the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI) and Taiwan with the Council on Economic Planning and Development (CEPD).  Evans 
argues that “the existence of a given agency with generally acknowledged leadership in the 
economic area allows for the concentration of talent and expertise and gives economic 
policy a coherence that it lacks in a less clearly organized state apparatus.”37  The 
importance of having a central economic planning agency with sufficient power to keep the 
state on a firm developmental track is a crucial component of truly developmental states. 
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The Philippines has the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), which holds 
a similar mandate to the equivalent bodies in East Asia, but wields far less power over 
policy.  Gerardo P. Sicat, Marcos-era NEDA head, has expressed concerns about its relative 
decline in prominence under the Arroyo administration, during which  
the agency’s independence and integrity have been compromised. At the 
very least, it seems that under Arroyo, NEDA and its director general are 
again being sidelined, if not marginalized, on matters that fall within their 
mandate, particularly seen as being less important in relation to the 
president’s economic team — which consists of the secretaries of the 
Department of Finance (DOF), Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), and 
Department of Budget and Management (DBM).38 
 
In NEDA’s 2004-2010 medium-term development plan, a 315-page document, the overseas 
employment program is only mentioned briefly in two short paragraphs despite the fact 
that remittances resulting from the program account for over 11 percent of national GDP in 
2008.39  NEDA’s planning and research capacities may be of the highest caliber, but if the 
agency lacks the autonomy to control the direction of national economic policy 
developmental outcomes will likely be fragmented.  Likewise if the central economic agency 
like NEDA is not sufficiently embedded within the government and business alike, another 
crucial developmental component will be missing. 
It is in his analysis of the Japanese, Korean and Taiwan case studies that Evans finds the 
strongest support for his idea of the importance of embedded autonomy.  He highlights the 
traditions shared among all three developmental states of a professional bureaucracy that is 
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autonomous structurally with authority to make decisions, but also embedded with business 
and other government areas.  As mentioned previously, these bureaucracies are also able to 
pick from among the brightest graduates of top universities.40  Evans explains that: 
This embedded autonomy is the mirror image of the incoherent absolutist 
domination of the predatory state and constitutes the organizational key to 
the effectiveness of the developmental state.  Embedded autonomy depends 
on an apparently contradictory combination of Weberian bureaucratic 
insulation with intense immersion in the surrounding social structure.  How 
this contradictory combination is achieved depends, of course, on both the 
historically determined character of the state apparatus and the nature of 
the social structure in which it is embedded.”41 
 
So what benefits then come from this ideal mix of embedded autonomy?  In the case of the 
three Asian tigers the central economic planning bodies have been able to collaborate with 
business in achieving national development goals by supporting private sector efforts to 
break into new markets, or expand capacities.  The miraculous economic growth seen in 
East Asia is the result of careful planning by central economic authorities with the full 
cooperation of the private sector who together achieved more than either could have 
possibly hoped to achieve individually.  The state in the East Asian case studies used 
numerous methods of encouragement, threat, enticements, to motivate business into 
moving in the direction they wanted.  In describing government-business relations in Korea, 
MacIntyre highlighted various methods of government influence on business.  He described 
government licensing control over entry into certain industries, “the state’s role in 
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negotiating price levels for a wide range of key commodities”, and even threats of punitive 
‘reviews’ of paid taxes.42  Beyond these MacIntyre argues that: 
the single most important economic instrument in the hands of planning 
authorities was the control over access to credit facilities.  With capital 
markets largely undeveloped, business in South Korea has relied very heavily 
on the banking sector for the procurement of long-term finance.  An 
important consequence of this is that Korea’s industrial conglomerates have 
been very highly leveraged, with debt-equity ratios unimaginable in Western 
economies. This extraordinary level of dependence rendered business highly 
vulnerable to government arm-twisting as all the major commercial banks 
were government controlled.  With off-shore borrowing prohibited unless 
specially approved, no company could afford to earn the displeasure of the 
government.43 
Thus we see that the lesson to be learned from the ‘developmental state’ type of state 
structure is that selective intervention by the state is common, by highly specialized 
autonomous economic planning bodies in an effort to steer the private sector in a direction 
that matches desired national developmental outcomes. 
The third category described by Evans fall into a category that he calls “intermediate 
cases.”44  He uses the examples of Brazil and India and explains that these cases “are neither 
purely predatory nor consistently developmental.”45  The Philippines, in the post-Marcos 
era, but before the Asian financial crisis in 1997, likely fit this type of structural framing.  As 
described earlier, the Philippine state faces continual challenges with patrimonialism, 
clientelism, and corruption, but has many of the structural requirements necessary in 
developmental states in place.  Like Brazil, in the Philippines “the efficiency of 
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government...was dependent...on the cooperation of the landed oligarchy.”46  Evans 
highlighted an aspect of Brazil’s ‘intermediate’ case that applies to the situation in the 
Philippines when he said that: 
Problems created by divisions in dominant economic elites were reinforced 
by the nature of state structures.  The lack of a stable bureaucratic structure 
also made it harder to establish regularized ties with the private sector of the 
administrative guidance sort and pushed public-private interaction into 
individualized channels.47  
Some of the individualized channels that have developed as result of this situation within 
the overseas employment program will be highlighted in Chapter Four.   
A final important point in discussing the ‘developmental’ nature of the Philippine state 
involves exploring the targeted developmental outcomes the state sets out to achieve.  The 
problems of the Philippine bureaucracy come not from a lack of necessary institutions but 
instead a problem of capacity within these institutions.  Evans again offers insight into the 
mistakes made by states seeking to become more developmental in this regard: 
Almost all Third World states try to do more than they are capable of doing.  
The contrasting balance of capacity and tasks that separates India and Brazil 
from the East Asian developmental states illustrates the point.  The 
developmental states not only had higher levels of capacity but exercised 
greater selectivity in the tasks they undertook.  They focused on industrial 
transformation and their strategies of promoting industry were designed to 
conserve administrative resources.48 
This characterization often reflects the nature of economic planning in the Philippines, as 
well as planning within the overseas employment program, where grand overarching goals 
are articulated over more realistic incremental goal setting.  It is this point about capacity 
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and economic development planning that supports the argument for better utilizing the 
overseas employment program for development.  The program is already tremendously 
important to the national economy, and relatively sophisticated in terms of implementation 
and achieving program objectives both in the private sector as well as state management of 
the program.  Why then should national economic development goals not include overseas 
migration?  I am arguing that the overseas employment program can be better utilized 
through improved government-business coordination in order to contribute to national 
development.  This in turn would give planners the ability to move toward increased 
domestic industrialization and possibly even the eventual discontinuance of the program 
entirely—or at the very least making overseas labor migration an ‘option’ rather than a 
necessity.   
Overall Characterization of Government-Business Relations and Development Policy (or 
lack thereof) 
As mentioned earlier the primary objective of the government-business relations framework 
is to specify the necessary ingredients within a state for successful industrialization.  This 
research is instead applying the theoretical framework to improving the overseas 
employment program for greater developmental outcomes.  The jury is clearly still out on 
utilizing migration for national development purposes, but there is strong research support 
for the case that when overseas labor migration can be leveraged for developmental 
outcomes, such efforts can contribute to those ends.  This thesis is not seeking to contribute 
to this ongoing debate, but instead to focus on making improvements to a large national 
labor program.  This program has all of the appearances of a development strategy, with the 
goal that program improvements would result in economic developmental benefits that 
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could provide Philippine economic planners with greater flexibility in the future to pursue 
multiple developmental options.  The idea then is to supplement the goal of 
‘industrialization’ with ‘maximized overseas migration potential’ for national development.  
This makes sense considering the capacity to achieve this goal is already in place, as 
opposed to the capacity for rapid industrialization, which is most certainly not in place.  As 
we learned from Evans above, states must not be overly ambitious in unrealistically setting 
their economic developmental agenda.  Today other states are seeking to emulate the 
overseas employment program management structures used in the Philippines.49  While 
working in Manila researching this project, I encountered more than one person who spoke 
with pride in describing the Philippines as a ‘model migrant sending country’.  It would 
therefore be prudent to take this development-strategy-like program and make the most of 
it. 
The story shared at the beginning of this chapter highlights the challenge to thinking about 
the recruitment industry as a contributing sector of the economy.  The reality, however, is 
that few industrial sectors contribute as much to national GDP as does the recruitment 
industry.  In fact the industry has more than one method of contribution, with the industry 
providing jobs and revenues domestically in addition to the enormous impact of remittances 
generated from the services they offer.  One of the first steps then is convincing statistical 
data organizations like BLES to track the contribution of the recruitment sector to the 
economy.  NEDA must also address the recruitment industry in its economic development 
plans in the same way it would any other national sector of the economy.  Ignoring the 
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industry in economic planning and statistical reporting presents an incomplete picture of 
the national economy. 
Government-Business Relations in Migration and the Challenges of Regulation 
In any comprehensive analysis, it is important to identify the strengths as well as the 
challenges to a particular theoretical approach.  In applying the government-business 
relations framework to the employment program a number of challenges become apparent.  
One of the first challenges to utilizing this approach is the fragmented nature of governance 
structures tasked with overseeing the overseas employment program.  Ostensibly, the 
overseas migrant worker program is managed domestically by the POEA, which falls under 
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).  However a number of aspects of the 
program are managed by related government agencies which include the Department of 
Foreign Affairs, the Overseas Worker Welfare Administration, the Department of Justice, the 
National Reintegration Center, the Commission on Filipinos Overseas, and the Bureau of 
Customs.  Migrant workers wishing to work overseas face a dizzying array of agencies that 
they must deal with and ultimately pass through in order to achieve their objectives.  The 
fragmented nature of program governance is thus a hindrance to maximizing efficiency 
within the program.  The complex governance structure also hinders communication and 
efforts to build networks between business and government.  Recruitment industry leaders 
may build strong networks with the POEA, but they also must navigate this bureaucratic 
maze if they wish to influence all of the program’s constituent parts.  Even after one has 
considered the many aspects of governance for the overseas employment program, it must 
be remembered that unlike the autonomy in policy making enjoyed by the central financial 
planning agencies described earlier in the chapter in Taiwan, Korea, and Japan, neither the 
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POEA nor any of the other related agencies have anything approaching the same level of 
policy-making autonomy to shape the direction of the program.  In the early days the policy 
direction of the program was controlled exclusively by the president.  In the post-Marcos 
period the Senate and House of Representatives have taken a larger policy making role.  In 
the Senate, the Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resource Development takes 
the lead in developing new program policies, with the Committee on Foreign Relations also 
playing a role.  In the House of Representatives the more specialized committee on 
Overseas Workers Affairs is dedicated to program policy formulation.  More information on 
the relationships between the House and Senate committees who oversee the overseas 
employment program, and how they interact with the bureaucracy and business, will be 
provided in the case study in Chapter Five. 
Economic planning organizations like MITI (Japan), EPB (Korea), and the CEPD (Taiwan) 
enjoyed higher levels of autonomy to enact policies.  This command-and-control authority 
seems to be one of the primary missing features of the overseas employment program.  
Those who are most likely to have expertise in the program itself are not the ones honing 
policy to meet goals and objectives, instead this task falls to politicians in the legislature and 
executive.  NEDA, as previously mentioned, has seen its ability to fill the central economic 
planning role diminished in recent years, as for the POEA, it has never had broad authority 
to manage the policy direction of the program.50  Clearly, questions of jurisdiction and 
policy-making authority within domestic program governance structures are a hindrance to 
more developmentally oriented government-business relations. 
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Another challenge is the international aspects of the program.  As the overseas employment 
program is inherently multinational in nature, government and business must deal with 
multiple regulatory regimes in each country in which workers are deployed.  For the 
recruitment industry this usually involves either being licensed to operate in that state, or 
partnering with local placement agencies.  The second option is more common than the first 
and includes an obvious loss of control for the recruitment agency.  The issue of partnering 
with foreign placement firms is risky for recruitment agencies as they can be held financially 
liable for the mistreatment of workers deployed through their agency.   Foreign 
governments can also complicate the process for the recruitment industry by requiring 
paperwork to be translated into local languages, or even establishing laws that require 
Philippine recruiters to partner with placement agencies operating in the destination state.  
This forced middle-man set-up increases the cost for the recruiters, and these costs are 
often passed along to the migrants themselves in the form of additional fees.  Chapter Five 
will elaborate this point, and include some of the strategies through which the recruitment 
industry has attempted to address these issues.  It can be said that the recruitment industry 
as an element of business must then deal with two government structures, the Philippine 
government and the government of the foreign state.   
Likewise, the unique challenges posed by the international aspects of the overseas 
employment program must be considered when applying the government-business 
relations framework to the issue of leveraging the program for developmental outcomes.  
Of primary concern to the Philippine government is the lack of jurisdiction it has over its 
citizens while working in destination states.  The demand from OFWs and their families back 
home that the government protect Filipino workers while abroad has heavily influenced 
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program policy making for the past 15 years.  The Philippine government has had only 
limited success in pursuing OFW protections through a variety of diplomatic means (as 
examined in Chapter Six).  The Philippine government is thus not only dealing with state-to-
state diplomatic efforts to manage migration, but they also must adjust to government-
foreign private employer relations in destination states.  This is true for both migrants who 
deploy from the Philippines through recruitment agencies, but especially for those workers 
who deploy through the POEA’s direct hire program (more on this in Chapter Six).  The 
government, like business, becomes dependent on the governments of destination states to 
fulfill their obligation to OFWs.  Needless to say this does not always happen.   
Limited government resources and distance also play a role in complicating the application 
of the government-business relations framework to the overseas employment program.  
The Philippine government has spent millions of dollars in setting up mechanisms to support 
overseas workers, but despite its efforts the number of problems faced by OFWs has not 
diminished.  Although this problem is serious, it is likely that once progress has been made 
maximizing the developmental impact of the program in other areas, the issue of limited 
resources to support OFWs will begin to resolve itself.  Through program maximization-for-
development, additional resources could be allocated to the programs that support OFWs 
while abroad.   
In order to overcome these difficulties the government-business relations framework will be 
assisted by the application of two-level game theory.  In his classic 1988 piece, Robert 
Putnam described two-level game theory as follows: 
The politics of many international negotiations can usefully be conceived as a 
two level game.  At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests 
by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians 
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seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups.  At the 
international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability 
to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of 
foreign developments.  Neither of the two games can be ignored by central 
decision-makers, so long as their countries remain interdependent, yet 
sovereign.51 
In context of this project, government-business relations must thus be explored at both 
levels, domestic and international.   
A final challenge to the application of the government-business relations framework is the 
non-industrial, non-commodity, service nature of the overseas employment program.  
Unlike the case studies used throughout the government-business relations literature, 
industrial manufacturing plays no role whatsoever in the overseas migration from the 
Philippines.  This however does not mean that the principles of the framework are not 
applicable.  The same developmental state structures described by Evans, Haggard and 
others have the potential to be broadly inspirational in enhancing developmental outcomes 
from the program to the nation as a whole.  After all few scholars would argue that the 
services offered at call centers in India have not been economically beneficial for 
developmental purposes.  Millions of Indians are now employed in the outsourcing sector of 
the Indian economy, which is clearly a service-based industry.  The government-business 
relations framework should not be constrained or limited by the nature of the industry or 
sector to which it is applied as the principles outlined coincide with sound principles of 
communication, coordination and cooperation, which have the potential to improve 
efficiency across a diverse range of economic sectors.  For the purposes of this research the 
notion that the overseas employment program, and especially the recruitment industry, 
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engage in a ‘commodification’ of OFWs will be acknowledged as an important perspective to 
consider, but not the primary means by which industry practices should be viewed.  This 
instead is a service based sector of the economy, which connects skilled and unskilled 
laborers to employers abroad facing labor shortages.  It does not appear that in the body of 
government-business relations literature anyone has argued that the theoretical principles 
outlined can only be applied to tangible goods-producing industries and not those which are 
service-based.  Concerns over the treatment, hiring, and firing of workers exist regardless of 
what sector of the economy is under review, be it service or manufacturing.  It seems then 
that analysis of government-business relations in the developmental state don’t necessarily 
focus on worker welfare, hence analysis of government-business relations in the Philippine 
overseas employment program don’t necessarily need to focus on worker welfare. 
Contributions to the Literature 
The government-business relations framework was a dominant perspective in research 
regarding the political economy of development from the late 1980s until the late 1990s.  It 
seems that attention was diverted somewhat by the ravages of the Asian financial crisis in 
1997, in an attempt to understand what caused the crisis.  There have been a few additional 
contributions to the literature in the post-financial crisis years by scholars such as Ravenhill, 
MacIntyre, and Haggard.  Throughout the body of literature there appears not to have been 
any attempts to apply the government-business relations framework to migration programs 
or even service-based economic sectors.  This new approach will test the adaptability of the 
framework to an untried set of variables and circumstances.  Key among the groundbreaking 
approaches to this theoretical application is the notion of achieving developmental 
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outcomes through non-industrial means.  This research will clearly test the robustness of 
the framework in handling service-based sectors.   
The business typologies outlined by Haggard et al. will also be tested for applicability in a 
sector quite different than those described in East Asian economies, namely the 
extraordinarily high number of participants in the recruitment industry in the Philippines.  In 
applying the government-business relations framework to the overseas employment 
program in the Philippines it is likely that additional applications for the framework will 
become clear.  In other words, by testing the framework in an untried, if not unusual, way it 
may be discovered that the framework has a plethora of applications not all of which need 
be necessarily directly tied to national developmental outcomes.  They can instead be 
applicable to making improvements in program effectiveness across a range of government 
plans and programs. 
A further contribution of this research is in bridging the gap between government-business 
relations literature and the literature looking at out-migration as a development strategy.  
There is a hotly contested debate raging among migration and development scholars over 
how migration should best be utilized, or if it should be approached as a development 
strategy.  This research falls neatly between the original premise of government-business 
relations in understanding how states can achieve industrialization and the notion that 
states can achieve developmental objectives through effective out-migration programs.  My 
argument does not advocate that out-migration is or should be the Philippines national 
development strategy.  Rather, as previously mentioned, I assert that it has all of the 
appearances of a development strategy and is a major source of national income and should 
therefore be maximized for the best possible benefit for those involved, and, if possible, for 
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the nation as a whole.  Clearly a better understanding of government-business relations in 
Philippine migration can only serve to increase our understanding of what national 
developmental outcomes can or cannot be accomplished through an efficient out-migration 
program. 
An additional approach of this research project, which may or may not have previously been 
utilized by scholars, is the combination and collaboration of two research methods: the 
government-business relations framework and two-level game theory.  While the 
government-business relations framework clearly has its roots in comparative political 
economy studies and two-level game theory has a firm foundation in International 
Relations, they seem to complement each other very nicely when applied to the unique 
circumstances of the overseas employment program.  The Philippines clearly can benefit 
from comparative analysis of how other Asian states have achieved developmental 
outcomes, and the inherently international nature of the overseas employment program 
demands attention from an International Relations perspective.  This combination may have 
further applicability with research on export industries as well as international trade 
relations.   
Contributions to the Political Economy of Development in the Philippines  
Migration from the Philippines, as mentioned in Chapter One, has been going on since the 
time of the Spanish, but in the years since 1974 it has become an integral part of Philippine 
economic, social, and political culture.  There are many voices involved in the debate over 
the overseas employment program, from NGOs advocating for its end, to recruitment 
agencies calling for de-regulation and an end to the government’s ‘anti-business’ policies.  
Whether overseas migration is or is not a choice for the millions of Filipinos involved, the 
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reality is that they work overseas and there are not a sufficient number of jobs being 
created domestically to meet demand or population growth rates.   
As already mentioned the Philippine state has a historical dependence on external 
resources, with remittances taking on the dependency mantle since the 1991 closing of U.S. 
military bases and the subsequent reduction in foreign aid.52  Remittances in 2005 
accounted for nearly 14 percent of national GDP, before dropping back to just over 11 
percent in 2008.  Remittances have increased steadily since the inception of the overseas 
employment program.   
The importance of remittances to the Philippine economy has grown tremendously since 
1974, and seems to be showing no signs of decreasing.  Even in the face of a global financial 
crisis, the overseas employment program, despite initial fears that OFWs would face layoffs 
overseas, has seen growth continue in both numbers of workers deployed as well as the 
remittances they send home.53  The IMF has even attributed the record high remittance 
inflows into the country in 2009 as a reason the Philippines has been sheltered from some 
of the worst aspects of the global financial crisis.54  These points all illustrate the need for 
greater understanding and research effort into maximizing program benefits for national 
development purposes.  This research will thus contribute to the literature on the political 
economy of development in the Philippines. 
This project is motivated greatly by the prospect of offering meaningful recommendations 
to policy makers on how the overseas employment program can be maximized for greater 
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efficiency as well as possible contributions to national developmental objectives.  Through 
the case studies undertaken, this research will identify opportunities for improvements in 
collaboration and cooperation between business and government in managing the overseas 
employment program.  Once the program is operating at peak efficiency the next steps on 
the road to national development will clearly fall beyond the scope of this project, but it is 
hoped that at this point there will truly be choices available to national economic planners.  
In Chapter Three, the government-business framework will be applied to government-
business relations in the overseas employment program from its inception in the early 
1970s to 1994. 
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Chapter Three: Government-Business Relations in the Migration Industry, 1974 to 1994 
This chapter examines the foundations of the modern Philippine overseas migration 
program through the lens of the government-business relations framework introduced in 
the previous chapter.  The evolution of the overseas employment program will be explored 
primarily through the policy foundations and major policy shifts that have taken place over 
the first twenty years of the program’s existence.  Major policy developments and shifts will 
be placed into the context of relevant developments in Philippine society and politics from 
the promulgation of the overseas employment program in 1974, through the post-Marcos 
era to 1994.  By exploring program trajectories at key policy moments across the program’s 
first two decades, insight will be gained into how government and business interacted in 
efforts to improve program and developmental outcomes.  In the subsequent review it will 
become clear that government-business relations in the early years of the overseas 
migration program were often contentious in contrast to the more coordinated efforts 
among the East Asian tigers as described in Chapter Two.  It will also become clear that the 
program has evolved piece by piece with no single objective or overarching goal as to what 
the long-term objectives should be. 
Policy/Legal Framework for the Overseas Migration Program 
As described in Chapter One, the Philippines as a nation has a long tradition of its people 
going abroad to find new opportunities.  Prior to 1974 migration from the Philippines 
occurred organically without any well-established governmental program.  From 1970 the 
number of migrant laborers leaving the country began to steadily increase (see Table 3.1 
below).  It was during the early 1970s that the so-called ‘oil boom’ occurred in the Middle 
East with enormous infrastructure projects that required large numbers of laborers.  
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Economic conditions in the Philippines during this time were also highly conducive to 
laborers seeking employment elsewhere.  Martial law had been imposed in September 
1972, and there was growing armed insurgency in the countryside, an exploding population 
growth rate (3.1 percent annually between 1965 and 1974), high unemployment and 
underemployment, low rates of savings and investment, ever increasing reliance on foreign 
aid and external loans, high inflation and recurring government budget deficits.1  Clearly 
there were many problems in the country during the early 1970s which provided ample 
rationale for workers to leave. 
Prior to 1974, as opportunities were identified in the Middle East and elsewhere, 
recruitment agencies began to spring-up in order to find workers to fill overseas labor 
contracts.  Precise numbers of recruitment agencies during the early 1970s were not kept as 
no formal licensing process or regulatory agency yet existed.  Interviews with industry 
leaders has shown that there were perhaps somewhere between 20 and 50 recruitment 
agencies during early years.2 
The 1974 Labor Code  
On May 1, 1974 President Marcos issued Presidential Decree 442, otherwise known as The 
Labor Code of the Philippines.  Secretary of Labor Blas Ople, who served from 1967-1986, is 
widely acknowledged as having been a key contributor to the creation of the new law.  
Although the labor code had wider implications for labor and employment across the 
country, of primary interest for this project was its formalization of overseas migration 
within the realm of government oversight.  Instead of an organically grown phenomenon, 
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overseas migration would instead be the prerogative, at least supposedly, of government 
planners and regulators.  It is unclear why Marcos decided to regulate this promising new 
industry.  Considering the high unemployment and underemployment figures, it seems 
logical that increased overseas worker migration could act as a pressure relief valve.  It was 
during this early stage of formalizing the overseas migration phenomenon into a 
government-managed program that it was described as a temporary ‘option’ for Filipino 
workers.  This program, originally intended to be temporary, has now become a permanent 
fixture in Philippine political, economic, and social culture, and shows no signs of drawing to 
a close anytime soon.   
As explained in Chapter Two, one of the key ingredients of the successful convergence 
between government and business in achieving meaningful progress in national economic 
development is coordination and cooperation in both planning and implementation of 
economic policy objectives.  Unlike the dedicated government agencies in Japan, Korea, and 
Taiwan, which facilitated long-term economic planning and coordinated with business and 
industry leaders in achieving national economic objectives, the Marcos administration 
established developmentally focused institutions only to ignore them while he and his 
cronies plundered the nation.  In order to achieve national economic development Marcos 
ostensibly embarked on a program of export-oriented industrialization (EOI) to which 
overseas migration was only perceived as a ‘stop-gap’, ‘temporary’ measure to relieve 
unemployment until demand for Philippine exports picked up (more on this below).  It 
would thus be discontinued once exports met their targets.  The lack of focused program 
objectives and target outcomes has proved problematic since the program was conceived.  
Philippine labor scholar Rene Ofreneo explained that “the argument for the migration-EOI 
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transition was seductively simple – the turning point would occur once the EOI succeeded in 
pushing domestic employment and wages upward.”3  It will be shown throughout this 
chapter and thesis that each successive administration has followed this same basic strategy 
of viewing migration merely as a ‘side-show’ to EOI, proclaimed to be the ‘main event’ in 
national economic development policy.  Unfortunately, as argued by Emmanuel de Dios, the 
EOI strategy was merely a ruse to enable Marcos to continue accessing international loans 
while, “the issue of the development strategy could be essentially avoided.”4  In hindsight, it 
is clear that cronyism was the ‘main event’. 
The 1974 labor code turned what had been an informal, mostly unregulated industry into a 
fully government-run program.  New agencies were created within the bureaucracy to 
manage various aspects of the program.  New fee structures were imposed on prospective 
workers under the guise of protecting their rights and expanding their opportunities.  Of 
particular importance was Marcos’ decision to nationalize overseas migration, sidelining the 
recruitment agencies who had achieved such remarkable growth in the industry in the years 
preceding 1974 (Table 3.1 below).  Marcos, and his inner circle of cronies, may have thought 
that government control would give them freer access to the spoils associated with placing 
workers overseas.  A more benevolent rationale could have been that it was done in order 
to ensure better protection for workers from the abuses that were already common within 
the recruitment industry.  Gonzalez explained that “Marcos thought that he could use the 
Philippines’ surplus manpower and the high demand labor from oil-producing countries.”5  
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Some insight into how Marcos saw migration within the larger national developmental 
economic context can be found in certain of his speeches.  In 1982 Marcos said: 
For us, overseas employment addresses two major problems: unemployment 
and the balance of payments position.  If these problems are met or at least 
partially solved by contract migration, we also expect an increase in national 
saving and investment levels.  In the long run, we also expect that overseas 
employment will contribute to the acquisition of skills essential to the 
development of the country’s industrial base.6 
Tigno explained that “there was a large (and growing) section of the population 
discontented with the local situation and a government that wanted to dissipate this 
discontent by projecting a possible alternative, i.e., overseas employment.”7  Considering 
the ongoing separatist and communist insurgencies in the countryside, rising 
unemployment and rampant inflation could have further exacerbated the situation.  Marcos 
must have understood how the benefits of an overseas labor migration program 
outweighed the risks, and his gamble seemed to pay off. 
Regardless of the rationale for excluding the private sector from participating in overseas 
labor migration, it seems clear that the Marcos administration felt that the government was 
better equipped to facilitate overseas labor migration.  It is also clear from the language 
used in his presidential decree that he viewed overseas labor migration as part of his 
comprehensive ‘industrialization focused’ national development strategy.  The amended 
1974 labor code says that the overseas labor migration program and those groups and 
agencies serving within the program structure “serve national development objectives.”8  
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This language is important to our overall understanding of where overseas labor migration 
fits into national development objectives.  Clearly the original intention of the program was 
to act as a component of an overall plan, despite denials of this in years since (as described 
in Chapter Two).  Whether or not Marcos’ economic development plans have succeeded or 
were misguided to begin with, as argued by Ofreneo, does not diminish the intended 
component role the overseas labor migration program was created to fill.9 
In regard to Marcos’ command style of managing the overseas employment program, Tigno 
explained that “the Philippines under Marcos initially attempted a corporate style strategy 
of exporting Filipino labor similar to what the Koreans did, while at the same time 
encouraging private sector participation.”10  With the introduction of the 1974 new labor 
code three new state-run corporations monopolized the fledgling overseas employment 
program.  These included the Bureau of Employment Services (BES), the Overseas 
Employment Development Board (OEDB), and the National Seaman Board (NSB).  With the 
introduction of these state-owned corporations to run overseas labor migration, private 
sector recruitment and placement agencies were effectively banned from participation.  The 
ban, however, was short-lived.  By 1978 worker deployments overseas had risen 170 
percent from 1974 and the newly created state-run corporations were no longer able to 
cope.  Thus in 1978 President Marcos issued Presidential Decree 1412, which once again 
allowed for private sector recruitment and deployment of Filipino workers.  From 1978 the 
three government corporations took on instead an enforcement, management, and 
promotion role in overseas labor migration.  This basic framework of private-sector-driven 
labor migration overseen by government bureaucracy has persisted from 1978 until today.  
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Although direct hiring by government corporations was de-emphasized in the PD 1412 
amendments to the labor code, it was not banned altogether.  Consequently the 
government has never fully abandoned direct-hire programs and still directly places workers 
overseas in 2012.  Chapter Six offers more detail on how state-to-state direct hiring 
programs impact government-business relations in overseas labor migration policy making. 
Once the private sector was allowed to participate in overseas labor employment the 
number of annual deployments began a remarkable growth streak that has not stopped for 
over 35 years.  Growth in both overseas Filipino worker (OFW) deployments and 
remittances has been nothing short of remarkable (See Table 3.1 over page).   
Along with the astounding growth in deployments of OFWs, there was a corollary rise in the 
number of licensed and illegal recruitment agencies all wishing to get in on the action.  
Many early OFWs returned home after working overseas for several years with enough 
savings to start a business.  Rather than starting manufacturing businesses or retail 
ventures, many OFWs stuck with what they knew, namely overseas labor migration.  They 
choose to start their own recruitment agencies.  In essence the quote from Marcos’ 1982 
speech proved true, but instead of utilizing their newly acquired skills “to the development 
of the country’s industrial base”, they applied those business and organizational skills into 
an expansion of the overseas employment program. 
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Table 3.1 Annual Deployment of Filipino Workers, 1970-
1994* 
Year Land-based Sea-based Total % change 
1970 - - 1,859 - 
1971 - - 1,863 0.2% 
1972 - - 14,366 87.0% 
1973 - - 36,418 60.6% 
1974 - - 32,764 -11.2% 
1975 12,501 23,534 36,035 9.1% 
1976 19,221 28,614 47,835 24.7% 
1977 36,676 33,699 70,375 32.0% 
1978 50,961 37,280 88,241 20.2% 
1979 92,519 44,818 137,337 35.7% 
1980 157,394 57,196 214,590 36.0% 
1981 210,936 55,307 266,243 19.4% 
1982 250,115 64,169 314,284 15.3% 
1983 380,263 53,594 434,207 27.6% 
1984 300,378 50,604 350,982 -23.7% 
1985 320,494 52,290 372,784 5.8% 
1986 323,517 54,697 378,214 1.4% 
1987 382,229 67,042 449,271 15.8% 
1988 385,117 85,913 471,030 4.6% 
1989 355,346 103,280 458,626 -2.7% 
1990 334,883 111,212 446,095 -2.8% 
1991 489,260 125,759 615,019 27.5% 
1992 549,655 136,806 686,461 10.4% 
1993 550,872 145,758 696,030 1.4% 
1994 564,031 154,376 718,407 3.1% 
*No land-based, sea-based data available prior to 1975.  
Figures from 1975 to 1983 refer to number of contracts 
processed; figures for 1984 to 1994 refer to number of 
workers deployed abroad. 
Source: Gonzalez p. 32, Abella p. 8, 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/USFocus/display.cfm?
ID=364 
 
In its medium-term development plan covering 1978-1982, NEDA emphasized the key role 
the overseas employment program would play within the larger export-oriented national 
development strategy. 
The Development Plan seeks to harness the tremendous human resources 
potential of our country and it is a matter of national policy that economic 
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activities be designed to promote the greater utilization of our human 
resources…Recognizing the problems of unemployment and 
underemployment, the Plan has set as one of its goals the creation of 
productive employment opportunities…[T]he export of manpower will be 
allowed only as a temporary measure to ease unemployment and 
underemployment…Overseas employment will be better organized to ensure 
that exported manpower will be accorded equitable and just compensation 
and treatment in foreign lands.11 
With the rise in the number of licensed recruitment agencies, through competition, ever 
more employment opportunities (referred to as ‘job orders’ in the industry) were being 
created for OFWs to fill.  One might initially suppose that this was a supply-side 
phenomenon where a booming population in the Philippines contributed to ever more 
Filipinos going overseas to work, but this does not represent a complete assessment of the 
picture—whether during the early years of the program or today.  Demand for Filipino 
manpower was not driven by the number of workers available in the country, but the 
recruitment agencies creating opportunities for overseas employment and thus more 
positions to be filled by the ever increasing pool of laborers back home.  The point raised in 
Chapter One must again be considered; if the overseas labor migration program was only 
intended to be a stop-gap measure or temporary option then why has not any 
administration from Marcos to present discontinued the government’s active promotion of 
overseas labor migration both inside and outside of the country?   
The 1978 presidential decree emphasized that the state-run corporations in charge of the 
overseas employment program would assume a regulatory role over the re-authorized 
participation of the private sector in the program.  From 1978 until today, regulation has 
persisted as the primary function of government regarding overseas labor migration 
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although the perspective of what can be included under the ‘regulation’ umbrella has 
changed from pure ‘program promotion’ to ‘promotion combined with protection’.  The 
introduction of Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers (WelFund) in 1977 was one of the first 
signs of the pending return from state-monopolization of the program to private sector 
participation and the new government-as-regulator role.  From the earliest days of the 
program, migrant workers encountered difficult situations that required a policy adaptation.  
The inevitable problems that come with overseas contract labor agreements meant that 
workers were sometimes left stranded overseas or without the means to either fulfill their 
contract, among many other problem possibilities.  In response to such issues, and 
especially the question of who would pay for them, the government introduced a fund into 
which workers would pay to cover eventualities such as becoming stranded or unexpectedly 
unemployed in a destination state.  The WelFund brought stranded workers back home, or, 
in the case of unexpected death abroad, return of their body for burial. 
Although the new labor code provided for new agencies to manage what was certain to 
become a large and complicated program, little thought was given to establishing the 
necessary regulatory infrastructure that would be required to manage such a far-reaching 
program.  Domestic bureaucratic structures were established with clear obligations yet 
somewhat poorly delineated responsibilities.  Most if not all of the foreign side of the 
program’s infrastructure was conspicuously absent from planning guidelines during the 
program’s early days. The Department of Foreign Affairs, although a competent and capable 
foreign service, had no prior experience in dealing with the unprecedented numbers of 
Filipino citizens who were now spreading out across the globe.  The lack of clear planning for 
how the program would be managed in destination states is the primary reason that current 
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safety-net mechanisms in place for the welfare of workers while abroad are so ad-hoc, a 
veritable patchwork of programs run by government agencies never intended to fulfill such 
a role. 
During the inception of the overseas labor program Marcos may have been attempting to 
emulate Korea, as described previously by Tigno, but there were key differences in the 
planning, arrangement, and implementation of the program in comparison to the managed 
industrialization that took place in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, as described in Chapter Two.  
Marcos did not have an independent, skilled central economic planning organization like 
Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), Taiwan’s Council on Economic 
Planning and Development (CEPD), or Korea’s Economic Planning Board (EPB) to coordinate 
his multipronged export driven industrialization strategy with overseas labor migration as a 
component piece.12  The National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) was 
created in 1973, a year before the overseas labor program was introduced, and had little 
real power to impose coordinated economic development policy outside of the plans laid 
forth by Marcos.  Like the rest of Philippine institutions, NEDA during the Marcos era was 
simply an agency designed to portray an image of a competent development planning 
agency on par with those driving economic policy decision in the newly industrialized East 
Asian countries.  Thompson refers to Marcos’ reform efforts under martial law as “[p]seudo 
reform” explaining that Marcos tried “to justify authoritarian rule by claiming that the 
Philippines required drastic reforms and that the state needed stronger institutions.”13  
Predictably “[p]rivate businesses and technocrats found their interests subordinated to 
those of Marcos’ cronies” while “economic growth in the Philippines fell to become the 
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lowest in Southeast Asia.”14  The contrast between the well-coordinated, and most 
importantly consistent, long term development plans of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan and 
Marcos’ Philippines could not be clearer.  Even if his plan had been fully implemented and 
consistently pursued, the personalistic nature of his administration and the cronyism that 
pervaded the economy would have stymied any sincere efforts of achieving meaningful 
national economic development. 
1980 - 1994: Program Reform and Post-Marcos Labor Migration 
Overseas labor migration from the Philippines began the 1980s in much the same way the 
1970s ended, with rapid increases in the number of Filipinos going abroad to work as well as 
in the amount of money they were sending home as remittances.  In 1982, to meet the 
rising number of worker deployments, the BES, OEDB, and NSB were consolidated into the 
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).  This was accomplished through 
the issuance of Executive Order 797 in which Marcos consolidated all of the responsibilities 
previously divided between the BES, OEDB, and NSB with the POEA.  He further created a 
three-person executive board over the POEA with one seat reserved for the president’s 
direct appointee.  The newly established POEA could not afford to take its time in slowly 
absorbing its three predecessors, as the number of OFWs to process was increasing rapidly 
from year to year (see Table 3.1 above). 
Due to increasing demand for OFWs, the recruitment industry was also experiencing 
phenomenal growth with an explosion in both licensed and unlicensed (illegal) recruiters in 
the 1980s.  One point that illustrates the growth in the recruitment industry was the 
creation of new industry associations.  There were two recruitment agency associations in 
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existence during the 1970s, the Filipino Association for Mariners' Employment, Inc. (FAME) 
and the Overseas Placement Association of the Philippines (OPAP).  FAME started as an 
informal group of maritime recruiters in 1971 who discussed industry development over 
meals.  By 1974, with the introduction of the formal overseas labor program FAME 
formalized their group into an association representing the interests of maritime 
recruitment industry.15  OPAP, on the other hand, was organized by land-based recruiters 
specifically to fight the 1974 Labor Code provision banning private sector involvement in the 
new government-managed overseas employment program.   
By 1980 a third recruitment agency, the Philippine Association of Service Exporters Inc. 
(PASEI), was founded by ten private recruitment agencies with four guiding objectives.  
These objectives provide insight into what recruitment agencies in the Philippines hoped to 
gain through combining their resources.  These objectives include: 
1. To make proper representation with government agencies, divisions, 
branches and other instrumentalities, with foreign governments through 
their respective Embassies and Consulates and also with private and non-
government entities, for the purpose of promoting and protecting the 
welfare of its members consistent with the national interest and the 
common good. 
2. To aid government in its campaign against illegal recruitment and other 
problems that concerns the overseas employment industry. 
3. To upgrade the skills of Filipino workers thereby uplifting work standards 
and conditions in overseas employment and to aid our Filipino workers in 
their fight against harsh and exploitative foreign employers. 
4. To establish and maintain closer and harmonious relationships among its 
members; to encourage healthy competition among its members through 
the formulation, adoption and enforcement of appropriate rules and 
procedures governing its activities; to build the reputation of PASEI to a 
level where it will acquire recognition in both government and private 
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sectors that it participates and get consulted in all matters involving 
overseas employment.16 
The roots of early organizational efforts within the recruitment industry were not born of a 
desire for cooperation with government, but instead because they felt threatened by it.  
During the first four years of the program, and in the years after recruiters were allowed 
back in, some recruiters felt that their positions were not being addressed, or that they 
were being unfairly dealt with.  Consequently some agency owners chose to organize 
themselves for strength in numbers while others chose to withdraw from the legal 
framework and operate their business illegally.  It seems clear, that whether intentional or 
not the decision by Marcos to exclude recruiters from the program in 1974 deserves a large 
share of the blame for the ongoing tensions between government and business within the 
context of the overseas labor program.   
In the case of the East Asian tigers, business associations cooperated with government 
which had mutual benefits for both sides in addition to greater benefits toward national 
developmental outcomes.  For example Park described the remarkable cooperation that 
took place in Korea between the Spinners and Weavers Association of Korea (SWAK), and 
government economic planners, cooperation that persisted even through periods where 
government objectives meant less profitability for industry association members.17  It 
should be noted that Korean economic planners first pursued an export oriented 
development strategy, with overseas labor migration as a component, that Marcos 
ostensibly attempted to imitate.18  The effects of early antagonism between government 
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and business within the overseas labor program have rippled through the years and shape 
policy approaches and decision-making relationships today.  Though the roots of 
government-business antagonism were born during the early days of the program, the 
uncooperative nature of these relationships will feature prominently in succeeding chapters.   
As the 1980s progressed overseas labor migration seemed to show no signs slowing down, 
while in the program’s eighth year (1982) there were no signs at all that Marcos’ faux export 
oriented industrialization strategy was succeeding.  In fact quite the opposite was true; 
unemployment was rising and inflation reached even higher levels.  In 1978 there had been 
0.8 million unemployed, but by 1983 that number had risen to 1.2 million.19  Even worse 
were underemployment figures that increased from 1.6 million in 1978 to a staggering 5.6 
million in 1983.20  What began in as a recession in the late 1970s in developed countries 
spread its way around the world ultimately affecting developing countries.  This financial 
downturn began to affect the Philippines in the early 1980s, with domestic issues (as 
discussed below) leading into a full-blown national economic crisis.  Clearly without the 
overseas labor migration program the domestic employment situation would have been 
made even worse.  As it was, Marcos faced a raft of problems in the early 1980s, many of 
which were of his own making.  In addition to the problems of unemployed and 
underemployed workers, by mid-1983 the total amassed foreign debt reached $18 billion 
(U.S.), while “lower-than-expected exports resulted in the continuation of the problem with 
balance-of-payments deficits.”21  Unable to meet its debt obligations the Marcos 
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administration sought help from the IMF, which eventually granted assistance contingent 
upon certain austerity measures being adopted.22 
Describing foreign exchange rates from Marcos’ EOI program as ‘lower-than-expected’ 
perhaps does not project an adequate image of how bad the situation really was.  Bello 
referred to the EOI strategy as “the foreign exchange mirage” explaining that “export-
oriented industrialization had been promoted as an expeditious way to acquire substantial 
foreign exchange for internal development…but by the late 70s, EOI was earning many 
fewer dollars than originally promised.”23  It did not take long for the rapid rise of workers 
remittances to equal those of manufactured exports: 
Central Bank figures show that in 1983, the salary remittances of Filipino 
workers overseas have contributed about US$955 million to the country’s 
foreign exchange reserves, equaled only by the dollar earnings of the export 
manufacturing sector.24 
 
It should be noted that Marcos’ primary political opponent Benigno Aquino II was 
assassinated in August 21, 1983 which set off a chain of events eventually leading to 
Marcos’ removal from office in 1986.  After Aquino’s assassination opposition to Marcos’ 
rule intensified with daily protests and more importantly a gradual withdrawal of support 
for his regime from the United States.  The Catholic Church, which had long attempted to 
push for political change through dialogue, began to take a harder line against Marcos and 
proved instrumental in the organizational efforts to encourage his ouster.25  Even Marcos’ 
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traditional allies began to abandon him en masse.  Much of the business community and 
organizations, including members of the recruitment industry, withdrew support following 
the assassination.  Silliman pointed to the withdrawal of support from business and industry 
leader as a primary contributor to the economic fallout, especially in regard to the rapid 
withdrawal of foreign currency.  He explained that: 
The key to the actions of Filipino businessmen is that the aftermath of the 
killing of Aquino produced domestic and international lack of confidence in 
the ability of the government to cope with its political and economic 
problems.  One index was a flight of capital from the Philippines.  In the 
weeks after August 21, there was an estimated $700 million capital outflow 
because of the nonrenewal of short-term revolving credits and exits through 
the black market.  International reserves slumped from $2.4 billion to just 
about $600 million in the eight weeks following the assassination.26 
As elite support for Marcos evaporated following the assassination, he found himself 
increasingly isolated.27   
It was into this climate that Marcos issued Executive Order 857 in December 1982.  EO 857 
mandated that a majority percentage of overseas worker remittances be returned to the 
Philippines through official government channels, including government-controlled banks.  
Gibson and Graham explained that workers were required to remit their earnings through 
government controlled channels “where exchange rates are manipulated to the 
government’s benefit.”28  This argument seems plausible considering the difficult financial 
situation Marcos was in, and his need to support the large-scale corruption he presided 
over.  Gibson and Graham further argued that: 
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Remittances from these contract workers abroad have become over the last 
few years the most stable source of foreign exchange in the Philippine 
economy, especially as the growth of local export processing zones faltered 
through lack of business confidence in the Marcos regime.29 
The amount of money which would have been removed through taxes and fees from OFW 
remittances sent home through official channels would have equaled ten percent.30  This 
order would have represented a massive government grab of OFW money, and meant a 
bigger piece of the remittance pie for Marcos.  Even if Marcos did not issue EO 857 in order 
to enrich himself or his cronies, there are glaring problems with the mandates set forth 
within it.  The most controversial portions are found in section 2, which set forth the 
required ratios of OFW salaries that were required to be remitted via government-
controlled channels. 
a) Seamen or mariners: Seventy (70) percent of basic salary; 
b) Workers of Filipino contractors and construction companies: Seventy (70) 
percent of basic salary; 
c) Doctors, engineers, teachers, nurses and other professional workers whose 
contract provide for free board and lodging: Seventy (70) percent of basic 
salary; 
d) All other professional workers whose employment contracts do not 
provide for free board and lodging facilities: Fifty (50) percent of basic salary; 
e) Domestic and other service workers: Fifty (50) percent of basic salary; 
f) All other workers not falling under the aforementioned categories: Fifty 
(50) percent of basic salary. 
Unsurprisingly OFWs were incensed at being told what to do with their money, especially by 
a government whose failure to produce a sufficient quantity of domestic jobs had required 
them to seek employment abroad far from their families in the first place.  EO 857 also 
brought in a new player into the dynamics of government-business relations within the 
overseas employment program context, namely the banks.   
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In essence EO 857 illustrates that government and business (banks in this case) can 
cooperate within the context of the overseas labor program, but is it really a surprise that 
the banks would cooperate with a policy that forced OFWs to increase their usage of 
Philippine banks?31  In regard to government-business relations between the Marcos 
administration and the recruitment industry at first glance it seems that the agencies would 
have little cause to be alarmed by EO 857, however when one studies the penalties for non-
compliance some troubling issues come to light.  The enumerated penalties in section 9 are 
as follows: 
Contract workers who fail to comply with the requirements of this Order shall 
be suspended or excluded from the list of eligible workers for overseas 
employment. In cases of subsequent violations, he shall be repatriated from 
the job site at the expense of the employer or at his expense, as the case may 
be.  Filipino or foreign employers and/or their representatives who fail to 
comply with the requirements under this Order shall be excluded from the 
overseas employment program. In the case of local private employment 
agencies and entities, failure to comply with the provisions hereof shall be a 
ground for cancellation of their license or authority to recruit workers for 
overseas employment, without prejudice to their liabilities under existing 
laws and regulations. [emphasis added]32 
In other words, the recruitment agencies could be held responsible if workers did not remit 
their savings at the required levels, and through the appropriate government-controlled 
channels.  It seems clear that Marcos was not prepared to acknowledge his failure with EOI, 
nor fully embrace his “temporary” overseas employment program.  By the time EO 857 was 
issued the economic and political situation in the country become more tenuous. 
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EO 857 had further implications for government-business relations beyond the roles of the 
banks or recruitment sector.  Unsurprisingly the migrant workers were fearful of what the 
order meant for them.  Beyond those punitive implications of the order mentioned above, 
another penalty enumerated was the threat to revoke OFW passports.  The specific clause 
that alarmed OFWs stated that:  
The passport shall be renewable every year upon submission of usual 
requirements and presentation of documentary proof of compliance to the 
remittance requirement in the percentages provided for in this Order. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall not extend or renew the passport of any 
contract worker unless proof of his compliance with the mandatory 
remittance requirement is submitted.33 
Overseas workers NGOs, as well as formal and semi-formal OFW associations in Hong Kong, 
were so incensed by the mandatory remittance rules and passport threats in EO 857 that 
they began to publically oppose the order and by association the Marcos regime.  Loosely 
affiliated groups and NGOs banded together forming the umbrella alliance called United 
Filipinos against Forced Remittance.  Gibson, Law, and McKay explained that: 
The alliance was instrumental in having the Executive Order revoked and, 
with such success to their credit, the coalition renamed itself United Filipinos 
in Hong Kong (UNIFIL).  This intervention was a clear indication that many 
migrant workers did not see the Philippine state or its banks as acting in their 
national interest.34 
In February 1984, fourteen months after its introduction, the indignation and revolt against 
the order reached such a level that Marcos issued Executive Order 935 which amended 
parts of EO 857 and watered down the remittance requirements simply to require workers 
to remit their savings home without specifying an amount or percentage requirement nor 
                                                          
33
 Marcos, Executive Order 857. 
34
 K. Gibson, L. Law and D. McKay, “Beyond Heroes and Victims: Filipina Contract Migrants, Economic Activism 
and Class Transformations,” International Feminist Journal of Politics 3, no. 3, (2001): 369. 
81 
 
mandatory modes of transmittal.  Increasingly beleaguered, Marcos could not contain his 
disdain for the OFWs and groups who had defied his edicts. In the preamble to the repeal, 
Marcos placed blame for his leadership failings and economic mismanagement on the OFWs 
themselves: 
contract workers while complying with the requirement of submitting a 
confirmed bank (foreign) remittance form, have been able to evade the 
actual remittance to the Philippines of their foreign exchange earnings, 
through fraudulent and ingenious means, to the detriment of the country's 
economic development program.35 
In May 1985, fifteen months after EO 935, Marcos issued Executive Order 1021, which 
repealed all punitive measure contained in EO 857.  In their place he created an inter-
agency committee tasked with finding ways to incentivize OFWs into sending a larger 
portion of their remittances through official channels.  In justifying the government’s policy 
change from a penalty-based structure to one focusing on incentives he recognized the 
increasingly important role OFWs and their remitted savings were playing in the Philippine 
economy.  He acknowledged that “Filipino contract workers overseas have by way of the 
inward remittance of their earnings through the years contributed tremendously to the 
stabilization of the national economy.”36 
The issuance of Executive Orders 935 and 1021, which repealed EO 857, were an important 
milestone in the evolution of the overseas employment program.  Overseas workers for the 
first time stood up for themselves and found that through organization their voices could 
shape policy outcomes.  The events surrounding EO 857 also signify the arrival of civil 
society groups, including worker associations and NGOs, into our framing of government-
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business relations.  Although the primary focus of this project is to explore the relationship 
between the recruitment industry (as business) and government, other groups such as 
banks, NGOs, and OFW associations (and, as we will see in Chapter Six, insurance agencies) 
play important roles in the implementation of the overseas labor program as well as 
ongoing program policy debates.  On this point Gibson et. al. explained that “the revoking of 
the Executive Order clearly reshaped the power relations around control of remittance 
flows into the Philippines, demoting the state and repositioning migrants as important 
agents in charge of their own economic destiny.”37  While this is clearly true it is important 
to remember the two-level game that is the overseas employment program.  Politicians in 
the Philippines can legislate and issue executive orders as often as they wish, but there are 
major limitations in enforcing these rules on citizens residing and working abroad under the 
sovereign laws of destination states.  This issue will arise repeatedly in all future policy 
debates and initiatives discussed in this chapter and throughout the remainder of this 
thesis. 
Throughout the latter half of 1985 domestic and foreign pressure on Marcos increased, 
culminating in his November call for elections in early 1986.  The elections were held on 
February 7, 1986 amid widespread allegations of fraud, violence, and voter intimidation.  
When the official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results identified Marcos as the 
winner on February 15, widespread protest erupted across the capital.  In excess of a million 
protestors gathered on Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) outside a major Philippine 
military base (which happens to be across the street from POEA headquarters).  By February 
26, Marcos had fled the country conceding the presidency to Corazon Aquino, wife of 
assassinated opposition leader Ninoy Aquino. 
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The tumultuous time between Aquino’s assassination and Marcos’ departure did seem to 
temporarily impact the number of workers deploying overseas.  As seen above in Table 3.1, 
1984-1986 saw a dip in the overall number of OFWs deploying, with 1987 numbers moving 
back where they had left off in 1983.38  A further explanation could have simply been a drop 
in the demand for contract laborers overseas.  Once Marcos had gone, President Corazon 
Aquino established the Presidential Commission for Good Government which was tasked 
with investigating Marcos’ crony abuses.  In essence a period of spring cleaning was 
underway across the board within the bureaucracy as well as the institutions of 
government.  A new constitution was written and efforts were made to safeguard against 
the possibility that another dictator would be able to repeat the abuses perpetuated by 
Marcos and his cronies.  The overseas employment program leadership and bureaucracy 
were also included in the across-the-board corruption review process.  The post-Marcos era 
brought a period of greater focus on the negative side of overseas labor migration, and how 
government might ameliorate some of these problems.   
In 1977, and ever after, the number of land-based deployments exceeded the number of 
sea-based deployments.  By the early 1980s there was a shift in the gendered make-up of 
OFWs deploying overseas.  While early overseas contract labor had been dominated by 
male seaman and construction workers, male dominance was giving way to low-skilled 
female domestic workers.  This new cadre of domestic workers filled needs for domestic 
helpers in Hong Kong, Singapore and the Middle East.  Unlike male workers on the 
construction sites throughout the Middle East, these women worked in people’s homes and 
faced a large variety of difficult issues and challenging circumstances.  There are issues of 
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status, subservience, etc. that are often associated with hired domestic labor, all of which 
made this an especially challenging line of work for OFWs.  The well documented plight of 
OFW domestic workers, and the multitude of problems associated with this type of work is 
beyond the purview of this research project, but are important to mention as they have 
changed the way that policy makers have approached the overseas labor program.  As soon 
as domestic workers started to deploy from the Philippines there began to be reports of 
problems--including cases of violence and sexual assault.  The frequency of these negative 
reports increased with the rise in the number of female domestic workers deployed 
overseas.  Complaints reached record highs by the mid-1980s in conjunction with President 
Aquino’s ascension to the presidency.  It was within this context that her administration 
embarked on its across-the-board review of Marcos-era programs and policies, which led to 
several policy outcomes in the first years of her presidency.39 
While the Marcos regime had been isolated and exclusive in its policy making related to the 
overseas labor program, Aquino took a more open and inclusive approach to policy 
formulation.  Tigno explained: 
One significant change in the conduct of the overseas employment program 
is in the decision-making process that now allowed for a more inclusive 
participation through the greater involvement of non-governmental 
organization (NGOs) and other representatives of migrants.  Consultative 
meetings became a key feature of the Aquino administration.  Under Marcos, 
there was great reliance on the expertise of technocrats.  With Aquino, there 
was a greater reliance on legislators and the opening up of the democratic 
space to civil society groups through popular consultations.  The process of 
decision-making now became open to basic sectors, including the migrants 
themselves.40 
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In addition to civil society groups and NGOs the recruitment industry was also allowed to 
have input into the policy-making process.  By December 1987 there were 665 licensed 
recruitment agencies operating in the Philippines as the total number of workers deployed 
that year reached nearly 550,000.41 
With the inclusion of NGOs and OFW associations worker welfare became increasingly 
important in policy approaches to the program, especially considering the rising number of 
reports of female domestic workers experiencing hostile working conditions.  Aquino also 
sought to improve program efficiency by eliminating overlapping responsibilities across 
agencies and more clearly defining the limits of each agency’s role in implementing and 
overseeing program activities.  Tigno explained that “there existed unclear lines of 
command among agencies responding to crisis situations” and that “each agency had its 
own ‘turf’ to protect in order to justify its existence.”42  As mentioned earlier many 
problems arose due to the international nature of the program.  The Department of Foreign 
Affairs (DFA) holds responsibility over international relations issues, as well as responsibility 
for assisting citizens overseas.  However the POEA, within the structure of the Department 
of Labor and Employment DOLE, was tasked with promoting the overseas employment 
program as well as assuring worker welfare.   
The first major piece of post-Marcos policy, Executive Order 247, was issued in July 1987 
and attempted to tackle the dual challenge of enhancing worker protections while 
improving efficiency through better delineated responsibility guidelines among agencies.  
This was done by reforming the responsibilities, powers, and structures of the POEA.  Within 
EO 247 the Executive Board of the POEA was restructured and new regional POEA offices 
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were opened in the provinces to expand access to overseas employment opportunities.  EO 
247 outlined four “powers and functions” for the POEA in an attempt to eliminate disputes: 
(a) Regulate private sector participation in the recruitment and overseas 
placement of workers by setting up a licensing and registration system; 
(b) Formulate and implement, in coordination with appropriate entities 
concerned, when necessary, a system for promoting and monitoring the 
overseas employment of Filipino workers taking into consideration their 
welfare and the domestic manpower requirements; 
(c) Protect the rights of Filipino workers for overseas employment to fair and 
equitable recruitment and employment practices and ensure their welfare;  
(d) Exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all claims 
arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or 
contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment including the 
disciplinary cases; and all pre-employment cases which are administrative in 
character involving or arising out of violation or requirement laws, rules and 
regulations including money claims arising therefrom, or violation of the 
conditions for issuance of license or authority to recruit workers.43 
Though made with the best intentions, these enumerated “powers and functions” did not 
achieve either of the dual objectives of the Aquino administration.  They have helped, but 
the same disputes over government agency jurisdiction and the issues related to the 
mistreatment of workers continue to be central problems in the overseas employment 
program today.  An opportunity was missed here to define the “powers and functions” of 
other agencies involved in the overseas employment program.  Problems with jurisdiction 
should have been predicted with clause (c) above, as the POEA may be tasked with 
‘protecting the rights of Filipino workers’ and to ‘ensure their welfare’, but how can a 
domestic agency hope to fulfill these obligations for a program that is inherently 
international?   
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In 1988 Aquino coined the term ‘Bagong Bayani’ (New Heroes) while speaking to OFWs in 
Hong Kong.  She was drawing reference to traditional national heroes from the struggle for 
independence from Spain, which included Dr. Jose Rizal, Emilio Aguinaldo, and Andres 
Bonafacio, among others.  This term has been repeated and referred to by all presidents as 
well as many Philippine politicians in the years since she first mentioned it.  The notion in 
the modern sense was that OFWs were the new financial heroes of Philippine economic 
development.  This OFW-as-hero discourse, started by Aquino, has highlighted the sacrifice 
and hard work of Filipinos working overseas.  Although this discourse has been widely 
criticized by scholars, NGOs, and OFWs themselves, it is clear that the ever increasing 
remittances sent home by OFWs year by year helped the country tremendously during the 
economically tumultuous post-Marcos years over which Aquino presided.  From her 
perspective, they were indeed heroes.  Alegado explained that “in her weekly radio program 
‘Magtanong sa Pangulo’ (Ask the President) in March 1988, President Aquino recognized the 
critical role played by overseas Filipino labor migrants when she told the country, “‘Malaki 
talaga ang foreign exchange na ipinadadala nila sa ating bansa at malaking tulong ito (the 
foreign exchange they send home is really of tremendous help to us) because without them 
it will be more difficult for us.’”44  The problem with the ‘bagong bayani’ discourse is that it 
ignores the inherently personal nature of the decision to become an OFW.  Filipinos do not 
become OFWs to contribute toward any grand national economic development objectives, 
but instead for highly personal economic reasons that will directly benefit either themselves 
or their family.  In other words, the decision to become an OFW is inherently oriented to the 
economic needs of the workers and their families, motivated by a desire to improve their 
own opportunities and circumstances.  
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The issue of US foreign aid and US military bases in the Philippines are important points to 
raise while discussing the overseas labor program between 1974 and 1994.  Though the 
issues of aid and military bases seem unrelated to the overseas labor program at first 
glance, there are remarkable similarities that must not be overlooked.  Scholars have argued 
that US aid related to continued access to military bases have acted as a crutch that all post-
independence administrations have relied on to prop up the national economy and 
compensate for the absence of a sustainable policy of domestic economic development.45  
In the early 1990s, due to a variety of factors, the Philippine government decided against 
renewing its base agreements with the United States military.  Was the ever increasing 
amounts of foreign capital flowing into the Philippines through remittances an enabling 
factor in the decision to ban the US from further use of its bases in the Philippines?   The 
primary explanation for the expulsion of the US military from its Philippine bases had much 
to do with post-Marcos new nationalism in the country, but with remittances increasing 
year to year the economic spillover from having US bases in the Philippines was no longer 
absolutely vital.  In effect, although not by design, remittances replaced US aid as the new 
crutch for Philippine leaders to hobble on.  
The issue of the overseas employment program and how it (as well the resulting 
remittances) acts as a pressure valve for social and economic tensions within the Philippines 
deserves further analysis.  Some scholars have perceived evidence of Marcos’ cronyism 
embedded into the very fabric of the overseas labor program.  The fact that the program 
changed so little during the administrations of Aquino and Ramos seem to make them guilty 
                                                          
45
 David Wurfel, Filipino Politics: Development and Decay (Ateneo De Manila University Press, 1988).  (Also see 
Hutchcroft, Booty Capitalism, 1998). 
89 
 
by association of the same nefarious role that Marcos may have originally designed the 
overseas labor program to fill.  Alegado argued that: 
While seemingly seeking a solution to the impoverished masses’ problem of 
unemployment and underemployment – not to mention pitifully low wages, 
terrible working conditions, and lack of democratic rights – Marcos appeared, 
as the same time, to be offering the services of the regime’s state machinery 
through the POEA to the multitude of unemployed and underemployed.  By 
monopolizing the labor trade and by appearing to crack down on 
unscrupulous labor recruiting agencies, the state integrates the Filipino 
workers into its machinery under the conditions of domination.46 
Neither Aquino nor Ramos (elected to the Presidency in 1992) significantly changed the 
Marcos era structures or institutions that operated the overseas employment program, nor 
did they re-align or re-purpose its role within a comprehensive national economic 
development strategy.  Neither of them elevated its status beyond its original ‘temporary’, 
‘stop-gap’ intended use and most shockingly maintained Marcos’ official faux export 
oriented development strategy.  Although national discontent with conditions during the 
Aquino and Ramos years were far different than those in effect during the Marcos years, it 
could be argued that societal and economic ‘pressures’ were relieved through the ‘safety 
valve’ of the overseas employment program.  Alegado again explains that, “By sending this 
huge number of workers … out of the country, the state is able to … achieve a measure of 
political stability however temporary that may be.”47  The reality is that whether or not the 
program was a ‘temporary option’, and not part of a larger development plan, both the 
problems of Aquino and Ramos would have been made much worse if not for the influx of 
foreign capital from remittances and the ‘pressure valve’ effect that migration had on 
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national unemployment and underemployment.  Consequently, what incentive did the post-
Marcos administrations have to adjust the program or make significant changes to it?   
Perhaps most surprisingly of all is the fact that both the Aquino and Ramos administration 
maintained Marcos’ failed export oriented development strategy, which as mentioned 
above was not really much of a strategy in the first place.  Meanwhile, the ‘temporary’ 
overseas employment program achieved ever increasing levels of participation from 
workers and the resulting remittances from their labor abroad.  In this case the side-show 
truly came to eclipse the main event.  Throughout the period examined in this chapter, 
successive leaders failed to position the overseas employment program squarely within the 
national economic development plan or to set achievable goals and targets for how the 
overseas employment program could contribute to developmental outcomes.  It is upon 
these foundations that overseas labor migration from the Philippines has become 
“permanently temporary.”48 
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Chapter Four: The “Humanization” of Labor, 1994-2001 
As discussed in Chapter Three, Siracusa and Acacio describe the period between 1978 and 
the mid-1990s as the Commodification of Labor, in which labor was viewed as a mere export 
commodity.
1
  In the wake of a high-profile tragedy in 1995 they have labeled the era from 
the mid-1990s to the present as the Humanization of Labor, in which human elements of 
this trade have come to the fore.
2
  This characterization is appropriate, considering the scale 
and impact of the tragedy to be described shortly, but more important was its impact on the 
way the overseas migration program was viewed by government, business, civil society 
groups, and the Filipino people at large.  The events of the mid-1990s represented a seismic 
shift in how government and business approached overseas labor migration policy, and 
represented a proliferation of civil society groups and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) concerned with worker welfare issues.  Although these groups had long been active 
in advocating for overseas Filipino worker (OFW) welfare issues to both government and 
business, they had not previously had such influence in migration policy-making circles.  This 
elevated role has persisted from this time until today. 
This chapter begins with an overview of major trends in Philippine political economy for the 
period, in order to place developments within the overseas employment program in the 
broader national picture.  It then examines the events leading up to the creation of the 
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (Republic Act 8042 or RA 8042), 
followed by a discussion of its specific components.  The first half of the chapter, in essence, 
concentrates on legislative analysis, while the last half examines the impact and reactions to 
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the bill, particularly in regard to government, business, and NGO groups.  Additionally, 
discussion of how the act has impacted individual migrant workers is embedded throughout 
the chapter.  The events covered in this chapter fall chronologically roughly between 1994 
and 2001, although the bulk of the legislative activity during this period occurred between 
1994 and 1996.   
I will connect this policy effort to the wider focus of the thesis on government-business 
relations in the overseas employment program.  In exploring this policy effort two significant 
shortcomings will stand out: first, a lack of acknowledgement of how important the 
overseas employment program had become to the Philippine economy, and a lack of 
instructions for development planners (such as National Economic Development Authority 
[NEDA]) to include the program as a component in future national development plans, and 
second, no plan to improve cooperation among stakeholders (including OFWs) in the 
overseas employment program, thereby improving welfare and program benefits through 
coordination and mutual respect rather than antagonism, mistrust, and threats. 
A major theme that permeates this chapter is the increasing attention to worker welfare 
that motivated and resulted from the promulgation of the bill.  Although the issue of worker 
welfare has been a part of social and political considerations regarding the overseas 
employment program from its earliest days, it had by the mid-1990s become the 
predominant focus of all attention paid to the issue by all program actors and by the nation 
at large.  The events surrounding the creation of this act will provide further insight into the 
evolving nature of the policy-making relationship between government and business within 
the overseas employment program.  Primary source materials for this chapter come 
principally from archival records of the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, as 
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well as interviews with government officials, recruitment industry leaders, and NGO leaders.  
The unprecedented national focus on the overseas employment program in 1995 provided 
the first major opportunity since the program’s inception in 1974 to determine what role it 
would play in the country’s future and how stakeholders could work together to make the 
most of program benefits.  Instead, the executive branch abdicated its leadership role on 
the issue, Congress punted on addressing the major strategic questions over the program’s 
objectives and role in the Philippine economy, and antagonism increased among 
stakeholders rather than bringing them together through common difficulty. 
Philippine Political Economy (1994 – 2001) 
The political economy of the Philippines during the early 1990s was somewhat precarious.  
Mount Pinatubo erupted in June of 1991, devastating large areas of Luzon Island north of 
Manila and causing significant damage to the region—most significantly to the US military 
bases at Angeles City and Subic Bay.  The eruption devastated the region economically for a 
time, and the ecological affects are still apparent today.  In 1991, before Ramos came to 
power, the Philippine Senate voted against the extension of the bases treaty, thus ending 
more than four decades of U.S. military presence on Philippine soil. This brought significant 
economic dislocation, particularly in the vicinity of the bases, and a reexamination of the 
country’s strategic position.  Mount Pinatubo’s eruption and the subsequent cost to repair 
the bases hastened the United States’ decision to pull up stakes.  To move the economy 
forward, President Fidel Ramos (1992-1998) embarked on a plan to improve ties with his 
neighbors in the region.  In 1995 the Philippines joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and also looked to its membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for 
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regional approaches to improving trade and economic relations.  Hutchcroft and Rocamora 
explained that: 
Ramos came to power in 1992 with a much stronger reform impulse, but his 
reform initiatives were concentrated far more in the economic than the 
political realm. Ramos and his chief theoretician, former general Jose 
Almonte, blamed oligarchic groups for the country’s laggard economic status 
and combined measures of economic liberalization, privatization, and 
infrastructure development with concerted attacks on “cartels and 
monopolies.” At the same time, they asserted the need to build a more 
capable state and free the state of oligarchic influence.
3
 
While anemic in comparison to some regional neighbors Ramos did preside over several 
consecutive years of growth (see Charts 4.1 & 4.2 below).  Bernardo and Tang attributed the 
economic growth of the mid-1990s to his exuberant reform efforts and optimism: 
While the growth episodes were brief, the quality of growth, grounded on 
employment-generating investments in plants and equipment, may be 
deemed superior to the current remittance cum consumption-driven 
economic expansion.  Investment activity then was based on tremendous 
amounts of domestic and international goodwill and, especially during the 
Ramos administration (1992-98), a lot of consumer and investor exuberance 
and confidence in the Philippines.  Reforms—trade and investments 
liberalization, tax policy reform, privatization of government assets, 
restructuring of government enterprises enabled investments to come in 
while improving government’s financial position.  The Philippine government 
under President Marcos was finally seen as one that could “set its mind to do 
something and actually do it.”  Indeed, the reforms brought the economy 
within sight of newly industrializing economy (NIC) status and by 1997 the 
Philippines was one step away from an investment grade rating.
4
 
Ramos’ economic reform efforts were ultimately hampered by the Asian financial crisis 
which stuck the region in 1997, while his political reform efforts (as well as his popularity) 
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faltered following the exposure of details related to his efforts to change the government 
structure established in the 1987 constitution.
5
   
In the midst of the financial crisis, in 1998, leadership in the Philippines changed hands from 
Ramos to Joseph Estrada (nicknamed Erap).  As a former actor and national politics novice, 
Estrada embraced his outsider status and took on a populist pro-poor platform complete 
with the slogan “Erap para sa Mahirap” (Erap for the Poor).
6
  In reality Estrada’s slogans 
were nothing more than lip service: 
For all the pro-poor rhetoric and vague redistributive promises made on 
behalf of those who felt excluded by the economic gains of the Ramos years, 
the major redistributive benefits of the Estrada administration were 
extended to those who enjoyed most favorable access to the Palace, most 
infamously those privileged to join the “midnight cabinet” drinking sessions 
presided over by Estrada himself.
7
 
At his election Estrada presided over a country that still appeared to be headed in the right 
direction economically despite regional reverberations from the financial crisis.  It seemed 
that the Philippines was well positioned to come through the financial storm and continue 
on a positive growth trajectory.  Hutchcroft and de Dios refer to Estrada’s time in office as 
“the flawed experiment,” explaining how Estrada’s disastrous behavior, policy decisions, 
and general ineptitude affected the national economic situation: 
This picture of macroeconomic stability and policy consistency was swept 
aside, however, by the wave of scandals and criticism that engulfed the 
presidency.  The credibility of the administration’s entire program was 
undercut by charges and exposes of corruption and cronyism, putting paid to 
all sanctimonious pronouncements about “leveling the playing field” and 
“transparency” in doing business.  By 2000 the extended political crisis had 
sapped business confidence and threatened to scuttle a fragile economic 
                                                          
5
 Hutchcroft and Rocamora, “Strong Demands,” 283. 
6
 Maria Christine N.Halili, Philippine History (Manila: Rex Books, 2004): 287. 
7
 Emmanuel S. de Dios and Paul D. Hutchcroft, “Political Economy,” in The Philippine Economy: Development, 
Policies, and Challenges (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003): 60.  
96 
 
recovery.  The peso depreciated rapidly from 2000 to early 2001, and the 
scandal-ridden stock market continuing its downward slide, well out of line 
with regional trends.
8
 
With perhaps a collective sense of déjà vu, a popular uprising reminiscent of 1986 filled 
Manila’s major circumferential artery, Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA).  This second 
mass demonstration became known as “People Power II” or “EDSA II”, and sparked a rapid 
withdrawal of support for Estrada by his allies, leading to his resignation and transfer of the 
Presidency to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in January 2001.  Macapagal-Arroyo 
held a PhD in economics, was the daughter of former President Diosdado Macapagal, and 
had previously served as both a senator and undersecretary of the Department of Trade and 
Industry in the administration of Corazón Aquino.  Both politically and economically, 
Macapagal-Arroyo faced many challenges in getting the Philippine state back on track.  
Hutchcroft and de Dios explain: 
The Macapagal-Arroyo administration faced the difficult task of normalizing 
political and economic conditions after the excesses and inadequacies of the 
previous Estrada administration. To some degree, the greater professionalism 
and back-to-business mien of the Macapagal-Arroyo cabinet represented a 
welcome change.  Corruption, even as it persisted, was kept within bounds 
and did not reach the institutionally disruptive scale experienced under 
Estrada.  In terms of macroeconomic management, the country even 
appeared to regain a semblance of balance.
9
  
A mere eight months into her presidential tenure, Arroyo’s efforts were undercut by a 
sudden worldwide recession in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks against the 
United States.  Despite the recession per capita GDP remained positive through 2002 and 
2003, albeit significantly lower than many regional states and still heavily reliant on 
remittance income.  The positive growth trend between 1993 and 1997 notwithstanding, 
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the entire period from 1990 to 2003 registered a paltry average annual GDP growth rate of 
only 1.01 percent (see Chart 4.1 below).  In contrast, throughout the 1990s and into the new 
century, the numbers of deploying OFWs increased exponentially each year.   Charts 4.1 and 
4.2 track key growth indices across the broad period from 1990 to 2003. 
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Chart 4.1 and 4.2 Source: World Bank 
Background to RA 8042 
In the early to mid-1990s, there were a number of high profile incidents involving OFWs that 
changed both the evolutionary trajectory of overseas employment program policy as well as 
the country’s migration policy objectives.  Female OFW, Flor Contemplacion, working as a 
domestic helper in Singapore, was accused in 1991 of the murder of another female OFW 
and the young Singaporean boy for whom she cared.  Four years later, on the 17
th
 of March 
1995, after a series of court trials and appeals, Contemplacion was executed at Changi 
Prison in Singapore.  Relations between the Philippines and Singapore deteriorated to the 
point that the Philippines nearly severed diplomatic ties.  In response to the execution, mass 
demonstrations were held in both the Philippines and other states where significant 
numbers of OFWs resided, often in front of the Singapore or Philippine embassies.  The 
execution of Contemplacion was in essence the climax of seemingly endless reports of 
abuses inflicted on OFWs and a steady stream of OFW caskets being repatriated to the 
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Philippines.  Gonzalez likened the events after her execution to the 1991 eruption of Mt. 
Pinatubo: 
The overall scenario prior to the furor of the Contemplacion Affair was quite 
similar to the violent awakening of Mount Pinatubo, supposedly a dormant 
volcano north of Manila, i.e., smooth and picturesque on the outside but 
brewing and waiting to explode on the inside.  No one expected that people 
would display such angry emotions about another Filipino being executed 
overseas.  However Filipinos had been witnessing … casket after casket and 
hearing one [overseas worker] horror story after another.  In the meantime, 
their pleas for assistance and action were to no avail.  Bitter emotions had 
been building up.  So on 17 March 1995 this silent international labour 
migration “volcano” finally erupted, like the force of Mount Pinatubo, 
triggered by the hanging of Flor Contemplacion.
10
 
It is difficult to overstate how important the Contemplacion case has been to both the policy 
direction of the overseas employment program and to government-business relations in the 
policy-making process.  Rodriguez explained that “the Philippine state, thrown into crisis, 
was compelled to respond to the protests, which threatened to undermine its labor export 
program, a program on which it had come to depend both economically and politically.”
11
  
Prior to these events, “the Ramos administration’s position on the overseas employment 
program remained similar to the past governments’ stance – strong in stating that it would 
maximize the economic benefits but weak on voicing its determination to minimize the 
social costs.”
12
  In the immediate aftermath of her tragic execution there was a wholesale 
dash by all politicians across the government spectrum to appease the increasingly 
boisterous call for better OFW protection.  The timing of Contemplacion’s execution became 
a key issue in the general election in May of 1995, where Senatorial and House candidates 
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across all political parties attempted to position themselves as pro-OFW, and “champions” 
for enhanced protection.   
Whether or not it was due to election-year politics, or the remarkable level of public outrage 
over Contemplacion’s execution, the Ramos administration responded quickly.  On March 
20, 1995, a mere three days after her execution, and two days after her body returned to 
the Philippines, Ramos issued Executive Order No. 231 which created a “presidential fact-
finding and policy advisory commission on the protection of overseas Filipinos.”
13
  As the 
commission was headed by retired Supreme Court justice Emilio Gancayco, it became 
known as the Gancayco Commission.  The Gancayco commission was assigned two 
objectives: 
1. Determine particular and general facts and circumstances involving the 
policies and actions of the Philippine Government and its agents or officials in 
relation to the protection of overseas Filipinos, particularly cases involving 
the criminal conviction of overseas Filipinos, including the case of Mrs. Flor 
Contemplacion; and 
2. Make recommendations with a view to improving the protection afforded 
by the Philippine Government to overseas Filipinos, consonant with 
international conventions and standards. 
14
  
The commission was further mandated to “Formulate recommendations, to include 
legislative measures, for the improvement of the protection of overseas Filipinos by the 
Philippine Government.”
15
  The commission released its report “On the Safety Nets and 
Protective Measures for Overseas Workers and Filipino Nationals” in early April, 1995 which 
further exacerbated relations between the Philippines and Singapore.
16
  President Ramos 
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requested that the Singaporean ambassador to the Philippines be recalled, and dismissed 
several government officials at the commission’s recommendation.   
The Gancayco Commission report produced a number of recommendations, but perhaps its 
most “significant proposal was for the defeminization of labour migration by gradually 
phasing out the export of women domestic helpers and entertainers who form the most 
vulnerable sub-sector of the diaspora.”
17
  In response to the social fallout over the 
Contemplacion situation, the commission recommended: (a) discontinuing the practice of 
deploying domestic workers to the Middle East and world-wide by 2000; and (b) 
discontinuing the deployment of non-professional entertainers to Japan.  Since the majority 
of problems for OFWs occur among those engaged in domestic work environments abroad, 
the idea was to quit sending these lower skilled workers into such potentially harmful 
situations.  Likewise, there had been a high number of problems with OFWs who deployed 
to Japan as entertainers, but in some cases ended up working as escorts, prostitutes, or 
adult entertainers.  As many domestic workers deploy illegally, the commission further 
recommended that (c) Overseas Worker Welfare Administration (OWWA) centers be 
established in every foreign post; (d) agencies engaging in illegal recruitment receive 
permanent bans from program participation; and (e) a special anti-illegal recruitment 
prosecution team be created.  Anti-illegal recruitment initiatives had long been a part of 
government strategy in managing the overseas employment program, though the Gancayco 
commission’s recommendations on the issue went beyond any efforts previously employed.  
Finally, the commission recommend that (f) legal assistance be provided to OFWs regardless 
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of whether they are the plaintiff or defendant, “especially in cases of capital or serious 
offenses.”
18
 
As mentioned by Rodriquez above, the ever increasing importance of OFW remittances to 
the Philippine economy undoubtedly had an impact on politicians in both the speed and 
intensity in which they responded to this crisis.
19
  Nevertheless, remittances were only part 
of the “perfect-storm” that occurred in the wake of Contemplacion’s execution.  The 
additional factors of election year politics, and emotionally charged public outcries for 
better OFW protections, combined to set the stage for an extended process of legislative 
political maneuvering that permanently shifted the policy direction of the Philippine 
overseas employment program. 
Creating the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (RA 8042) 
Immediately following his party’s election success on May 8, President Ramos called a 
special legislative session to commence work on a bill being referred to as a “Magna Carta” 
for overseas workers.  The bill originated in the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House 
of Representatives, which held hearings in November 1994 as the commotion related to 
Contemplacion’s pending execution was building toward its climax.  The usage of the term 
“Magna Carta” or “Great Charter” of course draws reference to the document signed in 
1215 in which King John was forced to proclaim certain liberties to the English people.  This 
new bill was envisioned to provide a similar declaration of what OFWs rights were and also 
what they could expect from their government.  By the time President Ramos called a 
special legislative session, the House version of the bill had already been passed, and thus a 
Senate version was needed if the Senate decided not simply to pass the House version.  
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Concerning the differences between the circumstances surrounding the creation of both the 
House and Senate versions of the bill, Tigno explained that “it may be said that the Senate 
version was more a reaction to the Contemplacion incident whereas the House version was 
drafted prior to the said episode even as it does not completely set aside the plight of 
Filipino migrant workers.”
20
  The Senate fully understood the popular sentiment around the 
country regarding the need for meaningful government action toward improving OFW 
protection.  Consequently there was no shortage of proposed senatorial bills aimed at 
enhancing worker protection within the overseas employment program.   Table 4.3 provides 
a brief synopsis of each proposal, its author, and assigned bill number. 
Ultimately the five bills were consolidated into Senate Bill Number 2077, or Migrant 
Workers Act of 1995.  Senate Bill No. 2071 “was withdrawn from consideration,” possibly 
due to the complex and controversial nature of its proposals, and the desire for the bill to be 
passed post-haste.
21
  The various bills were consolidated and debated within the Senate 
Committee of the Whole.  On May 23, 1995 the committee of the whole conducted a public 
hearing where “resource” speakers were brought in to testify and answer the senator’s 
questions.  Table 4.4 shows the number of resource persons, senators and assorted stake 
holders in attendance during the public hearing for the bill.  There was solid representation 
from both NGOs and the recruitment industry, but representatives from the various 
government agencies involved in the overseas employment program made up the largest 
group of participants.  The high number of government agency representatives is not 
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surprising considering that the premise for the bill was to reform how the government 
manages and protects overseas workers. 
Table 4.3. Senate Bills Introduced  
Senate Bill number Sponsoring Senators Description of key proposals 
2068 Senator Blas Ople Proposed a Legal Welfare Commission for 
Overseas Workers   
  Proposed a Legal Assistance Fund 
2069 Senator Ernesto Herrera Non-promotion of overseas labor for 
development and the creation of local 
opportunities   
  
Deployment of skilled workers only to 
countries ensuring protection 
  System of absentee voting 
  
Legal assistance to victims of illegal 
recruitment 
  
Diplomatic initiatives and the signing of 
bilateral labor agreements 
  
Establishment of crisis centers for 
information, counseling and assistance 
2070 Senator Alberto Romulo Similar to House version 
  
Establishment of Filipino Overseas Worker 
Centers 
  Absentee voting for OFWs 
2071 Senators Edgardo Angara, 
Rodolfo Biazon, Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo, Raul 
Roco, Francisco Tatad 
Recognized the duty of the state to create 
job opportunities for Filipinos in the 
Philippines   
  
Creation of a Department of Overseas 
Employment 
    
    
2075 Senators Ernesto Maceda, 
Nikki Coseteng 
All fees paid by OFWs to POEA and OWWA 
be frozen at current levels   
  
OFWs pay only 50 percent of fees, while 25 
percent be funded out of Lotto revenues and 
25 percent charged to employers 
2076 Senator Heherson Alvarez Only allowing overseas work when the state 
can ensure protection   
  
Focus on international cooperation in 
handling migration 
  Increased sensitivity to gender issues 
Source: Graziano Battistella, "The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 and 
Migration Management" in Filipino Workers on the Move: Trends, Dilemmas and Policy Options, ed. 
Benjamin V. Carino, (UNESCO-Most 1998) 85-86. 
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Table 4.4. Number of Participants in attendance at the 
public hearing on a proposed Magna Carta for Overseas 
Workers (held May 23, 1995) by category 
Recruitment Agencies/ Private Sector 13 
Government Agencies 37 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 17 
Senators 17 
Labor Unions 5 
Academics 1 
Individual OFWs 1 
Unidentified  2 
Source: Philippine Senate Archives   
 
Senator Ernesto F. Herrera, who chaired the hearing, made its objectives clear in his opening 
remarks “may I call to order the hearing of the Committee of the Whole to tackle the 
various bills related to  overseas employment, and, hopefully, to come out with the 
consolidated Magna Carta for Overseas Workers.”
22
  Insights about the perspectives of the 
groups involved in the overseas employment program can be found in the testimonies they 
gave, as well as in exchanges between legislators and the various program stake holders in 
attendance.  As the various resource persons in attendance at the hearing answered 
questions and gave their opinions, sharp disagreements emerged over what were the most 
pressing issues were facing the overseas employment program and who should be 
responsible for rectifying them.  Many questions from senators focused on recruitment 
agency practices and government oversight of the program.  It does, however, seem that 
the amount of attention paid to the recruitment industry was disproportionally higher than 
the amount of time spent interrogating the quality of government oversight functions in 
managing the overseas employment program.  Some senators were openly looking to 
reform the program from the top down, but nevertheless sought to assign the lion’s share 
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of the blame for the state of the program at the feet of the recruitment industry.  This is 
apparent in an exchange on the problem of illegal recruitment involving Dr. Caroline Rogge, 
Chairperson of the Overseas Placement Association of the Philippines (OPAP, a leading 
industry organization at the time) and Senator Blas Ople, the former Minister of Labor under 
President Marcos and architect of the overseas employment program : 
Senator Ople: Now, Dr. Rogge, I recall a clear understanding at that time that 
the OPAP and the PASEI [Philippine Association of Service Exporters Inc.] 
would police their own ranks so that illegal recruitment agencies could be 
exposed and brought to court and maybe proceeded against criminally.  You 
did not deliver on your part of the bargain.  Can you credit any member of 
yours with the initiative to expose an illegal recruiter agency? 
Rogge: Mr. Chairman, as a matter of fact, when we tell them [POEA] that 
there is an illegal recruiter in a hotel, we report to them, they said they 
cannot just go after the illegal recruiter.  As I said, there should be a genuine 
partnership between the private sector and the government because that’s 
the only time we can operate together, that process of synergy helping one 
another, Mr. Chairman. 
Senator Ople: Do you have some concrete proposals on how to deal with the 
illegal recruitment menace?
23
 
 
This exchange highlights the difficulty in dealing with illegal recruiters.  The recruitment 
industry itself can only report illegal activity to the Philippine Overseas Employment 
Administration (POEA), and the POEA is not structured properly to find and prosecute illegal 
recruiters.  Legitimate recruitment agencies in the industry would like to see the illegal 
recruiters put out of business, as they are not burdened by the financial or administrative 
compliance requirements licensed recruiters must meet.  Because illegal recruiters operate 
outside of the overseas employment program structures, they have a competitive 
advantage over legitimately licensed recruiters.     
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Rogge further discussed the POEA’s direct hire activities, where it takes on the role of 
recruitment agency (RA) in deploying workers directly abroad.  RAs have long alleged that 
these arrangements create an ethical problem where the POEA acts as both enforcer and 
direct competitor to traditional RAs.  In further comments on the difficulty with illegal 
recruitment and the adversarial relationship between the recruitment industry and the 
POEA, Rogge added: 
 Why are we called the scalawags when we are supposed to be the genuine 
partner of the government because we were the ones who looked for the 
jobs for the many Filipinos we have sent abroad?  But instead of us being 
given some sort of citation, we are told that we are the scalawags.  But may I 
tell you, Mr. Chairman, that we are not the ones.  It is the failure of the 
government to govern.  They have been giving so many licenses which they 
cannot control….So if there should be any magna carta,…I think that the 
[POEA] should remain, to monitor, to supervise, and to issue respected 
policies for the private sector to also follow, but not as a competitor.  That 
way I think, we will be heading for a better recruitment program.  ….I think 
that they [POEA] have also some operational system that is not good for the 
private sector.  They are our competitors….They put more teeth to us, when, 
in fact, the ones that is committed, all the mistakes, are the illegal recruiters, 
sir, the ones that are not licensed, because so many red tapes in processing 
with them [POEA].[sic]
24
 
The numbers of OFWs deploying directly through the POEA has always been low, and the 
competition claims made here are overblown.  But OPAP Chairperson Caroline Rogge made 
an important point about the government’s failure to govern, which highlights a common 
criticism by many program actors and observers at the time and further illustrates the 
inadequacy of the measures under consideration within RA 8042 to reform the overseas 
employment program.   
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Traditionally OFWs did not pay fees to recruitment agencies, but instead the companies 
abroad wishing to hire OFWs paid the agencies directly.  This began to change however 
when lower skilled domestic workers began to deploy in greater numbers rather than highly 
skilled workers.  During the proceedings a suggestion was made that a return to the old 
system of no fees for the workers be adopted.  When representatives of the recruitment 
industry were asked about this, Senator Ople interjected: 
Now, this is related, I believe, to changes occurring in the global labor 
market.  You will also recall that some years ago, the wages paid to our 
workers in the Middle East were much higher than now.  And this is probably 
a function of labor market realities there.  There are more countries sending 
workers to the Middle East and there is a tendency for employers and their 
governments to play-off one country against another [sic].  So the [Middle] 
East can very well say, “when we go to Sri Lanka, to India and Pakistan for our 
unskilled labor needs, the people there offered to pay all these fees.  Why 
should we make an exception [for] you?”  At any rate, that is how this 
evolved.  So many countries are willing to accept much lower standards of 
work than our own.  And so the reaction of the employment agencies in the 
Philippines is just to submit to the demands, the terms dictated by the 
foreign employers, either you accept these standards or you do not get a job.  
So I do not want to attribute this change to any difference in management 
competence but to probably it owes more to the changing realities in the 
labor markets abroad.
25
  
The fragmentation of the recruitment industry became apparent during the proceedings as 
resource persons representing different sides of the industry cast accusations of 
wrongdoing at fellow members who represented different sub-sectors of the industry (i.e. 
land-based vs. maritime).
26
  For example, an attendee representing a maritime recruitment 
agency association referred to the land-based agencies as “scalawags,” prompting Rogge’s 
rebuttal above.  Both the maritime recruiter associations and the associations which 
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deployed only skilled construction workers drew attention to the practice of charging OFWs 
fees, and claimed not to engage in the practice themselves.  It was during one such 
exchange that Senator Ople made the statement above about the realities of competition 
that the Philippines faced from states less concerned about protecting their workers.  One 
would have expected a certain amount of scapegoating considering popular national 
sentiment following the execution of Contemplacion, but surprisingly during the Senate 
hearings most of the accusations of wrongdoing came not from the NGOs (their traditional 
foes) or senators (government), but instead among the various factions within the 
recruitment industry itself.  This was perhaps due to the fear that a bill would ultimately 
penalize them all due to the misdeeds of the bad apples.  The factions therefore wished to 
differentiate themselves from those on whom they pinned the blame.  The NGOs and 
senators did of course have negative things to say about the recruitment industry, but by 
and large did not seem to be attempting to fix blame solely at their feet.  
Among the topics debated, illegal recruitment, fees, and government “support” 
infrastructure at home and abroad took up a large portion of the hearing time.  Topics that 
were discussed, but received somewhat less attention, included pre-departure training, 
voting rights for OFWs, retirement benefits for OFWs, and bilateral labor agreements among 
others.  The day after the public hearing (May 23, 1995) the Senate Committee of the Whole 
heard a report from the Gancayco Commission, and also took the opportunity to ask 
members of the commission about the evolving bill.   
After the Senate finished its work and passed its version, the Senate and House of 
Representatives met in a Conference Committee to iron out the differences between their 
respective versions of the bill.  They completed their work within a few days and had a bill 
110 
 
ready by June 2, 1995.  Five days later, on June 7, President Ramos signed the bill set to take 
effect on the 15
th
 of July 1995.  Although the House version of the bill was started the year 
before, the post-election flurry of activity on overseas employment all took place over a 
period of less than three weeks.  The speed at which the bill was debated, rectified, adopted 
and signed by the president highlights the level of expectation in the Philippines that the 
government would take serious and meaningful action toward fixing the overseas 
employment program.  Unfortunately the calls made in the public hearing from NGOs and 
recruitment industry leaders alike to adopt a slow, considered approach to reforming the 
program were not heeded.  The speed at which RA 8042 was pushed through is likely the 
leading reason so many problems have arisen related to its various provisions.  Had 
legislative deliberation been slowed down, and more (possibly less emotional) debate taken 
place, it is possible that some of the mistakes that have arisen since RA 8042’s creation 
could have been avoided.  Political expediency and election year politics evidently do not 
mix well with sound program policy making. 
The Objectives of RA 8042 
Battistella identified the two primary objectives of RA 8042: “to institute the policies of 
overseas employment” and “to establish a higher standard of protection and promotion of 
the welfare of migrant workers, their families and overseas Filipinos in distress.”
27
  Both 
objectives fall in line with the popular sentiment that despite being dubbed the “bagong 
bayani” (new heroes) of Philippine economic development, OFWs were being let down by 
their own government and its agencies.  In response to the national disquiet over the 
treatment of OFWs, RA 8042 was designed to cover as many areas of the overseas 
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employment program as possible.  In essence, it was intended to provide comprehensive, 
across-the-board reforms both to the governance of the program and to the working 
conditions of those it deployed.  
On July 7, 1995, in a push to prove how serious the Ramos government was about 
protecting OFWs, the Philippines became one of the first states to ratify the International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families.
28
  This was largely symbolic considering that the treaty would not enter into force 
for another eight years; to this day, it has not been adopted by major migrant receiving 
states but instead primarily by migrant sending states.  Nevertheless, the symbolic gesture 
showed that the Philippine government would pursue whatever avenues it could in order to 
provide proactive protection to the welfare of its workers abroad.  
RA 8042: Completing the Shift to a Worker-Welfare Focus 
At its inception in 1974, the overseas employment program was a temporary measure.  By 
1995, there had come to be an acceptance that it was a permanent fixture in Philippine 
society.  What had been touted as a temporary necessity, where economic considerations 
were the driving force, became a critical survival strategy where improvements in worker 
welfare were sorely needed.  After over two decades of horror stories and tragedies, the 
Contemplacion execution was in essence the straw that broke the camel’s back.  This led to 
the passage of RA 8042 and a broader shift in which worker welfare has become the 
dominant discourse paradigm on all issues related to the overseas employment program.  
This is the case not only in the political sphere but also in the majority of academic inquiry 
on overseas labor migration from the Philippines.   
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RA 8042’s Impact 
I will now turn to analysis of the changes that RA 8042 brought to the structures and 
institutions of the overseas employment program and the relationships among its key 
actors.  The changes and impacts subsequently explored are organized by actor group, with 
government first, followed by NGOs, and the recruitment industry (business). 
Impact on Government 
Department of Foreign Affairs 
The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) was heavily impacted by the introduction of RA 
8042.  Aside from new domestic committee responsibilities, the DFA absorbed additional 
responsibilities in regard to the welfare of OFWs abroad that were previously beyond the 
scope of its mandate.  In essence the DFA would continue as the lead agency promoting 
Philippine interests in regional, international, and bilateral relationships, but would also 
become a resource center providing welfare based services for OFWs around the world.  
The global scope of the overseas employment program made the DFA the only agency 
capable of undertaking such a role.  The DFA had little experience in dealing with complex 
issues arising from the massive numbers of OFWs deploying around the globe and was 
underfunded.  The DFA could readily solve visa or passport issues for overseas Filipinos but 
found that they were ill prepared to counsel distressed, abused, and runaway OFWs.  RA 
8042’s reinforcement of the “Country Team Approach” was meant to lessen the burden on 
the DFA by bringing specialized experts into the DFA’s overseas structures to deal with the 
wide variety of challenges faced by OFWs in destination states.  Despite this reinforcement, 
as discussed in Chapters Five and Six, support for OFWs while abroad has remained 
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disjointed and woefully inadequate.  The “country team approach” meant that several 
separate organizations within the overseas employment program bureaucracy would join 
forces and thus pool expertise in support of the new worker welfare mandates. 
Although the DFA has always been mandated to pursue trade and labor agreements with 
other states, RA 8042’s emphasis on bilateral labor agreement established a new foreign 
policy priority for its diplomats.  In the latter half of the 1990s, the DFA unsuccessfully 
pushed for migrant worker agreements through regional organizations such as ASEAN.  
Instead the DFA set its sights on bilateral labor agreements, which, while easier than their 
multilateral regional and global counterparts, nonetheless present their own challenges.  
Chapter Five will explore the strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities of bilateral labor 
agreements and will further explore the DFA’s role in completing them.   
Finally, the DFA was required to establish a Legal Assistance Fund of 100 million pesos to 
fund criminal or other labor disputes involving OFWs in destination states.  Defending OFWs 
accused of crimes while overseas can be expensive and is often beyond the means of 
individual migrants.  Through the assistance fund, attorneys and experts in local legal 
systems assist OFWs in legal matters ranging from salary and contract disputes to criminal 
cases involving theft and even more serious crimes such as murder (as in the case of Flor 
Contemplacion).  The task of legally defending the rights of OFWs in dozens of states around 
the world further illustrates the unique challenges the overseas employment program 
places on the DFA and why they have experienced growing pains and difficulty in fulfilling 
their new mandate (as further discussed in Chapter Five).  This fund operated in conjunction 
with the newly created Office of Legal Assistant for Migrant Workers Affairs.  In addition to 
monitoring the legal needs of OFWs, the DFA was also now required to produce 
114 
 
assessments of which regional and international labor standards agreements destination 
states were participating in, and how well they were complying with agreement standards.  
RA 8042 requires the DFA to “monitor, assess and undertake creative approaches in the 
observance of human and labor rights of migrant workers, including legal options” in 
destination states.
29
  In essence, the DFA became obligated to supply situational reports of 
the labor landscape (with a welfare focus) in each state to which OFWs are deployed.
30
 
In summary, the DFA faces monumental challenges in filling its robust mandate. The DFA is a 
department tasked with watching over the nation’s foreign relations, broadly defined, while 
it has been forced to focus to a huge extent just on the consular elements of its mandate 
portfolio. 
The Department of Labor and Employment 
Like the DFA, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) has seen a significant 
expansion in its responsibilities toward the overseas employment program and especially 
worker welfare.  The first new responsibility for DOLE was the call to create a “Re-placement 
and Monitoring Center” conceived to place recently returned OFWs in local employment at 
home in the Philippines.  This program sought to utilize the newly acquired skills of 
returning OFWs to fill positions domestically, but failed to provide a strategy for how these 
new jobs would be created beyond the cryptic mandate that DOLE should “develop 
livelihood programs and projects for returning Filipino migrant workers in coordination with 
the private sector.”
31
  One could reasonably ask that if these jobs existed in the first place, 
why were they not filled by prospective OFWs before their international migration in search 
                                                          
29
 Ofreneo and Samonte, “Empowering Filipino Migrant Workers,” 10. 
30
 Republic of the Philippines, 9
th
 Congress, Republic Act 8042, Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 
1995, Section 22. 
31
 Ibid, Section 18 (a). 
115 
 
of employment?  If the high quality jobs were somehow able to be created, the skills 
database of returned OFWs mandated as a part of the Re-placement and Monitoring Center 
would be useful for filling the positions.  The “re-integration” side of DOLE’s mandate is 
much easier to understand as many OFWs find it difficult to fit back into Philippine society 
or even their own families after many years or even decades living abroad.  
A second and somewhat more controversial change mandated on DOLE by RA 8042 was the 
instruction to formulate a plan for the POEA to de-regulate the recruitment industry within 
five years.  Including this order in a bill designed primarily to enhance welfare and 
protection for OFWs seems counter intuitive, but the logic behind the move will be 
discussed in detail below in the section on RA 8042’s effects on the recruitment industry.  
Needless to say this initiative sparked a great deal of opposition from NGOs and migrants 
groups alike.  Several scholars have attempted to unravel the reasoning and rationale 
behind this interesting move.  It should be noted that deregulation was a popular mantra in 
the 1990s, with the notion being that if government got out of the way the private sector 
would flourish.  Despite world-wide trends, this policy objective was controversial at the 
time, as it seemed counterproductive to the objectives of the newly created worker welfare 
provisions.  In the end, no meaningful deregulation of the private sector’s participation in 
the overseas employment program has taken place since the creation of RA 8042. 
In conjunction with RA 8042’s emphasis on increasing the number of BLAs, DOLE was 
assigned the task of assisting the DFA in future BLA negotiations.  It seems at first glance 
that the POEA would be a more likely candidate to negotiate on behalf of OFW interests, but 
as the lead labor organization within the Philippine bureaucracy, and as the POEA’s parent 
organization (see organizational Chart 2.1), DOLE represents OFW interests while the DFA 
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takes the lead in both initiating and conducting negotiations.  As I will explain in Chapter Six, 
DOLE has found it tremendously difficult to cope with this task. 
The Overseas Worker Welfare Administration (OWWA) operates under DOLE and received 
some specific mandate modifications through the introduction of RA 8042.
32
  In addition to 
playing a role in DOLE’s new “re-placement and monitoring” program, OWWA was tasked 
with managing two new funds, the Emergency Repatriation Fund and the Migrant Worker 
Loan Guarantee Fund.  The Emergency Repatriation Fund was designed to cover all 
necessary expenses related to unplanned OFW repatriation.  This would include causes such 
as natural disasters, violent conflict situations, or health epidemics.  In cases of contract 
violations committed by the employer, routine completion of an employment contract, or 
death, the foreign employer and recruitment agency are the default financiers of OFW 
repatriation.  The problem with assigning the agency with paying for OFW repatriation has 
long been that the majority of OFWs are re-hires, or repeat OFWs, who no longer rely on an 
agency but rather secure work abroad via their own contacts.  OWWA’s Emergency 
Repatriation Fund was designed to solve this problem though its record of success has been 
somewhat mixed in the years since the introduction of RA 8042.  Problems over who is 
responsible for repatriation bills linger today. 
OWWA’s new Migrant Worker Loan Guarantee Fund was designed to disrupt the abusive 
lending industry that had evolved out of the recruitment process.  Some Filipinos wishing to 
find work abroad, but who were unable to pay the necessary fees, would obtain high 
interest or otherwise abusive loans from “unscrupulous” lenders or illegal recruiters.  The 
goal was for OWWA to collaborate with government financial institutions to create 
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“financing schemes that will expand the grant of pre-departure loan[s] and family assistance 
loan[s]” to help prospective OFWs achieve their goal of working abroad, while avoiding 
unnecessary financial burdens or hardship.   Unfortunately, as illegal recruiters were and are 
primarily the ones engaging in such activities, and by definition operate outside of the law, 
there was little prospect of their discontinuing the practice of offering abusive loans.  
However, the fund did provide a safe alternative should prospective OFWs choose to utilize 
it. 
The Philippines Overseas Employment Administration 
The POEA was minimally impacted by RA 8042, with only small changes made to its role and 
responsibilities.  The changes however, could have been much more sweeping.  One 
exchange during the Senate hearings on RA 8042, between Senator Ernesto Maceda and 
Ampy Robles, a recruitment industry representative, showed the extent of the changes that 
were under consideration.  While Senator Maceda seemed to be implying that the POEA 
should be changed or reformed in some way, Robles instead asserted that the problem “is 
not the office, it is the people manning it.”
33
  The key question was this: should the 
institutional structures be altered or should there be a change in personnel?  In the final 
version of the bill however, nothing approaching the broad re-structuring proposed by 
Senator Maceda was included.  Instead, several small changes were made—particularly in 
regard to POEA policies and its collaborative relationship with fellow overseas employment 
program agencies within the government bureaucracy.  This exchange highlights another 
important point to consider when investigating the relationship between government and 
business within the overseas employment program context, namely, that RAs operating 
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within the legal side of the program want to see the program’s gatekeeping institutions 
maintained because they marginalize those agencies operating illegally.  This would have 
the desired effect of decreasing illicit competition. 
The most significant change made by RA 8042 on POEA policies and procedures was the 
freezing of all fees paid by OFWs at their then-current (1995) levels.  Additionally the 
repatriation bond, which had covered any need for an OFW to be repatriated, was 
abolished.  During the Senate hearings, the consensus was that the large array of fees 
required by the POEA only added to the financial pressures which burdened prospective 
OFWs.  By freezing fees at their current levels there would be less need for Filipinos to seek 
loans from unscrupulous lenders.  In conjunction with the country specific reports created 
by the DFA, the POEA was tasked with the regular publication of travel advisories to 
“adequately prepare individuals [in] making informed and intelligent decisions about 
overseas employment.”
34
 
Other Changes in Government Oversight of the Overseas Employment Program  
In addition to the individual changes that affected each of the agencies described above, 
there were changes in RA 8042 designed to bring together the various bureaucratic entities 
to improve program coordination.  One such effort was the introduction of a Shared 
Government Information System for Migration, designed to integrate information exchange 
across a variety of government agencies with varying degrees of involvement in the 
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overseas employment program.  RA 8042 envisioned that the entire overseas employment 
program bureaucracy would build a shared and centralized database, including:
35
  
(a) Masterlists of Filipino migrant workers/overseas Filipinos classified 
according to occupation/job category, civil status, by country/state of 
destination including visa classification; 
(b) Inventory of pending legal cases involving Filipino migrant workers and 
other Filipino nationals, including those serving prison terms; 
(c) Masterlists of departing/arriving Filipinos; 
(d) Statistical profile on Filipino migrant workers/overseas Filipinos/tourists; 
(e) Blacklisted foreigners/undesirable aliens; 
(f) Basic data on legal systems, immigration policies, marriage laws and civil 
and criminal codes in receiving countries particularly those with the large 
numbers of Filipinos; 
(g) List of labor and other human rights instruments where receiving 
countries are signatories; 
(h) A tracking system of past and present gender disaggregated cases 
involving male and female migrant workers; and 
(I) Listing of overseas posts which may render assistance to overseas Filipinos, 
in general, and migrant workers, in particular.
36
 
The benefit of improved data coordination cannot be understated in terms of its importance 
for capturing and sharing relevant information for program policy makers and managers.  If 
the overseas employment program is ever to be used as a component within a larger 
national economic development strategy, as argued in this thesis, it will be vital that these 
data points be captured. The agencies which have overseen the overseas employment 
program had been plagued by redundant data collection in some areas combined with a 
total lack of data tracking in others.  Since the introduction of RA 8042, data collection and 
sharing has improved dramatically although much more could be done.  To date most 
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improvements in capturing this data have occurred on the sending side of the program.  
There is still a serious lack of data being captured for returning OFWs.
37
 
The Legislative Branch 
Although they were responsible for crafting RA 8042, the legislature did not impose any new 
responsibilities upon themselves or fundamentally change their own policy-making role in 
the overseas employment program.  The legislature did accentuate a policy shift by signaling 
that workers would only be deployed to countries that met certain standards of worker 
welfare protection, also emphasizing the need for bilateral labor agreements (more on this 
in Chapter Five).  The one new responsibility the legislature assigned themselves was the 
crowd-pleasing introduction of the Congressional Migrant Workers Scholarship Fund 
designed to “benefit deserving migrant workers and/or their immediate descendants below 
twenty-one (21) years of age who intend to pursue courses or training primarily in the field 
of science and technology.”
38
  In fact the legislature left the management of this scholarship 
program to DOLE, meaning that the inclusion of “congressional” in the program title was 
nothing more than an emblematic gesture.  
Perhaps the most important of all policy shifts and declarations included in RA 8042 was the 
legislature’s assertion that “the government, in pursuit of the national interest or when 
public welfare so requires, may, at any time, terminate or impose a ban on the deployment 
of migrant workers.”
39
  It is difficult to say what motivated this declaration.  Was this 
statement intended to portray a sense to the public that the government would put OFW 
welfare above the economic necessity the overseas employment program had become?  
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Perhaps instead this statement was meant to reinforce the “temporary” status of the 
program in the eyes of the public.  Although this statement was made, it has never been 
implemented except in limited ways, in specific countries or hot spots, such as during Iraq 
War in 2003. 
The Executive Branch 
The executive branch was given the responsibility to make several new appointments in 
relation to new offices created by RA 8042.  These included two individual OFWs to 
represent OFW concerns in policy-making within the House of Representatives, the office of 
Legal Assistant for Migrant Workers Affairs under the DFA, and new female OFW 
representatives on the POEA and OWWA boards.
40
  Through these appointments the 
president could have influence over how welfare related policies were being managed, 
implemented, and overseen.   
The Ramos administration faced tremendous challenges in the face of the Flor 
Contemplacion crisis and successfully balanced the national need for a response while 
minimizing the impact of the Philippines relationship with Singapore (as well as other 
destination states).  That being said, the efforts made by Ramos and his successors, Joseph 
Estrada after 1998 and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo after 2001, amounted to little more than 
the minimum response required to make certain that pacifying public demands for justice 
would not be accompanied by disruptions to the remittance lifeline that the economy 
required.  Under Ramos, for example, major policy initiatives focused on economic reform, 
international economic and security ties, judicial issues such as the death penalty, and—late 
in his administration—efforts to revise the 1987 constitution (widely known as charter 
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change or cha-cha).  Beyond the 1995 response to the Contemplaction execution, reform of 
the overseas employment program was not a major policy priority.  In her assessment of the 
Ramos administration’s foreign policy, Pattugalan highlighted successes and failures across a 
variety of foreign policy areas.  Despite the tremendous importance of the overseas 
employment program and the subsequent remittances, she characterized the 
administration’s response to the Contemplacion situation simply as a “[push] for greater 
attention on migrant workers.”
41
  Ramos’ leadership role on the issue was such that he 
seemed satisfied with convening the Gancayco Commission and then calling the Congress to 
a special legislative session to address the crisis through the creation of a new law.  Ramos 
did take a leading role in trying to repair the now tattered bilateral relationship with 
Singapore. 
Although the Estrada and Macapagal-Arroyo administrations paid lip service to the 
importance of the overseas employment program and OFWs, neither made the program or 
OFW issues a centerpiece of their policy agendas.  The economic fallout of the financial crisis 
was of paramount importance through Estrada’s brief but corruption-plagued presidency, 
and were still evident when Estrada was removed from office and Macapagal-Arroyo took 
over in January 2001.  Because the executive branch chose not to focus on the overseas 
employment program, it was thus left to the legislature to lead on policy formulation and 
then for the bureaucracy to both implement RA 8042 and interpret the law’s provisions.  In 
addition, and as explained further below, the Supreme Court weighed in from time to time 
on program disputes. 
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Impact on NGOs (Civil Society) 
Although migrant worker NGOs concerned with OFW welfare have existed from the earliest 
days of the overseas employment program, it was not until the waning years of the Marcos 
administration that they had any real success in their attempts to influence policy-making 
decisions.  As discussed in Chapter Three, this included NGO success in forcing Marcos to 
rescind Executive Order 857, which required OFWs to remit their earnings through 
Philippine banks.  
NGOs became progressively more important players in overseas employment program 
policy making, especially during the post-Marcos years.
42
  President Cory Aquino solicited 
NGO opinions during her across-the-board review of the overseas employment program.  
The introduction of RA 8042 signaled a new high water mark for the status of NGOs in 
overseas employment program policy making.  Enshrined in RA 8042, under the 
“Declaration of Policies” section, NGOs were officially recognized as “partners of the State in 
the protection of Filipino migrant workers and in the promotion of their welfare”; 
furthermore, “the State shall cooperate with them in a spirit of trust and mutual respect.”
43
  
While this “partnership” was well received by NGOs, the same collaborative partnership was 
not offered or expressed in regard to the recruitment industry.  NGOs were not given any 
new roles or responsibilities within RA 8042, but several expressions of cooperation were 
made instructing various agencies to coordinate their efforts with relevant NGOs.
44
  Instead 
of RA 8042 impacting NGOs, it could be argued the reverse, namely that they impacted RA 
8042.  Many of the things which underpin the bill were either long sought-after by NGOs or 
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brought forward during the Senate and House hearings on the bill.  Most importantly, NGOs 
had long lamented the inadequate support infrastructure the Philippine government was 
providing to OFWs in destination states.  Large portions of the policy and structural changes 
contained in RA 8042 dealt with these criticisms and perceived shortcomings.  NGOs, 
however, would have liked to see RA 8042 go much farther than the Congress was prepared 
to in the aftermath of Contemplacion’s execution.   
Although they would likely not readily agree, considering their expressed dissatisfaction 
with the results of RA 8042, NGOs should take pride in their role in influencing the bill and 
its subsequent outcomes.  The passage of RA 8042 enshrined worker welfare, the primary 
focus of most NGOs, as virtually the sole consideration in all policy matters related to the 
overseas employment program.  While this should be viewed positively from the NGO and 
OFW perspective, this singularly one-sided approach to the management of overseas 
employment program policy has at the same time inhibited any meaningful action on 
utilizing positive program outcomes for national economic benefit.  Attention to worker 
welfare should be complemented with a comprehensive and pragmatic national economic 
development strategy that clearly outlines the role of the overseas employment program as 
a component. 
Impact on Business 
Although the recruitment industry had been included in the hearing processes in both the 
Senate and House, the measures in the final bill outlining the definition of illegal 
recruitment and associated penalties were perceived as overly punitive.  The recruitment 
industry felt as though they were being criticized and singled out for punishment despite 
their adherence to the laws governing the overseas employment program.  Key provisions in 
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RA 8042 were intended to address actions taken by illegal recruiters operating without a 
license, but because of their broad definitions many of these provisions would affect legal 
recruiters as well.  It is easy, however, to understand why licensed recruitment agencies 
would feel threatened by the unlawful practice definitions as well as the penalties 
prescribed in the bill.  Two examples of vague and ambiguous illegal recruitment definitions 
were (1) “to engage in the recruitment or placement of workers in jobs harmful to public 
health or morality or to the dignity of the Republic of the Philippines” and (2) “To fail to 
submit reports on the status of employment, placement vacancies, remittances of foreign 
exchange earnings, separations from jobs, departures and such other matters or 
information as may be required by the Secretary of Labor and Employment.”
45
  In regard to 
the first point, the ambiguity of such a statement would make any recruitment or placement 
agency nervous.  Protecting against jobs that might be hazardous to worker welfare is 
something that government has an interest in regulating, but there has been a disturbing 
vagueness in defining exactly what types of employment do or do not harm the “morality” 
or “dignity” of OFWs.  Likewise, the second point assumes a large measure of control by the 
recruitment agency, particularly in regard to capturing data related to an OFW’s work for a 
foreign employer.  Should it, for example, be the prerogative of the recruitment agency, or 
the foreign employer for that matter, to record the details of how much or to what extent 
an OFW is remitting his or her savings?   
Recruitment industry fears were further exacerbated the following year, with the release of 
the implementation rules and regulations for RA 8042 that specified how complaints against 
recruiters would be handled: 
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Where the complaint/Report alleges that illegal recruitment activities are on-
going, surveillance shall be conducted and if such activities are confirmed, 
issuance of closure order may be recommended to the POEA Administrator 
through the Director of the Licensing and Regulation Office (Director-LRO). If 
sufficient basis for criminal action is found, the case shall be immediately 
forwarded to the appropriate office for such action.
46
 
It is not difficult to understand why recruitment agencies took a dim view of being subjected 
to surveillance based on a complaint filed by an OFW against them.  Such a relational 
arrangement is hardly conducive to either embedded autonomy or even the most basic 
definition of cooperation and fair play.  Surveillance may indeed be necessary to document 
and convict illegal recruiters, but in the implementing rules and regulations no distinction 
was made between legal and illegal recruiters in regard to the application of surveillance. 
The de-regulation of the recruitment industry’s participation in the overseas employment 
program was enshrined in the final version of RA 8042, and constituted a major policy shift 
in government-business relations.  The final language contained in RA 8042 read: 
Comprehensive Deregulation Plan on Recruitment Activities. — Pursuant to a 
progressive policy of deregulation whereby the migration of workers 
becomes strictly a matter between the worker and his foreign employer, the 
DOLE, within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, is hereby mandated 
to formulate a five-year comprehensive deregulation plan on recruitment 
activities taking into account labor market trends, economic conditions of the 
country and emerging circumstances which may affect the welfare of migrant 
workers. 
Gradual Phase-out of Regulatory Functions. — Within a period of five (5) 
years from the affectivity of this Act, the DOLE shall phase-out the regulatory 
functions of the POEA pursuant to the objectives of deregulation.
47
 
Between the finalization of the House version of the bill and the passing of the Senate’s 
version, DOLE issued an April 1995 white paper that mentioned the idea of decreasing the 
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POEA’s regulatory role over private sector recruitment agencies.  There were in fact two 
conflicting perspectives toward the regulatory role government (POEA in this case) has over 
the recruitment industry, which created a policy-making paradox of sorts.  On the one hand 
arguments were made that because so many OFW welfare problems originated from their 
interactions with recruitment agencies, either legal or illegal, more regulation was needed 
to stamp out abusive or unfair practices within the industry in order to solve the problems.  
This perspective was taken for granted in the House version of the bill and was also the 
traditional position taken by NGOs.  By the time the Senate took up its own efforts at 
forging a bill there was a conflicting perspective, most likely influenced by DOLE’s white 
paper recommendations.  Tigno articulated this opposing perspective quite well: 
Specifically, what troubled the legislators was that the government had been 
putting too much emphasis on its regulatory and control functions to the 
point that these have ceased to be effective and enforceable.  Indeed, these 
tough regulations have in fact encouraged the proliferation of illegal activities 
that have become detrimental to the rights and the interests of Filipino 
migrants.
48
 
In other words, increasingly comprehensive and strict regulations were motivating more 
agencies to decide against operating within the legal structure, in favor of acting illegally.  
The paradoxical contradiction posed by this argument was that in order to better protect 
OFWs the government needed to lessen oversight and regulation on those perceived to 
have been committing the wrongs against them.  As Tigno identified, the deregulation 
rhetoric never really matched the reality.  Even by the end of the period covered by this 
chapter, into the Macapagal-Arroyo years, no serious effort at deregulation took place 
within the overseas employment program—despite RA 8042’s provisions for it to happen.   
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During the Senate hearings, several senators engaged with testimony provided from a 
variety of backgrounds over the notion of de-regulating the recruitment industry.  One 
previously cited exchange between Senator Maceda and OPAP Chairperson Caroline Rogge, 
a recruitment industry representative, on dissolving the POEA foreshadowed this 
perspective.  If not for their regulatory role, what need would there be for the POEA?  A 
later exchange during the Senate hearings provided a more overt view of the reasoning 
behind the push for de-regulation.  
Senator Maceda: It is accepted that under any political system it is the main 
function of government to provide jobs and livelihood for its people ….[T]he 
point I’m trying to raise is, when a Filipino who has not been provided with a 
job by his government is able to find employment abroad, he should not be 
penalized by having to pay so many fees for helping himself and saving the 
government from its job of providing him an employment in this country  
.…[E]arlier there was a proposition espoused by the Department of Labor for 
a deregulation within five years’ time when necessary, which means to say 
we leave this up to the private sector, to the employers, the employees, the 
workers to handle this.   
Rogge: Yes, Mr. Senator. 
Senator Maceda: Do you agree that the increases in passport fees, the 
increases in airport tax, the increases in the travel tax, all of these are 
unreasonable collections from workers who should otherwise be provided 
jobs by their government here and they helped themselves and get jobs 
abroad, why should they be charged this continuing number of fees and 
charges that are going up year after year? 
Rogge: I agree with you , Sir. 
Senator Maceda: Right.  Do you, therefore, agree that since the Department 
of Labor is proposing a deregulation in five years that all these fees to begin 
with should be frozen at present levels and any increase should be prohibited 
plus within these five years of phase out, these fees should be phased out for 
the [OFW]? 
Rogge: Five years, sir, is too long.  It should be soonest.[Sic]
49
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Although Senator Maceda made some sweeping generalizations about the role of 
government in providing jobs to its citizens, assertions that warrant further debate if they 
were not beyond the scope of this project, his argument equating the proliferation of fees 
on OFWs as a sign of overly intrusive regulation seems to have made an impression on both 
the committee chair as well as his fellow senators.  The final Senate version did indeed 
contain de-regulation language, but surprisingly was retained during the bi-cameral 
conference between the House and Senate in combining the two versions into a final bill.  
The House version of the bill contained no such provisions.  The retention of the de-
regulation mandates under the final version of the bill is surprising primarily because the 
House’s hearings and deliberations on their version of the bill centered on increasing rather 
than decreasing regulation.  Tigno described an exchange during the bicameral conference 
when “Senator Maceda reassure[d] Representative Lopez that, given the statements of 
President Ramos, the country would have achieved NIC-hood by the year 2000” (NIC,  Newly 
Industrialized Country) insinuating that within the five-year time span of the de-regulation 
plan, the overseas employment program would no longer be relied on so heavily as the 
country will have reached a certain level of industrialization and consequently increased its 
demand for domestic labor.  Despite lingering opposition from members of the House of 
Representatives, and after several incidences of deadlock, 8 of the 13 representatives signed 
the bicameral conference report leaving the president’s signature as the last step before 
becoming a law. 
The position of the recruitment industry on the de-regulation aspects of RA 8042 were 
overwhelmingly positive, with the possible exception that many felt five years was too long 
of a transition period.  One of their key complaints against the POEA’s regulatory role (as 
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mentioned above) was that as an active participant in both the recruitment and deployment 
of OFWs through its direct hire program, it was inappropriate for the POEA to undertake 
regulatory functions over their “competitors.”  The conflict of interest, they assert, 
establishes an unequal playing field on which the recruitment agencies had to compete.  
Some, however (such as Rogge) did express a certain value in the POEA regulating the 
industry to assure that all recruitment agencies would compete under the same rules and 
requirements.   
Regulation and Deregulation:  The Mixed Messages of RA 8042 
Throughout the remainder of the 1990s, debates over RA 8042 provisions continued while 
both the numbers of deploying OFWs and their resulting remittances increased.  In 1998, 
Battistella identified 23 key provisions of RA 8042 and identified 8 as having been fully 
implemented, 6 as having been started but not fully implemented, 5 having not been 
started, and 4 with undetermined status.
50
  In regard to the five year de-regulation plan, the 
POEA seems to have made efforts to reform how it regulated the recruitment industry, but 
not any real steps toward phasing out its regulatory role.  Ofreneo and Samonte explained: 
Six years after the enactment of the law, the POEA is still actively exercising 
its regulatory functions.  It has even initiated various re-structuring activities 
referred to as part of a “streamlining” program, which results …[in] a more 
effective implementation of its regulatory functions.  There has been an 
absence of policy guidelines on how the phase-out shall be implemented, or 
an anticipation of the necessary mechanisms that will competently manage 
the enforcement of overseas employment, placement and recruitment 
regulations in a deregulated environment, such that it indeed makes good 
sense for the POEA to continue the exercise of its regulatory functions.
51
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A major problem with the de-regulation provisions contained within RA 8042 was that the 
de-regulation provisions contained in sections 29 and 30 exist in direct opposition to section 
7, which explained that “the POEA shall continue to regulate private sector participation in 
the recruitment and overseas placement of workers through its licensing and registration 
system pursuant to its Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment.”  In essence, the 
POEA was told both that it should discontinue its regulation of the recruitment industry and 
that one of its core roles was to regulate private sector involvement through its licensing 
program.   
Compounding the problem was the fact that the POEA was to create its own de-regulation 
plan, meaning that they could interpret RA 8042’s de-regulatory intent any way they 
wished.  The lack of proscribed oversight bodies or assessments from DOLE of the POEA’s 
progress toward de-regulation was a further death knell for the prospects of de-regulation 
over the recruitment industry.   As mentioned by Ofreneo and Samonte above, what did 
happen is that over time the POEA embarked on a streamlining program designed to 
improve their processes and program management across the board.
52
   
In the years following the promulgation of RA 8042, the recruitment industry continued to 
deploy increasing numbers of OFWs but also brought several legal cases against the 
government in response to RA 8042’s definition and punishments related to illegal 
recruitment as well as some of the embedded responsibilities assigned to agencies.  One 
such case, brought by a recruitment agency against the DFA and DOLE in 2001, pertained to 
the responsibilities of the RA in the wake of the death of a worker who had been deployed 
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to Korea.
53
  The agency argued that because the OFW had violated their employment 
contract by fleeing from the designated foreign employer (a factory), and subsequently 
finding work in another factory, the agency could not be held responsible for costs 
associated with the repatriation of his body and personal effects as per the rules outlined in 
RA 8042.  The agency further argued that RA 8042’s provisions requiring that advance 
payment be made in such cases as OFW deaths abroad were unconstitutional as they 
preceded the arbitration process at the National Labor Relations Commission.  In 2001, the 
court of appeals ruled against the agency and affirmed RA 8042’s provisions requiring that 
recruitment agencies be financially liable for the OFWs they deploy regardless of what 
happens once they are abroad.  On appeal of the case, in 2006, the Philippine Supreme 
Court again decided against the recruitment agency.
54
   
Virtually every group involved in the overseas employment program found reason to 
criticize RA 8042.  The POEA disliked the de-regulation provisions, perhaps because it 
removed a large portion of their responsibility and ultimately a core reason for their 
continued existence.  NGOs disliked the de-regulation provisions because they felt that the 
recruitment industry was in large part responsible for many of the wrongs perpetrated on 
OFWs and therefore required more regulation, not less.  The recruitment industry disliked 
the harsh new penalties imposed for a variety of infractions, and preferred instead to 
establish some kind of tiered penalty system with warnings for first time offences.  The legal 
operators within recruitment industry felt that they were being punished unfairly for the 
actions of those recruitment agencies which operated outside of the legal structure.  Finally, 
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individual OFWs disliked RA 8042, alleging that its measures were insufficient and largely 
glossed over the significant problems facing the program itself and the welfare of workers.  
Gonzalez explained that: 
Soon after its release, implementation of some of the sections of RA 8042 
was put on hold because of objections from certain interest groups.  Several 
hundred individuals demonstrated close to Malacañang Place arguing that RA 
8042 was passed without adequate consultation with [OFWs] and their 
representatives.  [One] issue was that while the law highlights the general 
problematic areas of labour migration, it is not clear about specific guidelines 
on what should be done.  The most devastating criticism by RA 8042’s critics 
was that the law simply would not protect migrant workers since it does not 
adequately address the social and other substantive issues linked to labour 
migration.
55
 
One of the biggest objections NGOs had with RA 8042 was its call for de-regulation of the 
recruitment industry.  From the perspective of NGOs, the recruitment industry was the 
enemy and the only way to improve OFW welfare was to increase regulation or remove 
them entirely from participation in the program.  This is of course in addition to those within 
the NGO community who believe that the only way to protect OFW welfare and stop their 
exploitation is to completely and immediately end the overseas employment program.
56
  
The paradox with the de-regulation clauses of RA 8042, as mentioned above, was the notion 
that there would be fewer rights violations against OFWs by regulating the recruitment 
industry less.
57
  This disconnect between the stated policy objectives in RA 8042 and the 
total lack of any meaningful progress on this issue highlights a common theme in Philippine 
policy making, where is it common for laws not to be well implemented.  This happens for a 
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variety of reasons such as inadequate funding, lack of relevant training or skills in the 
departments, overly ambitious policy objectives exceeding bureaucratic capacity, and poor 
implementation guidelines. 
Conclusion 
The passage of RA 8042 involved a number of missed opportunities that could have made a 
real difference in both matters of OFW welfare as well as the developmental benefits the 
program could potentially provide to the national economy.    Although there are many 
important issues which were omitted from RA 8042, two shortcomings stand out: first, a 
failure to acknowledge the overseas employment program’s importance to the Philippine 
economy and to better integrate it into future development plans, and second, no plan to 
improve cooperation among stakeholders thereby maximizing both welfare and economic 
benefits for all. 
For the purposes of this project, the first shortcoming is particularly important as RA 8042 
was the perfect opportunity for the government to re-assess how the program could be 
better utilized within a national economic development framework.  Instead, the legislature 
acknowledged the program’s importance, and then proceeded to disavow its role in official 
economic development policy.  Taking this stance was counterproductive, and did not 
contribute either to worker welfare or to better utilization of the economic benefits to the 
country coming from the overseas employment program.  The National Economic 
Development Authority (NEDA) did not appear to play a role in the hearings leading up to 
RA 8042, nor was there any big-picture shift in placing the program within NEDA’s medium-
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term development plans.
58
  Furthermore, the most basic denials in RA 8042 of the overseas 
employment program’s role in achieving national development, namely, the declaration 
that “the State does not promote overseas employment as a means to sustain economic 
growth and achieve national development,” may have made it impossible for the 
government to truly partner with the recruitment industry to maximize the program’s 
developmental potential.
59
 
In regard to the second shortcoming, improving cooperation among overseas employment 
programs stakeholders, one can note another missed opportunity in RA 8042.  While there 
was political will for all concerned parties to work together for greater welfare and 
prosperity for OFWs, the tone adopted by the legislators (particularly in the Senate) in the 
wake of Contemplacion’s execution made it clear that they intended to assign blame for the 
perceived failures that led to her execution.  Rather than singling out one group such as the 
recruitment industry, what ultimately happened in RA 8042 was that the Congress 
attempted to divide the blame equally between the recruitment industry and the 
bureaucracy.  To avoid the impression that they were playing a blame game they embedded 
explanations into the bill as to why each was guilty but further explained how these 
problems would be overcome by the bill’s provisions.  In the case of the recruitment 
industry, over-regulation was the stated cause for the recruitment industry’s poor 
performance, and would be remedied through de-regulation.
60
  For the bureaucracy, 
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inadequate funding and poor coordination among agencies had been the culprit and would 
be rectified by addressing those points.   
The NGOs did not share in the blame game, but were instead upheld as the “defenders of 
the OFW” and declared to be “partners” with the government.  The sentiments expressed 
by the legislature toward the NGOs demonstrate that the Philippine state is capable of 
establishing cooperative relationships with the private sector.  In this case, however, the 
expressions of partnership with NGOs were disingenuous and more due to populist politics 
and national sentiments related to the execution of Contemplacion.  A more pragmatic 
approach to fixing problems with any government program is to partner with all its 
stakeholders.  The legislature itself assumed no responsibility for the state of neglect the 
overseas employment program was in during the mid-1990s.  There were no 
acknowledgements of the tardiness of their reform efforts until after a high-profile 
international incident, and subsequent demonstration and national outrage.  The reality is 
that the legislature would never have acted to improve worker welfare or the program at 
large if not for the Contemplacion saga.  By deflecting criticism of its own failure to 
effectively manage the overseas employment program, and putting major focus instead on 
the recruitment industry, Congress seems to have effectively inhibited any meaningful 
cooperation between government and business.     
Rather than assigning blame and assorted fixes for the supposed failings of program 
participants, it would have been more constructive for a once-in-a-generation, high-caliber 
bill to be carefully considered in a methodical, cooperative fashion.  This would, optimally, 
be based on mutual respect with the goal of improving not only worker welfare but 
implementing meaningful reforms that might improve all aspects of the program and its 
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benefits toward both the country’s economy and individual OFWs.  The Contemplacion saga 
was an opportunity for a thoroughgoing national reevaluation of the overseas employment 
program.  Instead, cosmetic changes were adopted and the program carried on without 
even determining what it was really meant to accomplish for the Philippines.  In Chapter 
Two, I examined the positive benefits that came forth, in the East Asian tigers, when 
government cooperates with business and government policies align with long-term private 
business interests.  Had RA 8042 been acclaimed by OFWs or NGOs alike, then perhaps one 
could argue that the bill was successful in accomplishing its objectives.  But by failing either 
to improve coordination among stakeholders or to leverage the program’s economic 
benefits for national development, RA 8042 was widely condemned by many sectors of 
Philippine society.  Rhodora Abano from the Center for Migrant Advocacy (an NGO which 
advocates for improvement in government policies toward migrant rights and welfare) 
characterized the creation of RA 8042 as the codification of the worst aspects of the 
overseas employment program, particularly with regard to the permanent normalization of 
the system in which it is permissible for recruitment agencies to charge prospective OFWs 
placement fees.
61
  In the House of Representatives, current Overseas Workers Affairs 
Committee secretary Atty. Christopher Lomibao explained that RA 8042 was flawed in many 
ways, particularly the joint solidary liability provisions with regard to OFW money claims 
against employers (as discussed further in Chapter Five).
62
  Lito Soriano, a recruitment 
agency owner and long-time industry advocate, declared that portions of RA 8042 were not 
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simply bad but actually unconstitutional.
63
  Soriano was involved in the recruitment 
industry’s efforts to bring a suit (described above) against certain portions of RA 8042, 
particularly the provisions which mandated that agencies would be held financially liable for 
contract violations perpetrated by foreign employers on OFWs.  This issue is further 
examined in the next chapter. 
The speed at which RA 8042 was rushed through meant that important issues requiring 
careful attention and sensitive calibration were instead subjected to stop-watch 
negotiations.  One might counter this argument, however, that the intensity of public outcry 
demanded immediate action to better protect OFWs.  This argument is most certainly true, 
but if the government had explained to the public that this bill was too important to be 
rushed, and then proceeded to work for another few weeks or a month on making the bill 
better with the help of program stakeholders, some of the problems that have subsequently 
cropped up might have been avoided.  Additional major legislative fixes for the overseas 
employment program introduced since then might have also been unnecessary.  It is hard to 
believe that something as important as the overseas employment program, accounting for 
such a large percentage of the Philippine economy could only be allocated a few days of the 
legislature’s time.  As will be discussed further in Chapter Six, the legislature’s short-
sightedness meant that there would be a future need for further legislative intervention on 
an even grander scale than RA 8042.  Placing all of the blame squarely on the shoulders of 
the legislature would be unfair, considering the serious lack of executive leadership by 
President Ramos on the issue.  Strong executive leadership could have provided the longer 
term, big-picture focus that was conspicuously absent from RA 8042.  Instead of leading 
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from the front on the issue, President Ramos was content to let others shape the future 
direction of one of the most important government programs in the country.  In the next 
chapter it will become clear that Ramos will not be the last president to pay lip service to 
the importance of the overseas employment program and reap its economic stabilizing 
benefits while refusing to engage in any substantial executive leadership on program policy. 
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Chapter Five: Government-Business Relations in the Overseas Migration Policy Process, 
2004-2011   
Before arriving in Manila in July 2009, I knew that significant efforts were underway to 
reform RA 8042, the landmark legislation that had governed the overseas employment 
program since 1995.  I had not yet heard, however, about the growing controversy over a 
particular provision in the proposed bill.  This provision mandated that liability insurance be 
purchased by Recruitment Agencies (RAs) for overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) to provide 
coverage related to a variety of problems sometimes faced while abroad.  Over the next five 
months, along with other research efforts, I conducted interviews with a variety of program 
actors and came to realize that I was witnessing first-hand not only a major shift in the 
direction of the overseas employment program but also a perfect example of how overseas 
employment program actors interact with one another in the policy-making process.  In 
capturing the struggles between actors and exploring their perspectives, as well as the 
reasons behind them, it is my belief that insight can be gained into why the program has 
evolved in such a  patchwork, haphazard way.  At one level, this bill and the process by 
which it was debated, fought over, and compromised upon should be viewed as a case 
study of the overseas employment program policy process works in the Philippines.  More 
importantly, and of particular relevance to the overall objectives of this research project, it 
provides insight into the troubling lack of communication, dialogue, and mutual 
understanding among major program actors. 
Between 2004 and 2008 the Philippines’ overseas employment program proceeded much as 
it had since the introduction of RA 8042 in 1995: the number of OFWs deploying abroad 
increased year by year with no end in sight, and the government displayed no desire to 
deviate from the present course.  By 2006, the number of OFWs deployed in a single year 
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surpassed the one million mark for the first time (see Table 5.1 below).1  The bill that aimed 
to introduce liability insurance and reform many parts of RA 8042 would eventually be 
known as Republic Act 10022 (RA 10022), though its full name characterized it as an 
amendatory act of RA 8042.2  There were a number of agencies, organizations, and private 
associations involved in the creation and implementation of RA 10022.  This chapter is 
arranged according to the framework outlined in Chapter Two, with the roles and actions of 
the government actors described first, followed by a discussion of the same for business.  
For the sake of simplicity, the policy process and actor perspectives and arguments 
described in this chapter are thus divided accordingly between government and business.  A 
third section on non-government organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs), 
and the media are included to provide solid coverage of the perspectives of the primary 
overseas employment program actors.  In this chapter, a single policy effort will be isolated 
and explored using the government-business relations framework outlined in Chapter Two.   
Table 5.1 
Total of Deployed Overseas Filipino Workers  
(Land and Sea-based) 
Year Total Deployed % increase over previous year 
2004 
 
933,588 
 
7.56% 
2005 
 
988,615 
 
5.89% 
2006 
 
1,062,567 
 
7.48% 
2007 
 
1,077,623 
 
1.42% 
2008 
 
1,236,013 
 
14.70% 
2009 
 
1,422,586 
 
15.09% 
2010   1,470,826   3.39% 
Total 2004 - 2010 8,191,818 Average 7.93% 
Source: POEA 
                                                          
1
 Philippines Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), A Compendium of Overseas Employment Statistics 
2006, accessed June 21, 2012, http://www.poea.gov.ph/stats/2006Stats.pdf. 
2
 The full name of the act (capitalized in the original text) is: AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8042, 
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE MIGRANT WORKERS AND OVERSEAS FILIPINOS ACT OF 1995, AS AMENDED, 
FURTHER IMPROVING THE STANDARD OF PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF THE WELFARE OF MIGRANT 
WORKERS, THEIR FAMILIES AND OVERSEAS FILIPINOS IN DISTRESS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. 
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Before the bill 
As the global financial crisis unfolded in 2008, the reality of the Philippines’ vulnerability to 
downturns in the global economy as well as individual economies around the world began 
to be felt acutely.  Fearing how the global financial crisis would impact the Philippines’ 
heavy reliance on remittance income, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued an 
administrative order in December of 2008 with the objective of filling “the possible slack 
that may be caused by the constricting market in traditional host countries such as the 
continental United States.”3  In order to address the prospective problem of diminished 
OFW deployments (and thereby remittances), Arroyo ordered that seven actions be taken.   
1. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration shall execute a 
paradigm shift by refocusing its functions from regulation to full-blast 
markets development efforts[sic], the exploration of frontier, fertile job 
markets for Filipino expatriate workers. 
2. Within the next few weeks, the POEA shall submit to the President a 
global employment map with emphasis on what can be called the Code 
Green areas, countries that are aggressively recruiting foreign workers, 
hence, natural deployment sites for Filipino expatriates. 
3. The Cabinet shall render full support to the POEA so it can aggressively 
deploy Filipino expatriates into the aforementioned Code Green countries 
with urgency and unbothered by institutional hurdles. 
4. The POEA shall update and expand its Rolodex on its country-contacts, 
global companies recruiting expatriate workers, international head 
hunters and manpower placement agencies with a global reach. 
5. The target shall be to increase the countries currently hosting Filipino 
workers and break through the 200-country barrier. 
6. The Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) shall 
recast its priorities in line with the aggressive labor marketing efforts of 
the POEA. 
7. TESDA shall intensify its skills retraining and skills upgrading program. 
(emphasis added)4 
                                                          
3
 Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, Administrative Order No. 247, (Manila, December 4, 2008). 
4
 Ibid. 
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There are several things that can be learned from an examination of this administrative 
order.  The first and perhaps most important is the monumental policy shift that is implied 
by President Arroyo’s new marching-orders for the Philippines Overseas Employment 
Administration (POEA).  The longstanding official position of the Philippine government has 
always been that the overseas employment program was a choice for Filipino workers, and 
not something that the government promoted or emphasized.  This standing policy 
perspective situates the Philippine government simply as the guarantor of an “overseas 
option” for Filipino workers.  In contrast, this order clearly shifts the role of the POEA from 
one of program oversight to one of program promotion and enhancement.  Secondly, the 
fact that such a long-held policy position has been abandoned in the face of the global 
financial crisis validates the importance that the overseas employment program plays in the 
Philippine economy.  If it were merely a government- guaranteed option and not crucial to 
the national economy, why then would Arroyo have insisted on such aggressive measures to 
assure that program outcomes (namely deployments and remittances) would not be 
diminished because of the threat of global recession?  Thirdly, President Arroyo’s 
abandonment of the decades-long policy position highlights how external shifts in the global 
economic climate exposed the vulnerability of the Philippine economy to its singular 
reliance on remittance income.  As we will discuss in Chapter Six, when times of economic 
hardship hit destination countries, it is often migrant workers who are the first to lose their 
livelihoods.  Lastly, the underlying context of President Arroyo’s order demonstrates that it 
is in the government’s best interest for the overseas employment program to continue on 
its growth trajectory, and that any negative program trends could have disastrous 
economic, political, and social consequences for the Philippines.  This again supports my 
assertion in previous chapters that if the overseas employment program plays such a crucial 
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role to the Philippines, why then had it not previously been embraced as an element of a 
national development strategy?  In essence, President Arroyo’s administrative order signals 
that the program is not only important to the country, but possibly the most important 
element of national economic policy. 
It was within this climate of uncertainty of how the global financial crisis would affect the 
Philippines’ overseas employment program that the case study occurred over a period of 
time stretching from late 2008 until July 2010. In this chapter, I will follow a particular piece 
of migration-related legislation from inception to formal codification into Philippine law.  
Special attention will be paid to the debates and consultations which took place between 
government, business, the media and civil society groups while the bill proceeded through 
the legislative process.  While it was initially conceived as a relatively minor policy 
adjustment initiative, RA 10022 has become a major policy turning point for the Philippine 
overseas employment program perhaps only superseded in importance by the 1974 labor 
code and RA 8042.  Through careful exploration of this particular event, insight will be 
gained into how government and business and other actors interact within the context of 
the overseas employment program. 
Republic Act 10022: Genesis to Major Reform 
In the years following the passage of RA 8042 there were occasional efforts to reform 
various parts of the legislation.  The genesis of the bill that eventually became RA 10022 
began in 2008 and centered on the issue of compensation for OFWs whose overseas 
employment contracts had been violated.  The issues adjoining OFW labor contracts are 
complex and have been the subject of numerous Supreme Court cases, but suffice to say the 
crux of the problem centered around who was responsible for fulfilling the terms of a 
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contract in those instances in which the terms were violated due in no part to the actions of 
the OFW.  Under RA 8042 the recruitment agency, through which the contract was 
arranged, was responsible for paying the worker the remaining (unexpired) portion of 
compensation for the duration of the contract.  RA 8042 used the term “joint and solidary 
responsibility” (JSL) to refer to the dual responsibility of Philippine recruitment agencies and 
the foreign employer for such actions as illegal contract termination by a destination 
employer.  In real terms this could mean, for example, that an OFW whose 24-month 
contract was terminated illegally by the destination employer four months into the contract 
period could seek compensation for the remaining 20 months from both the destination 
employer and the recruitment agency which arranged the contract.  Cases of this nature are 
brought by OFWs before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which then 
makes a decision on fault and how much compensation is owed.  Recruitment agencies are 
required to pay the OFW the amount determined by the NRLC .  
At this point in the process it became apparent that there was a major problem with the 
system under RA 8042.  Given the competitive nature of the overseas employment industry 
in the Philippines, it is not uncommon for individual recruitment agencies to go out of 
business.  This then leaves the OFW uncompensated.  Under the old system, the solution to 
this problem was for the OFW to be paid from the 1 million peso (approximately US$23,000) 
escrow account that all licensed recruitment agencies were required to establish at 
reputable Philippine banks as a precondition to obtaining a license to deploy workers 
overseas legally.  In many cases this arrangement worked as conceived, but if for example 
there were more than one OFW claimant, and if they happened to be higher paid ‘skilled’ 
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workers in the 20 month scenario given above, the amounts owed them could quickly 
exceed the escrow account balance.  Chart 5.2 illustrates the dispute process visually. 
The Commission on Audit (COA) released a report in May 2008 after having audited the 
overseas employment program for over a year.  Susan P. Garcia of COA explained in the 
forward to the report that “the audit was conducted to assess the effectiveness of the 
government in regulating overseas recruitment activities and providing sufficient and 
responsive services to OFWs to promote their decent and productive employment.”5  
Although the audit report comprehensively covered a variety of issues and topics, a great 
deal of attention was spent addressing the issue (outlined above) of difficulties faced by 
OFWs seeking compensation for contract violations.  In assessing the degraded and 
inadequate state of the escrow fund repayment system, the COA explained that considering 
“the total claims for the period January 2006 to June 2007 alone from each recruitment 
agency already ranged from 5,000 [pesos] to 6,088,500 [pesos], the escrow deposit of 
1,000,000 [pesos] was no longer sufficient to ensure full recovery of OFW claims from the 
concerned recruitment agencies.”6  To put these statistics into human terms, the COA found 
that claims from 452 OFWs against 49 recruitment agencies went unpaid during the audit 
period due to a lack of available funds from the escrow account system.7 
 
                                                          
5
 Ibid.   
6
 Ibid., 43. 
7
 Ibid., 35. 
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Chart 5.2 (source8)  
 
 
                                                          
8
 Commission on Audit, Government’s Overseas Workers’ Welfare Program, Management Services Report No. 
2007-01, 2008, 15, accessed on June 20, 2012, http://www.coa.gov.ph/GWSPA/2007/OWWP.asp.   
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After identifying the obstacles faced by OFWs seeking compensation for contract violations, 
COA proposed that the escrow account be increased by 50 percent to 1.5 million pesos 
($35,500 USD) in order to assure payouts.  The audit team however did not seem convinced 
that raising the escrow account amount would solve the problem.  As they reported, 
The team acknowledged the efforts being exerted by the POEA in ensuring 
that legal claims of OFWs will be covered in the proposed increase of escrow 
deposit.  However, the proposed amount of 1.5 M [pesos] may still not be 
sufficient.  The maintenance of a separate insurance cover would be a good 
alternative for OFWs even if it takes time to be released than having nothing 
to claim at all [sic].9 
The COA thus proposed that the escrow account requirement be raised to 1.5 million pesos, 
and that the POEA should “consider the establishment of separate fund/insurance to cover 
the risk related to unsatisfied claims of OFWs.”10  This proposal proved to be a standout 
recommendation from the COA report; as we further explore the policy-making process that 
ultimately led to RA 10022, it will become clear that lawmakers and others seized upon this 
recommendation in their efforts to reform the overseas employment program as outlined 
under RA 8042.  In subsequent sections of this chapter the developments and deliberations 
leading to the completions of RA 10022 will be explored from the perspectives of 
stakeholders in the policy-making process.  First, perspectives on the process from 
government actors will be shared, followed by the perspectives of business and then by 
those of civil society groups and the media. 
 
 
                                                          
9
 Commission on Audit, Report No. 2007-01, 43. 
10
 Ibid., 104. 
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Government 
House of Representatives 
The legislative origins of RA 10022 were similar in both the Senate and the House of 
Representatives, but exploring the timelines and sequence of events in each provides an 
overall understanding of how this important bill came into being.  In 2008 the Philippine 
House of Representatives saw a number of bills introduced aimed at revising RA 8042 in a 
variety of ways.  These five bills were ultimately consolidated into a single bill (House Bill No. 
5649) and a series of hearings were held by the House Committee on Overseas Workers 
Affairs (COWA).11  During COWA’s hearings representatives from a cross-section of 
government agencies, business interests, and civil society groups testified on the matters of 
consideration.  According to COWA Committee Secretary Atty. Christopher Lomibao it was 
actually a representative from the NGO Center for Migrant Advocacy (CMA) who 
recommended that the committee review the aforementioned COA audit report.12  COWA’s 
hearings on the HB 5649 brought in a wide cross-section of stake holders involved in the 
overseas employment program and covered a diverse range of issues related to improving 
worker welfare and protection.  Paramount among the proposals discussed during the 
hearings was the concept of third party liability insurance to provide compensation to OFWs 
who experience contract violations. 
Although the rationale for exploring the timeline of these legislative processes may not 
seem immediately clear, it is important to understand this timeline in order to better 
appreciate the perspectives of both government officials and businesspersons that will be 
                                                          
11
 House of Representatives, House Bill No. 5649 consolidated House Bills 628, 699, 700, 769 and 4783, 
Fourteenth Congress, Second Regular Session (Manila, 2009). 
12
 Atty. Christopher Lomibao, Committee Secretary Overseas Workers Affairs, Republic of the Philippines 
House of Representatives, interviewed by author November 2009. 
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shared later in this chapter.  COWA’s bill was presented for its first reading on the House 
floor December 17, 2008 after which it was referred to the House Committee on Rules.  
Shortly after returning from the legislative holiday break (December 17, 2008 – January 19, 
2009) the revised bill was approved via an oral vote during its second reading on February 3, 
2009 at which time the period for “debate and amendment” for the bill was ended.  On the 
18 of February copies of the finalized bill were distributed to all members of Congress for 
them to review.  Seven days later on February 24, the third and final reading of the bill was 
approved.  In the final vote there were 127 yeas, 0 nays, and 0 abstentions.  It is striking that 
only 127 representatives of the 267 members of the House of Representatives (or 47 
percent of the total) chose to have their votes recorded on such an important piece of 
legislation affecting such a large number of Filipinos, not to mention the national economy.  
Perhaps even more astonishing was the fact that no issues or portions of the bill were 
debated on the House floor; it was simply passed.  A few days later, the now completed bill 
was transmitted to the Philippine Senate for consideration.   
From its introduction until it was approved, the House version of the bill (HB 5649) 
traversed the lower chamber in only 18 legislative days.  This does not constitute a record, 
nor is it necessarily exceptionally fast by the standards of the Philippine House of 
Representatives.  It is, however, rather fast for a bill with such widespread implications 
across the Philippine economy and one that will directly impact so many individuals, not to 
mention their families as well as the business community tasked with executing the 
program.  It should be noted again that the process did not technically begin when the bill 
was initially introduced on December 17, 2008, but rather previously introduced bills 
authored by a variety of congresspersons were consolidated into what became HB 5649.  
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Technical working groups (hearings) had been organized and resource persons were invited 
to share their perspectives on the proposals contained within the draft bill.   
Senate 
The story of the Senate’s own version of the bill has similar origins as HB 5649.  Between 
2007 and 2009, five senators introduced 10 bills aimed at either revising aspects of RA 8042 
or otherwise reforming elements of the overseas employment program (see Chart 5.3 
below).  These bills were ultimately consolidated into Senate Bill 3286 (SB 3286).  Senators 
Lapid, Gordon, Estrada, and Revilla each offered a single reform-minded bill during this 
period while Senator Villar offered five bills on the subject.  Three of Senator Villar’s five bills 
were offered after his September 2008 declaration of his candidacy for the Presidency of 
which OFW welfare became one of his signature campaign issues.13  The 10 Senate bills 
were really a medley of disparate welfare-focused reforms designed to address populist 
sentiment toward the unfortunate plight of OFWs.  Remarkably, much of the language 
presented in the “Explanatory Note” introductions to the bills, which justified the need for 
the proposed reform, betray these Senators’ views of just how dependent the Philippine 
economy has become on the overseas employment program.   
In highlighting the need for better health insurance and retirement benefits for OFWs in his 
proposal, Senator Lapid explained: 
For many years now, these migrant workers have played a major role in 
keeping the Philippine economy from going bankrupt, particularly during the 
financial crunch of the 1990’s.  Today, our [OFWs] have evolved to become 
the biggest dollar earners for the country… admittedly, our migrant workers 
                                                          
13
 Bi Mingxin, ed., “Philippine Senate head confirms joining 2010 presidential election,” China View, last 
modified 4 September 2008, accessed 3 January 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-
09/04/content_9769905.htm. 
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are the ones who continue to salvage our debt-ridden economy from going 
down the drain (emphasis added).14 
Chart 5.3 
Senate Bills consolidated into SB 3286 
Introduced by Senator: SB # Date Introduced Primary proposal(s) 
Manuel M. Lapid 54 30-Jun-07 Adding a pension/benefit scheme to 
RA 8042 for OFWs 
Richard J. Gordon 149 30-Jun-07 Enhancing/improving emergency 
repatriation arrangements of RA 
8042 
Jinggoy P. Ejercito-Estrada 154 30-Jun-07 Increase number of BLAs, establish 
higher standards of OFW protection 
Manny Villar 1879 15-Nov-07 Establish strict penalties on Gov't 
officials who fail to protect OFWs 
Manny Villar 2231 30-Apr-08 Provide enhanced legal and 
financial assistance to distressed 
OFWs  
Manny Villar 2288 15-May-08 Increase penalties against 
Recruitment Agencies who deploy 
minors 
Manny Villar 2698 6-Nov-08 Provide comprehensive insurance 
policies to OFWs 
Manny Villar 3040 4-Feb-09 Provide compulsory welfare 
insurance to OFWs 
Ramon A. Revilla Jr. 3168 20-Apr-09 Compulsory insurance, strict ban on 
deployments to high-risk states 
Manny Villar 3180 22-Apr-09 Establish strict penalties on Gov't 
officials who violate deployment 
rules 
 
Senator Estrada justified his proposal to enhance OFW welfare protection by explaining that 
“it is only proper as OFWs deserve the concern, having proven that they can help ease the 
burden of the very economy that drove them to work abroad and be far from their 
families.”15  Likewise Senator Villar explained that “the contribution of Filipino overseas 
workers in the country’s economic recovery has proven to be both vital and 
                                                          
14
 Manuel M. Lapid, Senator, Senate Bill No. 54, Philippines 14
th
 Congress (Manila, June 30, 2007). 
15
 Jinggoy Ejercito-Estrada, Senator, Senate Bill No. 154, Philippines 14
th
 Congress, (Manila, June 30, 2007). 
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indispensable.”16  Senator Villar went a step further in another of his proposed bills in 
proclaiming the importance of the overseas employment program to the national economy 
amid fears over how the global financial crisis would impact OFW deployments: 
It can be acknowledged that a drawn-out global recession could result in 
unforeseen responses by OFW-receiving countries and their foreign 
employers, such as the inability to adjust their acceptance of OFWs that could 
cause their possible repatriation due to employment termination or decrease 
in salary and other employment benefits.  Millions of Filipino families 
dependent of the OFWs’ remittances could face a socio-economic 
catastrophe that would in turn direly affect the country.  Our concern for the 
overseas employment sector should be foremost as we share a social 
responsibility of ensuring that the country’s economic stability in this time of 
crisis and strengthening the ability of our OFWs to cope with the effects of 
such a crisis.[sic]17 
Collectively these sentiments, as well as others made in each of the 10 bills, constitute a 
recognition on the part of the Philippine Senate that the overseas employment program is 
vital to the survival of the Philippine economy.  Nevertheless, despite these admissions the 
bills they proposed only addressed welfare-related problems to the exclusion of all else.  It is 
curious that they would think that after identifying the tremendous importance of the 
program to the country that their next step would be to increase regulations, red-tape, 
penalties, and other cost burdens on the economic sector that they claim is the country’s 
life blood.  The larger point is that the measures they propose seem incompatible with the 
enforcement capacity of the Philippine state.18  It would seem more logical for them to have 
pursued enhanced welfare protections for OFWs while positioning the program itself more 
prominently within the national development strategy considering its singular importance.  
                                                          
16
 Manny Villar, Senator, Senate Bill No. 3180, Philippines 14
th
 Congress, (Manila, April 22, 2009). 
17
 Manny Villar, Senator, Senate Bill No. 2698, Philippines 14
th
 Congress, (Manila, November 6, 2008). 
18
 It is possible to imagine some of these welfare measures getting funded from the wealth generated by 
remittances, but that would require a far more adept state than that which currently exists, and any 
encroachment by the state on OFW remittances would likely prove as unpopular as Marcos’ attempts to do so 
in the early 1980s (see Chapter Three). 
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Particularly confusing was Senator Villar’s follow up to the quote given above about the risks 
posed by the global financial crisis where he explained that “in times of uncertainty such as 
what we are facing in the overseas employment market, the best strategic approach is to 
increase and strengthen OFW protection.”19  Worker welfare is perpetually important and 
should be enhanced wherever possible, but the Senator’s logic in this regard is somewhat 
incoherent.  Exactly how does enhancing OFW protection abroad address the concern that 
their jobs and compensation may be at risk by a change in financial circumstances for 
destination employers, or the economy in destination states?  The correlation that the 
Senator seems to be alluding to simply does not exist.   
In reality, President Arroyo’s approach just one month later in December 2008, in 
Administrative Order No. 247, seems much more in line with how policy makers might be 
able to ameliorate the potential effects of the financial crisis.  As discussed above, it 
proactively sought to enhance job opportunity sourcing and expedite the opening of new 
opportunities for OFWs.  In times of global financial instability, it seems more appropriate to 
focus on developing new OFW opportunities and improving program efficiencies in order to 
reduce costs for all parties involved. 
As shown in Chart 5.3, there had then been ten separate bills proposed by five senators by 
March of 2009, when House Bill 5649 was transmitted to the Senate.20  It was almost three 
months later, on May 27, 2009, when the Senate acted; rather than starting with the House 
version of the bill, however, they simply consolidated their own ten bills into a single one.  
HB 5649 was a mere four pages upon its completion, while SB 3286 ballooned to 27 pages 
likely resulting from it being merged from 10 separate bills.  The primary sponsor of SB 3286 
                                                          
19
 Villar, Senate Bill 2698, 2008. 
20
 HB 5649 was transmitted to the Senate on 4 March, 2009. 
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was Senator Jinggoy Ejercito-Estrada, who upon introducing the bill gave a brief speech 
describing its importance: 
It is a known fact that since the labor export industry was instituted in 1974, 
the Philippine economy has become increasingly dependent on the 
remittances of overseas Filipino and OFWs.  Indeed, the labor export industry 
is one of the major dollar-earning industries in the country.  Despite the 
significant and continuous contribution of our OFWs in our economy, they 
have yet to get a fair share of protection they deserve from the 
government.21 
After Senator Estrada made his case for the bill’s adoption, the periods of interpellation, 
amendment, and consideration were all immediately ended with the bill being approved on 
its second reading.  The next legislative day (five days later, on June 1, 2009) the bill was 
approved on its final (third) reading without debate, discussion, amendment or revision.  SB 
3286 was approved by a vote of 12 (of 24) senators in favor, 0 against, and 0 abstentions.  
Remarkably, Senator Villar did not vote on the bill at all despite his contributions to its 
contents and his expressed passion on the issue.   
Final legislative steps 
Three days later, on June 3, the Senate requested a conference committee between the 
House of Representative and the Senate to rectify the disagreeing provisions of the two 
versions.  The Senate/House conference committee completed its work during several 
meetings held between August and December 2009.  The final conference committee report 
was approved in both Houses in January 2010, after which the now completed bill went to 
President Arroyo’s desk for final approval.  President Arroyo chose neither to sign the bill 
nor to veto it; in accordance with Article VI of the Philippine Constitution, the law was 
                                                          
21
 Jinggoy Ejercito-Estrada, Senate Journal – Session No. 81, Philippine Senate, 14
th
 Congress 2
nd
 Regular 
Session, 2410 (Manila, May 27, 2009). 
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approved and formally became Republic Act 10022 on March 8, 2010.  The reasons for 
President Arroyo’s failure to sign such an important piece of legislation can only be 
speculated upon, but may have something to do with the fact that election season had 
arrived by early 2010 and she, as well as her party, was anxiously engaged in election season 
politics.  Perhaps due to election fever which had hit the Philippines by March 2010, there 
was surprisingly little written in the press about President Arroyo’s decision, aside from 
reports on the dissatisfaction of NGO groups toward her refusal to veto the bill.  According 
to John Leonard Monterona, Middle East regional coordinator of Migrante, a large multi-
national migration-focused NGO, “It seems that President Arroyo found her way not to sign 
it so she could escape from the ire of millions of OFWs and their dependents.”22  
The end result of this legislative effort, the bulk of which having been conducted in 
approximately 12 months, was a 37-page bill that made substantial changes to RA 8042, the 
law that had governed one of the most important aspects of the Philippine economy for the 
previous 15 years.  Key among the changes to the program was the creation of a new 
liability insurance mandate that was designed not only to protect OFWs from lost wages, 
but to provide them with a slate of enhanced protections while abroad.  As one continues to 
explore the perspectives of the actors involved in the overseas employment program, in 
both government and business, it will become obvious that the inclusion of the insurance 
provision of RA 10022 demonstrates much of what is wrong with how government and 
business cooperate within the context of the overseas employment program—to the 
detriment of the overseas employment program, the national economy, and nation as a 
whole. 
                                                          
22
 Pam Brooke Casin, “Migrante criticizes amendment to law on migrant workers,” Manila Bulletin Publishing 
Corporation, last modified March 21, 2010, http://www.mb.com.ph/articles/248923/migrante-criticizes-
amendment-law-migrant-workers. 
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For the most part members of Congress had nothing but good things to say about the 
passage of RA 10022.  Speaking to OFWs in Kuwait, Senate President Pro Tempre Jinggoy 
Estrada exclaimed that: 
More than giving the much-deserved verbal recognition to our OFWs, it is 
more proper that the government translate talk into concrete and immediate 
response to the needs of our OFWs.  I think [the provisions of SB 3286] would 
be [the] highest form of appreciation that we can extend to our bagong 
bayani [new heroes].23 
In contrast, House Overseas Workers Affairs Committee Secretary Christopher Lomibao 
identified the crux of a problem (described at length later in the chapter) centering on the 
expansion of the proposed insurance coverage among the narrowly defined “liability” 
parameters from HB 5649 to the vastly expanded coverages in SB 3286.  He explained that: 
The Senate version has adopted the House version, making it mandatory.  
Under the present version of the bicam, in the current version we have 
expanded coverages: natural death, accidental death, permanent 
disablement, repatriation including the remains – if the worker dies, and 
subsistence allowance in case the worker is involved in a case against a 
foreign employer.  For these additional insurance coverages, we have even 
raised the condition of non-contestability, meaning no-contest, if the worker 
dies, the foreign employer cannot ascribe fault, even if the worker commits 
suicide, under the no-fault no-contest provision including permanent 
disablement if the worker suffers physical injuries it is considered covered.24 
Although his tone indicated that these developments were positive steps toward providing 
additional protection and benefits to OFWs, he acknowledged that the enhancements were 
not in essence what the recruitment industry had originally sought.  He explained that “the 
                                                          
23
 Jinggoy Ejercito-Estrada, “Jinggoy speaks before FilCom in Kuwait; pays tribute to OFWs in Kalayaan ’09 
celebration,” last modified June 15, 2009, 
http://www.senjinggoyestrada.com/index.php/articles/view/179.html. 
24
 Lomibao, interview, 2009. 
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originally proposed level of insurance was very good for the recruiters, actually they would 
insure their liabilities, but not with the expansion.”25 
The Bureaucracy 
Up until this point the chronological progression of RA 10022 has been discussed from the 
perspective of the two legislative bodies that passed it.  Government, as discussed in 
previous chapters, of course includes more than just legislative bodies and executive 
leaders, it also consists of a large bureaucracy containing a number of departments and 
agencies which manage the implementation of laws and government programs.  As 
discussed in Chapter Two, there are a large number of government departments tasked 
with overseeing the overseas employment program.  As you would expect these 
bureaucratic stake holders were heavily involved in the creation of RA 10022.  This was 
especially true during the early formulation period for the House version of the bill.  
Representatives from relevant government agencies were invited to hearings and working 
groups to testify and respond to questions from congresspersons.   
The POEA as the lead agency on matters related to the overseas employment program plays 
a particularly important role in facilitating the smooth operation of the program as well as 
assuring oversight over the private recruitment industry.  Perspectives on the proposed bill 
were quite different among the leadership of the POEA.  Of all of the departments involved 
heavily in the overseas employment program some are clearly preeminent in their 
importance to making it work, day in and day out.  The Department of Labor and 
Employment (DOLE), the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA), and the 
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) all play crucial roles in assuring the program’s smooth 
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operation, but the POEA clearly functions as the keystone for the program.  As the lead 
agency over the overseas employment program, the POEA brings a great deal of experience 
and expertise in regard to the mechanical and procedural workings of the program.  In 
essence the POEA acts as the convergence point between government and business for all 
matters related to overseas labor migration.  From the perspective of the recruitment 
industry the POEA is the face of government as it is the department with which they must 
deal on a regular basis and which has tremendous power over them.  Likewise, most bills 
that the legislature passes in regard to the overseas employment program will ultimately be 
implemented by the POEA.  Their expertise in managing the large and unwieldy program 
since the early 1980s (see Chapter Three) has proved their ability to do the best they can 
with what they have been tasked.  For all of these reasons, it was crucial for the legislature 
to consult with the experts at the POEA when creating this bill.  As will be shown below, the 
reality of the consultation among key government actors in the overseas employment 
program was at best dysfunctional and at worst negligent.  
When interviewed for this chapter in November 2009, Hans Cacdac, the then Deputy 
Administrator of the POEA, provided insight into how the POEA viewed both the provisions 
of the proposed bill as well as the policy-making process related to the bill up until that 
point.26  Cacdac explained that there were three fundamental reasons why the POEA 
opposed the proposed mandatory liability insurance component of the bill.  First, he said,   
our questions relative to insurance are basically first fundamental.  One is 
while we do not disagree with the concept of social insurance, social 
protection for OFWs, we pose the question as to whether it is necessary to 
privatize this level of social insurance. … We feel that it is dangerous to have 
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the private sector, to leave the private sector with all the decisions with 
respect to social welfare and benefits of all OFWs.27 
As described by Cacdac this first objection is likely informed by the tremendous experience 
the POEA has had in regulating, or attempting to regulate, a large diverse private enterprise.  
As already discussed in Chapter Three, the problems with illegal recruitment, for example, 
illustrate how difficult it can be for the bureaucracy to effectively monitor a program as 
large and unwieldy as the overseas employment program.  Cacdac continues: 
Second, is the matter of the joint and solidarity liability of recruiters.  We feel 
that liability insurance, which is what would be the key component of the 
mandatory insurance proposal, at least the one that was passed in third 
reading in both Houses, undermines the joint solidarity liability of recruiters 
in the sense that recruiters would realize that they are not footing the bill and 
therefore they would be more careless in selecting foreign employers for our 
people. (emphasis added)28 
From the perspective of the POEA it is easy to understand how they might fear any erosion 
of the joint and solidary liability rules that are situated at the very heart of the laws which 
govern the overseas employment program.  Cacdac seems to be referring to the principle of 
a moral hazard, that if a third party (insurance agency) is inserted between the recruitment 
agencies and their financial liability toward OFWs they will be less inclined to conduct their 
business affairs ethically as they will not be subject to the full extent of the financial 
consequences of unethical business practices currently imposed on them through the JSL 
provisions.  It is in fact the joint and solidary liability provisions which address the tricky 
question of how to solve (if not simply “deal with”) complicated legal disputes between 
Filipinos and their foreign employers.  As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, even 
with the joint and solidary liability provisions in place there are many claims abuses 
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perpetuated on OFWs that never fully receive fair consideration, let alone compensation.  
From Cacdac’s perspective, the POEA opposes any weakening of the joint and solidary 
liability rules because the POEA is involved in the OFW-foreign employer-recruitment 
agency dispute settlement process, and it is charged with enforcing any punitive decisions, 
such as license revocation, against recruitment agencies.  As such, they understand the 
process. 
Along the line of reasoning put forward by Cacdac, if recruitment agencies were able to 
decrease their financial risk exposure to OFW money claims through the arbitration process 
at the NLRC, they might indeed take less care in placing OFWs with ethical foreign 
employers.  This point raises an interesting question not addressed by the bill: in NLRC 
disputes, will the disenfranchised OFW be able to claim what they are entitled to from the 
recruitment agency in addition to what the terms of the insurance covers, or will the 
recruitment agency only pay any remaining money owed to the OFW beyond what is 
covered by the liability insurance?  The final version of the bill as well as the “Omnibus Rules 
and Regulations”, created by DOLE, the DFA, the NLRC, and the Department of Health 
provides clarification on this issue.  The implementation rules state that: 
Within ten (10) days from the filing of notice of claim, the insurance company 
shall make payment to the recruitment/manning agency the amount 
adjudged or agreed upon, or the amount of liability insured, whichever is 
lower. After receiving the insurance payment, the recruitment/manning 
agency shall immediately pay the migrant worker's claim in full, taking into 
account that in case the amount of insurance coverage is insufficient to 
satisfy the amount adjudged or agreed upon, it is liable to pay the balance 
thereof.29 
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As feared by the POEA the bill does indeed reduce the financial liability exposure on the 
recruitment agencies.  The insurance requirements proscribed in RA 10022 mandate that 
the policy coverage’s against NLRC money claims “shall be equivalent to at least three (3) 
months for every year of the migrant worker's employment contract.”30  Any OFW 
compensation claims then beyond the three month minimum would be paid by the 
recruiter, unless they were able to purchase a policy that covers a larger number of months.  
Regardless, this insurance mandate does indeed reduce the financial liability for recruitment 
agencies, which has the potential to lead toward an erosion of recruitment agency regard 
for the quality of foreign employers.  Thus the fears of the POEA would be realized.   
Cacdac’s final problem with the liability insurance component of the proposed bill is one 
that has persisted since the earliest days of the overseas employment program and one that 
we have discussed in earlier chapters.  Cacdac explained that: 
The third one of course is the issue of passing on the premium costs.  
Recently we had a series of meetings with the recruiters.  We had some 
discussions and they said that the original proposal that they had [made] is 
not the same version that is in the recent bicam conference draft.  The bicam 
conference draft no longer just tackles liability but it put in repatriation which 
yields so many other questions from our end.  Something as basic as 
insurable interest of recruiters, what interest would the recruiter have for 
instance in an OFW’s life and disablement?  We understand when it comes to 
liability because of the joint solidarity liability but when it comes to accident 
and death and disability what insurable interest, legally speaking, would the 
recruiter have?  So we [POEA] have very strong reservations and according to 
the recruiters this is not the same version for which they signed on.  They had 
also thought that one million OFWs, they had factored in 1.2 million OFWs as 
potential beneficiaries but in reality only around 250-300 [thousand] will be 
covered.  Because of that, they [recruitment industry leaders] told us in that 
meeting two weeks ago that they are now not sure as to the affordability 
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level, short of telling us there is a strong likelihood we’ll pass this onto the 
workers, so that alarms us.31 
Deputy Administrator Cacdac’s third objection to the mandatory insurance provision of the 
bill contains many important parts that are worth exploring more deeply.  He first draws 
attention to the fact that there should be a valid interest, from the recruiter’s point of view, 
that the insurance would cover.  Money claims through the NLRC arbitration process clearly 
qualifies, but in the expanded insurance mandate coverage’s include: accidental death, 
disablement, repatriation costs, living allowance benefit, medical evacuation, 
compassionate visit (for family member in case of hospitalization), and medical repatriation 
(in case of illness).32  In essence, Cacdac is arguing that while the proposed insurance 
coverage may be great from an OFW’s perspective, particularly if they do not shoulder the 
costs, some of the coverage benefits are really not part of the responsibility the recruitment 
agency has toward their deployed OFWs.   
Next, Cacdac seems to have received not-so-subtle hints from recruitment industry leaders 
that despite the rules in the bill they may find ways to pass the costs on to OFWs due to the 
unanticipated expense of the newly expanded insurance premiums.  The higher-than-
expected insurance premiums, Cacdac learned, increased from the original calculations 
made by the recruitment industry on premiums that would be purchased by all deployed 
OFWs, not just those deployed through recruitment agencies.  If for example all of the 1.4 
million OFWs who deployed abroad in 2010 were required to purchase liability insurance 
the premium would be relatively low because of the wide pool of participants.  After the 
Senate version of the bill passed and was combined with the House version in the bicameral 
conference, and the insurance coverage was expanded, it became clear that only OFWs 
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newly deployed through private recruitment agencies would be included under the new 
scheme.  This would reduce the participant pool to “250-300 thousand”, potentially 
increasing premium rates for the recruitment agencies.33  As will be discussed later this in 
this chapter, recruitment agencies operate under strict guidelines as to the amounts they 
are legally allowed to “charge” OFWs.  If insurance premium costs rise dramatically it is 
possible that this could impact their profit margins on sending workers, which could explain 
the possibility (as stated above) of some recruiters finding a way to pass this premium cost 
on to the workers.  As we will see later in the chapter, the POEA’s fear of this outcome is 
shared by many other actors involved in the overseas employment program. 
After his describing his three primary concerns with the insurance proposal in the bill, 
Cacdac expressed an additional concern, not with the bill itself but with the process by 
which it was created.  His concerns were likewise shared among the other actors involved in 
the overseas employment program and speak to a fundamental problem that exists 
between government and business in relation to the management, implementation, and 
ongoing maintenance of the overseas employment program.   Specifically, Cacdac 
questioned the timing and “rushed” passage of the bill.  On this issue he explained that: 
They were pretty fast in passing this whole thing considering it’s an omnibus 
amendment to a major law, social justice law.  In the House for instance, it 
was filed in December and passed in February.  In a span of two months!  It 
was read on second reading, in both House and Senate, read on second 
reading, supposedly interpolated, supposedly amended, and passed on 
second reading on the same day.  They had clearly avoided discussions and 
interpolations on such an important bill.  On [the House] side this was passed 
on third reading in the House in February.  Between February and June, June 
was the time of the Senate passing and that’s when we learned about it, but 
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between February and June we had a series of hearings on some other 
matter with the House and we never once heard from Chris [House 
Committee Secretary] as to the passage of this third bill in February.  On such 
an important bill Nathan!  We are just really wondering why this was the 
procedure, this is how they did it.34 
There was a clear sense from the comments above as well as others made by Cacdac that 
this bill was far too important to be rushed through haphazardly, as one might do with a less 
important bill.  As already established above, from the mouths of the very senators who 
authored SB 3286, the overseas employment program has almost single-handedly kept the 
Philippine economy right-side-up.  Cacdac’s questions seem not only appropriate, but 
possibly the only rational way to look at the timeline and development of events in relation 
to the creation and eventual passing of RA 10022.  As will be discussed further, this came 
amid the opposition to the bill from a near unanimity of private sector program actors.  
Furthermore, Cacdac seemed to be implying that the POEA had not been involved in the 
House Overseas Workers Affairs Committee hearings that had been held according to 
committee secretary Christopher Lomibao.  When asked about this Cacdac later explained: 
First, Chris would say well, you were invited in the technical working group, 
but we’re saying, we were invited, we were there, but we had registered our 
reservations and you shut the thing down in one or two months’ time.  That’s 
not enough.  Even if you invite us to two or three meetings, we didn’t sign on 
for just those meetings and then suddenly we learn that its shut down.   
There’s a lot of back-and-forth about this.35 
Considering the POEA’s three decades of expertise in managing the program, it seems odd 
that their calls for the process to be slowed down and for more careful considered 
deliberations to be held were not heeded by the legislature.  As the leading government 
department on this issue, knowledgeable of the intricate workings of the overseas 
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employment program, it only seems appropriate that the legislature would rely heavily on 
the POEA’s recommendations and expertise. 
If the POEA opposed the bill, why did the legislature push it through with such speed and 
determination?  As soon to be discussed, their actions are even more striking given 
subsequent changes by the Senate and the near universal opposition to the bill from 
recruiters, civil society groups, and even international organizations such as the 
International Organization for Migration.  While discussing why the legislature ignored 
nearly unanimous opposition to the bill, the issue of the forthcoming elections was raised.  
Cacdac explained: 
It’s clearly a year before an election year.  I’m not so sure how much we can 
say beyond that, but it’s worse on the Senate side.  I don’t know if you 
checked the Senate records but we [POEA] learned about it [SB 3286] when it 
was passed in the Senate in June.  In the Senate there is even no debate or 
discussion at all in the hearings on insurance and this is something that 
clearly popped out after or during the second reading sponsorship by Senator 
Estrada.  In the second bicam conference where I testified in behalf of the 
department, Senator Estrada perhaps in frustration chastised myself and the 
POEA saying, you know, it’s too late, we’ve given you chances to participate 
and now you are objecting at the wrong time, et cetera.  I didn’t want to 
antagonize the good Senator, but all the records will indicate, aside from the 
swiftness in which the bill was passed, that insurance was never discussed at 
all.36 
While not necessarily a wedge-issue in Philippine politics, the overseas employment 
program and especially the plight of OFWs has become a favorite populist platform for 
politicians to utilize in their election pursuits.  Beyond their rhetoric and heavy usage of 
welfare-based language and proposals in the bill itself, there is little evidence to prove that 
the Senators involved did what they did due to the potential benefits the bill might have on 
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their re-election prospects.  Despite the lack of hard evidence proving an election 
connection behind the legislators motives, anecdotally the timing of the entire affair and the 
manufactured sense of urgency seem suspicious at best, and logically lead an observer to 
the election as a plausible motive—especially considering the unanimous opposition to the 
bill’s provisions from all actors outside the legislature.  The fact that Senator Villar was 
actively pursuing the presidency, while Senator Estrada’s father was also running, casts 
suspicion on what the motivations were for the decisions they made in regard to writing and 
passing the bill.37  In the final accounting of the circumstances surrounding the creation of 
RA 10022, it is the Senate’s failure to heed the avalanche of opposition to the liability 
insurance proposal that has brought both observers and participants of events to scratch 
their heads.  Why did the Senate continue to pursue something in the face of so many who 
argued that it was a bad idea?  
Business 
The Recruitment Industry 
As discussed in Chapter One, and in subsequent chapters, the relationship between business 
and government has been troubled over the nearly four decades-old program.  By 
“business,” the primary reference is toward recruitment agencies although in this project 
the perspectives of other groups, such as NGOs, IOs, and the media have also been 
included. 
As described above in the discussion of the COA report, the Joint and Solidary Liability (JSL) 
rules that recruitment agencies operate under are a major source of contention between 
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the private drivers of overseas employment from the Philippines, and certain government 
actors, in particular those in Congress.  Worker welfare and rights are of course at the 
center of the debate, although when matters related to JSL are discussed money is at the 
core of the problem.  It could be said that cases brought by OFWs to the NLRC are done so in 
pursuit of fairness.  OFWs of course should be able to claim lost wages when they have been 
unfairly treated abroad, but the solution under JSL rules show that little consideration has 
been paid to “fairness” for recruitment agencies.  Many might simply argue that RAs must 
simply accept the risk of negative financial outcomes from NLRC decisions as part of the 
price of participation in the overseas employment program or the cost of doing business.  
The tremendous difficulty of enforcing laws and regulations across international borders, 
involving sending RAs, destination employers, as well as foreign and domestic governments, 
is an incredibly complex undertaking by any measure.  Obviously, OFWs are exposed to 
tremendous financial and even physical or emotional distress in these types of situations.  
However without diminishing the plight of disenfranchised OFWs, and upon close 
examination, in terms of risk exposure in the business environment, the RAs are exposed to 
a large share of the financial liability when it comes to JSL provisions.  The foreign 
employers, who are usually at fault for creating the negative situation that results in the 
NLRC arbitration process, are beyond reach and therefore beyond culpability.  Victor 
Fernandez, head of the largest association of recruitment agencies in the Philippines, the 
Philippine Association of Service Exporters Inc (PASEI), attempted to explain the industry’s 
perspective on JSL after being asked how recruiters can be responsible for how foreign 
employers treat workers. 
You don't know after you deploy them, we are not saying no, we're letting go 
of any responsibility we are just saying we don't have the right to manage the 
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company, we don't have a say in how the employer treats the worker.  We 
cannot even recommend, hey, you pay the salary this way, do it. Here in the 
Philippines the salary is paid every 15 days.  There it’s done every month so 
we cannot say no, no, look the family here is starving and they’re used to, 
before they received their salary weekly you know, construction workers.   
Then if they become workers in a company it’s 15 days but now overseas it's 
monthly so no, no, no, you have to do it this way.  No, we don't have any say 
in those things.  We don't have a say in the way they market, they conduct 
their business, if they're doing bad, or doing good.  But if they don't pay the 
worker we now get blamed. I'm sorry, how can an agent be responsible for 
the acts of the principle?38 
Fernandez believes that the arbitration process is stacked against them to begin with so the 
OFWs can abuse the process to get compensation unfairly, which in turn causes recruiters to 
do wrong to make up for what they viewed as unfair theft of their money.  A discussion of 
the merits or morality of the various perspectives on the issue of the JSL rules is beyond the 
scope of this chapter, but it is important to understand the perspective of the recruitment 
industry on this very important issue.  This perspective led industry leaders to propose a 
solution to the problem, as they saw it, that would guard both against their own liability 
exposure to the illegal actions of foreign employers and offer stronger welfare protection 
for OFWs, namely liability insurance.  According to industry leaders, it was they who first 
proposed the idea for liability insurance to cover OFWs.39  
Fernandez went a step further, associating JSL rules with some of the unethical and illegal 
actions taken by some RAs in regard to the fees they charge OFWs.  He explained that some 
agencies might take more than the legally allowed one month salary maximum in fees from 
a worker to offset the possibility that the worker might return and sue the agency through 
the NRLC.  Fernandez explained that with the limits on what they are allowed to charge 
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OFWs, there is significant financial risk for the agencies in the off-chance that a worker 
returns and sues the agency for lost wages.  In addition to strong disagreements with the JSL 
provisions the issue of risk, and risk amelioration for recruiters, was at the very heart of 
their desire for some form of OFW liability insurance.  Fernandez blamed the problem of 
recruiters overcharging OFWs squarely on the JSL rules.  He explained, providing an example 
of the types of strategies used by some recruiters to reduce their financial exposure to risk. 
The bad guys in the industry, it is [in] their very nature.  That is why they are 
the ones making so much money, and they are the ones who can get 
themselves protected.  Like, I will deploy, I have a job order for 10 [workers].  
I will charge each of these workers maybe 2 or 3 months’ salary, and that is 
illegal.  But I can get 3 months, so let’s say I charge $1,000 each.  I can now 
have for 10 workers $30,000, when I should only have $10,000.  If one of 
these 10 gets into trouble and he comes back and he will sue me I have 
30,000 to [pay his] claim, and even with his own money.  [I say] let’s put an 
end to this, I will settle this by paying you 1 months’ salary, after all I was able 
to deploy you, you worked for 6 months so you have already recovered your 
3 months.  No, not fair!  Ok, I'll give you 2 months.  Which actually, the 
agency [is] returning only his money and then since he already earned 6 
months, plus 2 months, it’s ok.  Now I profit from my earning of $30,000.  I 
lost only $2,000.  But for an agency who collects only 1 month, he has only 
$10,000 and he will be the one who will fight tooth and nail to say no, it was 
your fault, you were not diligent, you destroyed this, etc.  No, I will not pay 
you, etc.  He [the OFW] is enriching himself at my expense.  But of course 
government will say no, you are making too much money.  You just recover 
that from your next deployment.40 
Fernandez’s example, though emblematic, is clearly something that does happen in the 
industry, particularly by those operating at the fringes of legality within the program.  
Although expressly against the law, one can see how the temptation for the recruiters to 
protect themselves by overcharging placement fees to OFWs can be strong considering the 
potential cost of settling a dispute with the NLRC.  Another industry leader shared similar 
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sentiments regarding the relationship between unethical industry practices and the JSL 
provisions.  After being asked if JSL provisions contribute to unethical and illegal activities, 
he explained: 
Yeah, and sometimes that is used as justification for asking fees from the 
worker.  If it is the fault of the worker, what is the liability of the worker if he 
does not do his job there and he is repatriated and then he comes back here 
and says his boss there is abusing him and maltreating, what?  Supposed he is 
found out to be not [sincere in his claim]?  What will he pay the government, 
what will he pay the agency?41 
Exactly why this issue of OFW accountability in making claims is not discussed is not difficult 
to understand.  The prevailing and overwhelming narrative regarding OFWs is that they are 
victims of abuse by others, and not abusers themselves.  However, it is not difficult to 
imagine how a returned and possibly disgruntled worker might not be willing to assume 
responsibility for their dismissal from a foreign employer, and instead claim that they were 
the victim of abuse in the hopes of recovering wages that they might have otherwise earned 
if not for their own actions.  The fact that this point of view has not been addressed or 
acknowledged by either the NLRC or the POEA as something that does occur certainly 
proves that further research and investigation into this claim by the recruitment industry 
warrants further research efforts.  In essence OFWs could potentially use the same 
accountability conundrum that has been discussed at length in this chapter surrounding the 
JSL provisions and the inherently international nature of the overseas employment program 
as a way around whatever contract terms that they may have violated while working 
overseas, thus resulting in their termination.  By claiming that abuse had taken place, they 
might convert a self-inflicted hurt through their own misdeeds while working for the foreign 
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employer into a financial windfall at the expense of the recruitment agency which sent them 
abroad in the first place. That RA, however, had no part whatsoever in events that occurred 
between the OFW and the destination employer.  It is no wonder that RAs would feel taken 
advantage of in such a scenario, particularly given that the notion of OFW as abuser does 
not fit into the collective national narrative.  When there are financial claims at the NLRC 
and uncertainty exists as to who is at fault, it seems that the OFWs commonly receive the 
benefit of the doubt while the RAs do not.   
Another industry leader and industry advocate, Loreto B. Soriano, described the risks he 
faces in doing business: 
To me as an ordinary practitioner, even with my kind of operations, I am 
really at risk, big risk!  Your contingent risk is so big, if you are doing risk 
management, I always look at that, those we call contingent risk and its 
equivalent to a 2 year contract of your worker that you deploy.  It’s really 
huge amounts of money, and … the responsibility compared to the money 
that you earn in deploying workers is so less, it’s grossly disproportionate to 
the risk - number 1.  Number 2 - your legal recourse is zero because you 
cannot run after the employer [in the destination country].42   
Soriano furthermore referenced a recent Supreme Court decision which struck down the 
provision in RA 8042 which limited the annual amount of compensation disenfranchised 
OFWs could claim from their original contract.  In the case of Antonio M. Serrano Vs. Gallant 
Maritime Services, Inc., et. al., the Supreme Court instead ruled that the deploying agency 
could be held responsible for the entire unfulfilled portion of the contract, thus significantly 
increasing the RAs financial liability risk.43  Speaking of the new reality RAs are operating 
under in the post-Serrano decision climate, Soriano explained that with the competitive 
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nature of labor recruitment and deployment, the margin for profit is low when compared to 
the level of risk.  He provided an example based on the type of workers he deploys, where 
his agency is able to negotiate a monthly salary for a prospective OFW of US$600.  His costs 
to deploy that worker are roughly $415.  This leaves a profit of $185 from the maximum 
legal amount (equal to one month’s salary) that RAs are allowed to charge prospective 
OFWs.44  Under the Serrano decision, if the recently deployed worker is sent home without 
cause during the first month of a 24 month contract, Soriano’s agency would be held liable 
to pay the worker for the remaining balance of the contracted salary, or in this case $13,800 
($600 x 23 months).  On this issue of profit versus risk Soriano exclaimed that “$185 per 
worker is equivalent to a very huge responsibility…I don't know why they [opponents of 
liability insurance] don't understand that?”45   
Soriano raises an interesting point in regard to the Serrano case, and based on the numbers 
he is justified in his apprehension if not fear.  In the case, “Seafarer Antonio Serrano had 
served two months and seven days of his 12-month contract when he was repatriated…won 
$26,442.73 in wages for the nine months and 23 days that he would have spent on board 
ship.”46  This decision significantly increased the risk stakes for RAs, considering a) the limits 
on their ability to charge fees; b) the competitive nature of job orders abroad; and c) what 
foreign employers are willing to pay them to source capable and qualified workers.  There is 
a real mismatch between the income potential for placing workers abroad and the 
enormous financial liability that lies over them.  It was with these risks in mind that the 
industry began to investigate ways of reducing their risk exposure. 
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Soriano explained how the industry first explored the feasibility of liability insurance and 
then introduced the concept to COWA in the House of Representatives.  After being asked 
about the origins of the liability insurance provisions in the bill, Soriano explained: 
Actually it was me who recommended that.  We introduced [to COWA] … 
employers practices liability insurance….What you are insuring is the liability 
of the agency and the practices of the employers who are not inside the 
Philippines….It’s not…easy because what you seek to insure is the 
commission or omission of a party that is outside of the Philippines in which 
you, the agency, has no participation in each successful omission or 
commission.  When I talked to AIG [American Insurance Group], the AIG 
people said Mr. Soriano, your product, we don't understand how to do it? 
You are not the company who is committing the error or the crime. How can 
[we] insure something that you are not the one doing?47  
The insurance industry, it seems, faced the same problems that have plagued those tasked 
with governance of the overseas employment program since its inception, namely, how can 
a program that is inherently international in scope be governed domestically?  Except in this 
case, the insurance providers were asking, how can a recruitment agency obtain liability 
insurance protection based on the actions of a third party, who also happens to be in 
another country and is therefore subject to a completely different set of laws?  Although 
liability insurance of varying types is extraordinarily common all over the world, the unique 
nature of the requirements here took some effort to work through.  According to Soriano 
again, it seems that a motivating factor for the insurance industry was the original 
assumption that such an insurance plan would be applied to all 1 million plus OFWs 
deploying annually.   
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As an example, Soriano referred to the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) 
which insures individual bank deposits up to a maximum amount of 500,000 pesos.48  
Through this, the risk that investors might lose their savings and investments is ameliorated.  
The PDIC insurance thus reduces financial exposure, allowing investors to put their money in 
banks with the confidence that their investments are backed by the government in case of a 
financial disaster.  Soriano argued: 
Our obligation should have also a cap because we are just an agent of the 
principle.  Our responsibility is subsidiary, the employer [abroad] is primary, 
and it’s the government who has a better recourse to [pursue] the employer 
to the government for the country of destination.  So in my proposal to the 
House I submitted them a “new mindset” in saying that it should not be the 
other way around where we become jointly and severally liable meaning our 
responsibility is equal.49 
The argument that Soriano makes above is logical and indeed the foreign employer should 
be liable for violating OFW contract terms and obligations.  The inevitable question, 
however, is how can they be held liable?  In order to do so, the case brought against them 
must be made in the destination country, but as the OFW has already returned home and 
most likely does not have the resources to hire legal counsel in the foreign state, there is 
little that can be done to the foreign employer that will provide just compensation to the 
disenfranchised OFW.  This conundrum is what led policy makers to the notion of JSL in the 
first place, the idea being that perhaps if RAs were meticulous in selecting only foreign 
employers of impeccable morale and ethical business practices, such situations could be 
avoided or at least minimized.  In reality, no amount of due diligence on the part of an RAs 
can definitively determine how an overseas employer will treat his workers, nor will it 
assure that they uphold their obligations under the employment contract.  The recruitment 
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industry is justified in feeling that these circumstances are unjust, again without diminishing 
the plight and ongoing problems faced by OFWs while abroad.  JSL is really not a workable 
solution for a problem that can only be addressed through a legally binding treaty between 
the Philippines and the destination state.  A bilateral labor agreement (BLA) can help, as we 
will see in Chapter Six, but it cannot fully address the ongoing legal challenges that can arise 
through the flows of migrants between two states. 
It is not only fee-charging recruiters who find the risk and financial liability associated with 
the JSL rules difficult to accept.  Rene E. Cristobal, a widely respected businessman who 
owns recruitment agencies which do not charge any fees to OFWs, pointed to a possible 
conflict between the JSL provisions and the national corporate code.  In addition to his no-
fee policy, Cristobal’s company provides a variety of services to the OFWs and their families 
while abroad which have been acclaimed by both NGOs and OFWs, some even calling his 
approach to recruitment the model that the industry should follow.  Nevertheless, despite 
his “enlightened” approach, and approbation from industry watchdogs, Cristobal still feels 
anxiety over his risk exposure in regard to JSL rules.  Cristobal did note that many of his 
deployments are maritime, and therefore less risky because of the insurance policies carried 
by shipping companies, though he does deploy land-based workers as well.  Nevertheless, 
Cristobal takes exception to the idea that although an agency might be a corporation, under 
the JSL provisions individual employees (or more likely owners) at that corporation could 
have their personal assets garnished or confiscated as result of a NLRC decision.  Cristobal 
explained: 
The reason why you incorporate is because you want to have limited 
liability….Now, what the recruitment people are saying, if we get this 
insurance, that the coverage of that insurance should include whatever 
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liability we have.  That may involve us to be personally, jointly and severally 
liable with the foreign employer.  That is the purpose of that, so that the 
government can run after, not the individual agencies, but run after this 
insurance company which has insured all this risk.  …. If you are a single 
proprietor or a partnership, then your personal assets are at stake!  So what 
we are saying is, let us insure all this liabilities under one [policy] so that the 
government will run after the insurance company rather than run after the 
1,000 agencies for this kind of liability.  50   
Cristobal’s point is interesting, and something that could potentially undermine the JSL rules 
through legal action.  He further mentioned that RAs could bring a case to the Supreme 
Court on this matter, and surmised that they would likely win.  Corporations do indeed 
indemnify individual company leaders from personal liability, and many RAs are 
incorporated, so which law prevails, the corporate code or JSL?  Another important point is 
his reference to the fact that through the JSL provisions RA owners can be held personally 
liable financially or criminally for the actions of destination employers.  This fear was widely 
expressed by industry leaders, as were tales of once successful RA owners brought to 
financial destitution through NLRC decisions.  There is no hard data on how many individual 
agency owners have lost their livelihoods due to NLRC decisions, but the laws do allow the 
NLRC to seize assets of agency owners if the agency itself is incapable of meeting the 
financial terms of the decision.  So at the very least, the possibility exists that this has and 
does happen, though many owners evidently choose to simply close their businesses and 
flee rather than to subject themselves to this eventuality.   
There is some uncertainty at this point as to who was responsible for originating the idea 
that eventually became RA 10022.  As mentioned above it was included in early drafts of 
some of the Senate bills which were consolidated into SB 3286, it was recommended as an 
option in the COA report, and according to Soriano and Fernandez, the recruitment industry 
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had lobbied the legislature to pursue liability insurance.  Regardless of with whom or when 
the idea for liability insurance originated, it was an integral a part of HB 5649 by late 2008 
and early 2009.  From the recruitment industry’s perspective, the provisions of the House 
version of the bill contained much of what they were looking for.  According to Mr. 
Fernandez the provisions outlined in the House bill served a second function to demonstrate 
that while looking out for their financial risks, the added benefits included with the 
insurance, and to be paid for by recruitment agencies, would benefit OFWs and prove that 
the industry does indeed value the workers they deploy.  In other words Fernandez 
considered the additional benefits, beyond the coverage for lost compensation, a “win-win” 
situation and would work to improve public perception of the industry.  In regard to how 
the new insurance plans would improve public relations Fernandez explained his vision for 
the future of the industry: 
We are trying to correct this particular situation.  The moment the financial 
burden is passed on to another entity more capable, I [recruiters] can now 
focus on my corporate social responsibility.  I can now act as an NGO.  I can 
now argue with an [overseas] employer and say no, you have to be better.  I 
can now have programs here in the Philippines that will generate training for 
his [OFW] family, because I am no longer fighting the worker….I want to 
produce results because everybody is blaming us, our industry.  [They say] 
that we are … good-for-nothing bastards who suck the blood out of our 
workers.51 
Fernandez’ vision for the industry focuses on removing the adversarial conditions that have 
dominated the relationship between OFWs and the agencies that deploy them.  The liability 
insurance proposals in the House version of the bill, according to Fernandez, Soriano, and 
other industry leaders were meant to address this adversarial relationship, which in turn 
would allow them to better pursue the interests and welfare of the OFWs they deploy 
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without constantly worrying about the possibility that any OFW that they deploy could 
potentially bring suit (and large financial penalties) against them with the NLRC.  Fernandez 
argued that once the liability risk was diminished for RAs, progress could be made in 
improving the behavior of the industry in regard to how it interacts and supports the OFWs 
they deploy overseas.  In essence, they could advocate on behalf of the worker to the 
destination employer, to encourage them to address concerns or discontinue inappropriate 
or illegal practices.  Under the current system, because of their JSL, RAs are more likely to 
side with the foreign employer than with the OFW they deployed because they are culpable 
financially if a case is brought to the NLRC despite the fact that the infraction was 
committed by a third party (the foreign employer). 
When HB 5649 was completed and sent over to the Senate, the recruitment industry 
generally viewed the provisions on insurance favorably and supported the effort.  However, 
as mentioned above, significant changes were made to the bill by the Senate, enlarging the 
scope of the insurance coverage.  Originally, the liability insurance provisions were intended 
to include not only agency deployed workers, but also OFWs who re-deploy abroad without 
the involvement of an agency.  In their case, the premium would be paid prior to departure 
much in the same way that people buy travel insurance before going abroad.  When 
recruitment industry leaders recommended that liability insurance be made mandatory, and 
volunteered to shoulder the costs for the workers they deploy, they were operating under 
the understanding that all workers, not just those deployed through agencies, would be 
required participate in the insurance scheme.  In 2009, of the 1.09 million land-based 
workers deployed overseas, 349K were deployed through agencies while 742K were rehires 
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and returned to jobs overseas without RA involvement.52  As Mr. Soriano explained above, 
the calculations for the price of the premium, which was projected to cost around 35 US 
dollars per OFW, were based on two variables: first, that all OFWs would be required to 
participate fixing the participant pool at over 1 million, and second, that the rate was fixed 
to the level of policy benefits originally outlined.   
The first variable needed to achieve the $35 premium, namely the anticipated participation 
of over a million land-based OFWs, never materialized as even the House version did not 
make the liability insurance mandatory for any OFWs other than those deployed through 
agencies.  Industry leaders continued to lobby for universal applicability of the mandatory 
insurance upon all departing OFWs even after the passing of HB 5649, but there evidently 
was insufficient political will in either the House or Senate to mandate that OFWs deploying 
without an agency be legally required to purchase insurance.  In expanding the coverage 
provided through the mandatory liability insurance, the Senate, in an apparent attempt to 
further enhance benefits for OFWs, made the earlier $35 premium quotes impossible for 
insurance providers to achieve.  Matters were not helped by the fact that SB 3286 seems to 
have been rushed through without hearings or consultation with overseas employment 
program stakeholders.  Fernandez and another industry leader, Raul de Vera, expressed 
their frustration with the Senate process explaining that: 
The House came up only with four amendments to the law [RA 8042].  The 
Senate came up with an entire revision of the law, complete revision!  But 
there was no consultation on the Senate side.  On the House, we are grateful 
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that almost every other week there was consultation and that is where the 
entire program was conceived.53 
Following the rushed passage of SB 3286 industry leaders began to shift their position on 
the whole idea of mandatory liability insurance, alarmed at the requisite rise in policy 
premiums based on the Senate’s added coverage.  During the bicameral process, which is 
designed to simply iron-out differences between both House and Senate versions of a bill, 
matters were made worse from the recruitment perspective when even more insurance 
benefits were added to the bill’s provisions.  Industry leaders attacked some of the 
proposed benefits as laughably unworkable, such as the provision for allowing 
“compassionate visits” of family members for hospitalized OFWs.  In essence the provision 
calls for the insurance policy to provide the family member an airline ticket, but does not 
provide for the maintenance of the family member while visiting.  Another added benefit, 
medical repatriation, provides airplane or helicopter transportation to sick or injured OFWs 
to the closest suitably equipped hospital capable of responding to their needs.  Fernandez 
and de Vera lambasted the lack of thought behind this well intentioned yet short-sighted 
provision, arguing that most OFWs deploy to states more developed than the Philippines 
with high quality medical care systems.  They explained: 
If the worker is going to Zambia or Rwanda that would be another thing, but 
if you are going to a Middle Eastern country, first world country, you don’t 
need all those things.  They know very well how to take care of this.  Now this 
is the catch.  Because of those premium provisions, the premium we have will 
now skyrocket because there will now be justification.  [The insurance 
companies will say] we have to increase the premium because there are 
these additional benefits for you.54 
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Industry leaders claim that the original estimate provided by insurance companies for the 
liability insurance, prior to the Senate’s added benefits, was to cost $35 per worker per year.  
This would put the average two-year deployment contract cost for an OFW at $70.  After SB 
3286 was passed, and even more benefits were added during the bicameral conference 
sessions, industry leaders claimed that the premium numbers they were now seeing were 
closer to $85 per year per OFW.55  It should again be noted that RAs are legally prohibited 
from collecting more than the value of a single month’s contracted salary from the 
deploying OFW.   
Although there never had been complete support for the liability insurance provisions of the 
proposed law across the entire recruitment industry, it was during the bicameral conference 
that support for the idea collapsed among industry leaders.  Some were upset by the added 
insurance coverage, and how the premium they would be responsible for paying would cut 
into their profit margins under the limitations of the one-month fee cap.  Fernandez and de 
Vera described what would happen if a lower skilled OFW was deployed: 
Imagine if you are going to follow the law, and collect only 1 months’ salary.  
You have a worker whose salary is 200 US dollars because he's a laborer.  So 
you cannot collect 250 or 300, you'd get your license cut.  You now have to 
pay OWWA 25 US dollars, if the contract is 2 years you now have to pay $165 
or $170 to insurance premium, and then you have to process with POEA, and 
then you have to pay for the PhilHealth [national health insurance program], 
and then you have to pay for POEA processing, visa fee. Where is the money 
now going to the agency?56 
Other leaders and owners expressed fear that they would now be subjected to “premium” 
abuses from insurance companies, where they could increase premiums at will, and the 
industry would be legally obligated to pay regardless of the cost.   
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Now imagine, ourselves, we are now going to be at the mercy of the 
insurance [companies] because if it becomes the law we have no choice but 
to get an insurance policy and that means now the insurance company will 
now dictate on us and say from now on no insurance company will have to 
sell lower than this price.  Why, because they have nowhere to go.  We can 
milk this recruitment agency and we can make more money.57 
A somewhat less common complaint by industry leaders was merely in reference to the 
highly unusual way in which the policy process was unfolding.  As described above in the 
section on government, the Senate passed the bill without consulting with stakeholders in 
the traditional sense.  Likewise, the bicameral conference was being used to make additions 
to the bill beyond simply rectifying the competing provisions of the bill.  This complaint was 
not unique to the RA perspective, but was verified by stakeholders in government as well as 
civil society groups.  Fernandez, upon learning that an NGO representative was permitted to 
participate in one of the first bicameral meetings, demanded that he be given the same 
opportunity at the next meeting in order to assure that the recruitment industry’s 
perspective was represented.  He explained: 
This is what’s unfair; it’s not open to us because it’s supposed to be bicam.  A 
bicam is supposed to harmonize two different versions…but what is 
happening is new provisions are coming in from the conferences, that’s why 
from the original bill it’s now growing to about 16 pages when it was only 
about 5 or 6 pages and there are new provisions that were never discussed … 
but now are being inserted.58 
By the time the bicameral process was underway the recruitment industry had publicly 
withdrawn its support for the mandatory liability insurance and instead called for it to be 
voluntary.  This created a unique situation in overseas employment program policy history 
in that the program bureaucracy, concerned civil society groups (more on this below), and 
the recruitment industry were in solidarity in opposition to the mandatory nature of liability 
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insurance.59  In essence, all program actors were united against it and yet the legislature 
persisted undeterred.  Recruitment industry leaders acknowledged that their earlier efforts 
to win over legislators to the idea of mandatory liability insurance had succeeded, perhaps 
too well, particularly in the Senate.  They argued that election year populist politics had 
coopted their proposals, and that the legislators, with particular emphasis on the Senate, 
were enhancing the insurance benefits for OFWs merely to curry favor with the electorate, 
and without considering how these changes would impact the program overall or those who 
make it work day-to-day.  Soriano shared similar sentiments of those shared above by 
Cacdac from the POEA that the overseas employment program was simply too important to 
rush policy through based on election year expediency.   
You can see how they react, how reactionary government rules are 
processed.  It’s too short-sighted, close-eyed.  They want it to be a public 
relations scenario and they are rushing it because of the election next year.  
The law as worded now and the attempt and the measure that’s being done 
is more of trying to address the public mind but not trying to address the 
problem itself.  So they will look at it more as a public statement that we care 
for the OFWs so we did this.60 
As already discussed above, several of the co-authors of SB 3286 in the Senate were either 
considering presidential runs, already declared candidates, or at least up for senatorial re-
election in 2012.  In the face of such universal opposition, particularly after the recruitment 
industry as original proponents of the insurance idea withdrew their support, it does seem 
unusual that the legislature would pursue the bill so doggedly and with so much urgency if 
not to utilize the completed bill as a legislative showpiece for their re-election campaigns.  
This was especially true for Senator Villar and to some extent Senator Estrada (on behalf of 
his father, who was an opponent of Villar in the presidential election).  
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For industry leaders such as Fernandez, de Vera, and Soriano they seemed to view the 
negative turn of events as a literal step in the wrong direction for improving the relationship 
among stakeholders in the overseas employment program.  Fernandez, who had earlier 
expressed so much optimism about how the industry could change its stripes if the 
adversarial nature of the arrangements among parties could be improved, felt that new 
battle lines were being drawn and that the industry needed to return to a defensive posture 
in order to protect its interests if not its survival.  He lamented the deterioration of events 
during the bicameral conference, explaining: 
The worst part there is what would now be lost.  Instead of focus[ing] on 
welfare and protection, on corporate social responsibility, doing preparation 
for workers, [the] family left behind, entrepreneurship, or teaching them 
livelihood or money management, now we are back to the same program 
and battle [where] we again have to protect ourselves.  It [insurance] veered 
away from the original concept.  They [government] saw the opportunity to 
abuse us further, from a concept wherein we feel we could only complement 
what the government could not do.  Now it became an obligation from us.61 
By the completion of the bicameral process and despite the 11th hour alliance between the 
bureaucracy, NGOs and RAs, the final bicameral draft was approved by both Houses and RA 
10022 lapsed into law in March 2010.   
Non-Governmental Organizations, International Organizations, and the Press 
In this section the participation and views of NGOs, the media and International 
Organizations (IOs) in the policy efforts leading to the creation of RA 10022 are explored.  In 
regard to IOs, the only organization which is included in this chapter is the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), which has a global reputation for expertise in migration 
policy making and has been involved in advising Philippine decision makers for many years.  
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The IOM maintains a large complex in Makati City, in Metro Manila, and is actively involved 
in migration-related research and projects in the Philippines and throughout the world.  As 
for the NGOs (often in the Philippines referred to as civil society groups), there is a 
seemingly never-ending number of them that engage in a wide variety of activities ranging 
from advocacy, worker welfare, OFW support services, education and training, social and 
economic re-integration for returned workers, and even training and support for would-be 
OFW investors and entrepreneurs.  There is a wide mix of Philippine-based NGOs, but also 
many that are based in other states and have branches in the Philippines.  By and large, and 
for obvious reasons, the majority of NGOs focus their objectives, efforts and resources on 
the worker-welfare side of the overseas employment program.  Relatively few engage in 
direct lobbying of government or the policy process itself beyond joining hands in solidarity 
with other like-minded NGOs on issues of particular importance to OFW welfare.  Even 
fewer still focus on bringing the developmental potential of OFW remittances to bear on the 
acute poverty and suffering in the country through investment and entrepreneurship.  One 
NGO which has caught the developmental vision of how remittances can better harnessed 
for developmental outcomes is Unlad Kabayan, which helps OFWs organize migrants’ saving 
for investment in cooperative entrepreneurial ventures in some of the poorest parts of the 
country.62  From the small group of NGOs who engage in government policy advocacy, three 
which play a large role include the Center for Migrant Advocacy (CMA), Philippine Migrant 
Rights Watch (PMRW), and the Scalabrini Migration Center.  A fourth group, Migrante 
International does engage in advocacy, but did not seem to play an active role in the 
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debates surrounding RA 10022.  Finally, the media includes all current forms of news and 
print media as well as the increasingly important role of internet-based media sources. 
Non-Governmental Organizations 
The initial reactions of most NGOs involved in the overseas employment program to the 
proposed bills in late 2008 and early 2009 were a mixture of cautious optimism for the 
chance of improving various aspects of the program with a healthy dose of skepticism based 
on their perceived failures of the last major program revision, RA 8042.  NGOs at first 
displayed uncertainty or even indifference toward the proposed mandatory liability 
insurance provisions, and instead focused their efforts on pressuring policy makers to 
reform aspects of the program which they saw as most in need of revision.  During the early 
policy formation stages NGOs began to voice opposition to the insurance proposals, but in 
explanation for their opposition only articulated the argument that RAs would inevitably 
find a way to pass the costs on to the OFWs.   
Similar to the expressed recollections expressed by Hans Cacdac of POEA, as well as many of 
the recruitment industry leaders, the advocacy-focused NGOs seemed to be caught 
unawares by the dramatic size and scope of the changes proposed by the Senate version of 
the bill (SB 3286).  Also similar to sentiments from the recruitment industry and the program 
bureaucracy, were their assessments that the Senate had not included them in the 
deliberation process, and had rushed their bill through without proper consultation.  It was 
during the bicameral process that NGOs, CMA in particular, began to oppose intensely the 
proposed bill for a variety of reasons, chief among them the mandatory liability insurance 
provisions.  Rhodora Abano from CMA explained that their opposition to insurance 
provisions, despite assurances that the RAs would cover the expenses on behalf of OFWs, 
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were based on historical precedent, particularly the failure of foreign employers (via RAs) to 
pay the required $25 OWWA fee as prescribed in RA 8042.  She explained: 
We’re saying that like the OWWA fee which should be shouldered by the 
employer, it’s now passed on to the worker.  We don’t see any assurance 
that the premium that will be paid by the agency will actually be paid by the 
agency and will not be passed on to the migrant worker.  Because what will 
keep them from passing it on?  They have been charging so much!  You never 
know what they put in [charges to the OFW].63 
NGOs like CMA did not believe, based on historical precedent, that the clause threatening 
license cancellation would act as a sufficient deterrent for RAs to resist the temptation to 
pass on insurance premiums through accounting gimmicks and fees.   
Before proceeding to explore the full list of NGO grievances toward the proposed revision to 
RA 8042, a brief exploration of their views toward the JSL provisions and the issue of “risk” 
seem important as they were central to the arguments put forward by the recruitment 
industry in pushing for liability insurance.  In the following exchange the recruitment 
industry perspective on JSL was put to Rhodora Abaño at CMA.  Her response was indicative 
of sentiment across the NGO sector toward the recruitment industry on the issue of JSL.  
When asked her opinion on recruitment industry complaints that they have no control over 
the behavior of a foreign employer, and feel that as a result they are unjustly punished and 
held financially liable for their actions, she explained: 
The question is why did they deploy the worker to that company?  They are 
supposed to make sure that the worker will be [protected], that is why there 
is a contract.  Of course they did study these companies.  So why will you 
choose a company that wouldn't treat your workers well?  Of course it’s not 
only them who is the problem, because of course the government.  For 
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example the POEA is supposed to be doing the regulation and the other 
entity is the [DOLE] labor attaché.64 
Abaño brought up an excellent point regarding the role of DOLE’s labor attaché.  She is 
referring to the law that requires the labor attaché in destination states to verify every 
employer meets a certain standard before OFWs may be deployed to work for them.  In 
practice, however, this requirement is unworkable considering the volume of OFW 
deployments and the paltry resources available to labor attachés in destination states.  
When asked about how the verification process is supposed to work, Abaño explained that: 
[The labor attaché’s responsibility extends to] every contract, because the 
process is that if there is recruitment, the contract should be sent to the 
labor attaché and he's supposed to check that the contract is ok, and to make 
sure that the employer will be able to, that employer exists and that 
employer will be able to pay the employee, etc., etc., etc.  Then on the other 
hand, the POEA here are supposed to monitor who are the people going 
abroad and where etc., etc.  They are supposed to be talking to each other.  
But because of the sheer magnitude, and whose fault is the magnitude?  It 
has to be clear whose fault is it?  Is it the workers fault that he had to go 
abroad?  Because it’s very basic, why does our worker have to go abroad to 
find livelihood for his family?65  
Although Abaño clearly does not accept the recruitment industry’s point of view on the JSL 
provisions, she does however make it clear that the industry is not solely responsible and 
that the government bureaucracy shares a large portion of the blame as well.  The last 
portion of the above quote was included because it underlies the philosophy of most of the 
major NGOs concerned with the overseas employment program, and specifically those 
which involve themselves in the policy-making process.  This fundamental position, in 
essence, is that it is the government’s responsibility to provide jobs domestically, and that 
OFWs should not need to go abroad for work unless they want to.  For example, when asked 
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about what would happen to the Philippine economy if OFWs were no longer able to find 
work abroad due to excessive and overly burdensome government regulation which made 
Filipinos too expensive to hire compared to other workers, the most common response was 
that this would be an excellent outcome as it would force government to provide jobs 
domestically.  When one begins to appreciate the staunchness with which the NGOs adhere 
to this central philosophy, it becomes easier to understand the totality of, and rationale 
behind, the positions they take on key issues in the policy-making process.  No matter how 
the question was phrased, NGOs such as CMA utterly refused to acknowledge the unique 
challenges and risks faced by businesses in the Philippines.  In essence, the RAs must take 
financial responsibility for the actions and behaviors of a business in another country and 
operate in a completely different culture and legal environment.   
The unwieldy nature of the JSL “fix” for the problems posed by the inherently international 
nature of the private sector driven overseas employment program are non-issues from the 
NGO perspective.  This explains why they have zero patience or tolerance for any arguments 
from the recruitment industry about risk exposure.   
Our position is: what’s keeping them from insuring, if they will pay for it?  
Nothing is keeping them.  So if you are really concerned about that then 
insure it!  Why will you make it into a law?  Whose interest are you 
protecting, because the government [bureaucracy] is against it, we are 
against it, the OFWs are against it, so who favors it?  It’s only them.  It must 
be the agencies’ interests that they are after, not the OFWs.  Of course what 
they are saying is, it’s for the OFW, but it’s actually because they are 
concerned about the damage to themselves.  Then [they should] protect 
themselves from that damage by insuring.  We have no problem [with them] 
insuring themselves.  There is risk in business.  So their risk, when the going is 
good [everything] is ok, but when the going is bad, then you ask government 
to help you about the insurance etc., etc.  It’s ok when you are benefitting 
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but when there is danger of your not benefitting then we have to look to 
where, where, where?66 
On the issue of the recruitment industry insuring their risk, the NGOs have taken the 
position that they do not object whatsoever, provided this is something that the industry 
does on its own, and is not legally codified.  In essence, they take the position that if the 
recruitment industry does not like the risk and financial liabilities they are exposed to 
through the JSL provision, then they should protect themselves through insurance, without 
involving the government.   
After the first bicameral conference in August a cross-section of welfare and policy focused 
NGOs joined hands and submitted two position papers to the member of the bicameral 
conference expressing their desire to see the compulsory liability insurance dropped from 
the bill.  Their position papers, signed by 37 different NGOs, launched a well-reasoned 
attack at the mandatory liability insurance provisions in the bill.67  Their argument can be 
broken down into five parts.  First, they argued that “data from the POEA covering the years 
from 1990-2008 shows that only an average of 26.6 percent of the total number of OFWs 
                                                          
66
 Ibid. 
67
 Members of Consultative Council on OFWs (CCOFW) and other migrants rights advocates: 
Apostleship of the Sea Manila, Center for Migrant Advocacy, Center for Overseas Workers, Development 
Action for Women Network (DAWN), Episcopal Commission for Migrants and Itinerant People (CBCP-ECMI), 
Kabalikat ng Migranteng Pilipino, Inc. (KAMPI), Kabalikat ng OFW, Inc. (KOFW), Kaibigan ng OCW, Kalahi, 
Kanlungan Center Foundation, Kapisanan ng mga Kamag anak ng Migranteng Manggagawang Pilipino 
(Kakammpi), Philippine Migrants Rights Watch (PMRW), Scalabrini Center for People on the Move, Scalabrini 
Lay Missionaries, Scalabrini Migration Center, Women in Development Foundation (WIDF), Akbayan Citizens’ 
Action Party, Alliance of Progressive Labor, Batis Aware, Batis Center for Women, Commission for Filipino 
Migrant Workers (CFMW) The Netherlands, Economic Resource Center for OFWs (ERCOF), Fernando Crisosto - 
Saudi Arabia, Filipino Community Services and Information Network-Hongkong (FILCOMSIN-HK), Filipino 
Domestic Workers Union – Hongkong, Florencio Olemos, Sr., Focus on the Global South – Philippines 
Programme, Francisco Oca, OFW Saudi Arabia, Geneva Forum for Philippine Concerns, Hsinchu Catholic 
Diocese Migrants & Immigrants Service Center (HMISC), Joseph Henry Bibera Espiritu Patnubay.com, KOOP 
Natin - The Netherlands, Marino, Migrant Forum in Asia (MFA), Merchant Marine Operators Association 
(MMOA), Mike Bolos, Jr.- Ex-OFW - OFW Rights Advocate, Peoples Partner for Development and Democracy 
(PPDD) – Thailand, Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates (PAHRA), PS Link, Pusong Pinoy Association – 
Abuja Nigeria, Rashid Fabricante – OFW - Saudi Arabia, RESPECT Network Europewide, Ronnie Abeto - OFW - 
Saudi Arabia, Samahan ng Manggagawang Pilipino sa Belgium, Trusted Migrants - The Netherlands, Women in 
Development Foundation, YMCA Philippines. 
193 
 
are deployed through recruitment agencies,” and therefore the provisions would only affect 
a fraction of the total workers deployed.68  Second, they further argued that any attempt to 
force the remaining 73.3 percent of workers who went abroad on their own to buy liability 
insurance would most certainly be unconstitutional.  By this point in the process, it was 
already clear that any such move would not be attempted, despite the desires of the 
recruitment industry.  The third reason given was that “the presence of a third party – the 
insurance companies – adds more layers to the bureaucratic tangle that the OFWs or their 
families have to unravel whenever they have money claims or damages claims against their 
agencies.”69  The irony behind this third point is that adding a third party to the already 
complicated program relationship is exactly what the recruitment industry is trying to 
protect themselves against, namely the uncontrollable actions of a third party which also 
happens to be in another country.  The fourth argument put forward by the NGOs relates to 
the problem of moral hazard: It was then explained that “should this insurance provision be 
passed into law, the recruitment agency will no longer be answerable to any abuses that the 
OFW will face abroad: their neglect can be passed on to the insurance companies.”70  Lastly, 
the NGOs provided a fifth reason explaining that they “doubt the capability of government 
agencies to effectively implement this insurance scheme, particularly the Philippine 
Overseas Employment Administration” as “their track record in protecting the basic human 
rights of our migrant workers has so far been unsatisfactory.”71  This final point is difficult to 
argue with considering the patchwork makeup of the overlapping responsibilities and 
haphazard organization of the overseas employment program’s bureaucratic overseers, 
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though singling out the POEA for criticism seems unfair as they clearly are not solely 
responsible for the direction and management of the program overall. 
Even with their well organized and coordinated effort to block the mandatory insurance 
proposal, and despite the withdrawal of support by the recruiters themselves, the bicameral 
conference completed its work and the final draft was passed by both the Senate and 
House.  Nevertheless, they had not fully given up their efforts.  On March 4, four days 
before RA 10022 was to lapse into law provided it was not vetoed by the President, a 
coalition of 24 NGOs dispatched a letter to President Macapagal-Arroyo.72  In the letter they 
requested that she veto the legislation and provided the following reasons: 
1. The compulsory insurance will do more harm than good to our bagong 
bayani [new heroes]. 
2. Many recruitment and manning agencies already, as a practice, provide 
insurance coverage for their workers, thereby making this provision 
unnecessary and irrelevant. 
3. We believe that, should this bill become a law, the government agencies 
tasked with its implementation will not be able to properly implement, 
regulate and monitor it. 
4. There are many other alternative to legislating and privatizing OFW 
insurance coverage.73 
Their efforts went unheeded, and for her own reasons President Arroyo opted not to sign 
the bill or veto it, but instead to allow it to lapse into law on March 8, 2010. 
International Organizations 
There did not seem to be large scale involvement by international organizations in the 
process leading up to the House and Senate versions of the bill, nor in the hotly contested 
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public debate during the bicameral conference process.  While they may not have been 
inserting themselves into what, by the end, became a very heated public policy dispute, the 
IOM was willing to share their views on the insurance debate for this research project.  
Ricardo Casco, National Officer – Labor Migration Support with the IOM, is uniquely 
qualified to offer his perspective on the insurance debate having worked at the POEA for 
many years serving in a variety of leadership capacities, as well as having worked for the 
International Labor Organization and now the IOM.  Casco’s comments on insurance were 
direct and to the point.  He explained that this kind “of scheme is welcome as an option, not 
to be compulsory, that’s alright but for the recruitment industry to lobby a law to mandate 
it, I think it is too premature because they have no track record.”74  Although Casco 
expressed that he sympathizes to some extent with the reasons for which the recruitment 
industry was seeking after protection for their financial liabilities, he clearly does not believe 
that making the policy mandatory was appropriate based on how the industry has 
performed in other mandatory compliance areas.  This of course echoes the concern of the 
NGOs that the premium costs would inevitably find their way back to the OFWs themselves.   
Although IOM did not play a major role in the policy debate surrounding RA 10022, in 
addition to their many projects in the Philippines, the IOM does provide important research 
functions on the Philippines overseas employment program, especially in how it compares 
to program structures in other migrant sending states.  While discussing the recruitment 
industry and the JSL provisions governing the relationship between the OFW, the 
recruitment agency, and the foreign employer, Casco provided some insight into the 
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importance of perspective when striving to understand how each actor in the policy-making 
process views the situation.  He explained: 
Who are the clients of the [recruitment] agencies?  I think considering the 
worker as their client is not something that sinks in with them as of now.  
Maybe very very few.  It’s always their “foreign principal” or “employer” 
[who] is their client so I think this is very bad because if there is something 
that needs to take place or be a basis for progressive changes this is the 
[attitude] that must [change in the industry].  Recruiters must realize that 
workers and employers are both their clients.  Because not until they operate 
this way will they be more objective.75 
Casco’s point about who the industry views as their client is an excellent observation and 
certainly could be a contributing factor to some of the problems that plague the industry 
and underlie many of the views shared above by industry leaders such as Victor Fernandez.  
Although a change in this area would certainly be welcome by NGOs and the workers 
themselves, it is unlikely that this sea-change in thinking could take place until alternative 
arrangements could be made other than the current JSL system.  As previously mentioned, 
the current JSL system forces the agencies, even if they view their deployed OFW as a 
client/customer, to defend themselves against a financial loss and when necessary defend 
the actions of the foreign employer. 
The Media 
The role of the media in regard to the overseas employment program should not be 
overlooked as they are powerful actors as the gatekeepers of information regarding what 
happens abroad and at home to OFWs.  Unfortunately they rarely have good news to report 
when it comes to the overseas employment program, something that is lamented greatly by 
recruitment industry leaders who are trying to improve the industry’s overall image.  A 
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reporter for the Philippine Inquirer, Veronica Uy, was active in covering the debate and 
developments related to the insurance proposals.76  Uy participated in the Inquirer’s Global 
Nation section and adjoining website which is dedicated to issues relevant to OFWs. Due to 
the Filipino diaspora, it has a strong world-wide readership.  In a role reversal that was 
difficult for her to accept, she agreed to answer some questions related to the role the 
media has played in framing the debate on insurance, and how the media in general 
portrays the recruitment industry.  Regarding the last point, Uy insisted that there was no 
malice toward the industry nor were there any overt attempts to paint the industry in a bad 
light.  In essence, according to her, such efforts would hardly be necessary.  Instead she 
insisted that the Global Nation reporters had made conscious efforts to find positive, upbeat 
stories related to overseas migration, but that these types of stories seldom materialized.  
Instead she readily agreed with the characterizations of media coverage by the recruitment 
industry of stories about bodies coming off of planes.  Uy explained that these negative 
stories cannot be ignored and that “there have been big stories of terrible things happening 
to overseas workers” and that “these stories resonate with everyone.”77   
From her articles on the subject it is quite clear that Uy endeavors to be impartial in 
presenting the sides of the argument regarding liability insurance.  As far as the perspective 
she has on the insurance debate, she explained that “if you allow insurance you are taking 
out government control, their mandate, and you are adding a level, adding another layer to 
the picture.”78  In this case Uy seems to share this perspective with NGOs that despite what 
motives the recruitment industry may or may not have regarding liability insurance, it was 
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the government that ultimately had responsibility for OFW welfare and she clearly does not 
believe that adding another “layer” to the process will be productive.  The role that 
reporters like Uy played in covering the debate also did not seem to sway the minds of the 
conference committee members during the final days of the bicameral process, despite 
their extensive coverage of the ever increasing ranks of program actors who opposed it, 
including press coverage of the recruitment industry’s public withdrawal of support for the 
measure.  The press reports that were written in opposition to mandatory liability insurance 
also could not sway Congress from passing RA 10022 with the insurance provisions 
included.79 
Conclusion 
By the end of 2011 the mandatory insurance element of RA 10022 had been in effect for 
just over one year (insurance became mandatory from November 2010 forward).  A year 
into the new program we have yet to see exactly what the new insurance provisions will 
mean for OFWs and recruiters alike, but we will glean more as increasing numbers of OFWs 
deploy with the new coverage.  There was a crisis in Libya in early 2011 involving the need 
to evacuate a large number of OFWs from that country, but almost none of them had been 
deployed since the insurance provisions became active a few months earlier.  One aspect of 
the case study in this chapter was the arguments made over what the actual premium costs 
would be.  With some hindsight, now that the mandatory liability insurance provisions have 
been active for over a year, it is possible to draw a few preliminary conclusions concerning 
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how the program is functioning.  To start with, it is now possible to review the actual prices 
being charged to RAs for liability insurance coverage.  In February 2012 the current 
insurance premiums were as follows: 
Table 5.4 
Premium for Land-Based OFW:   Premium for Sea-Based OFW: 
One-year Premium: US$ 72.00 Six-month Premium: US$ 56.70 
Two-year Premium: US$144.00 One-year Premium: US$100.00 
        Two-year Premium: US$200.00 
Source80   
Although policy premiums are much higher than the recruitment industry’s initial cost-
estimates, they seem not to have quite reached the levels to which some in the industry had 
feared they would.  Nevertheless, in the case of lower skilled workers the premium amounts 
here could potentially consume a significant portion of the permissible 1 month salary based 
fee structure charged by agencies for placing workers abroad.  It is too early to assess how 
this new reality will affect the deployment of lower skilled workers. 
A great deal of attention has been paid to the issue of the JSL provisions in this chapter.  This 
was not an intentional outcome but instead the focus on this issue stemmed primarily from 
the problems multiple program actors (especially RAs) identified with the JSL arrangements.  
Like much of the overseas employment program policy architecture, JSL provisions are a 
unworkable and flawed solution to a problem that really can only be addressed through 
binding agreements, or treaties, between the Philippines and destination states.  As we will 
see in Chapter Six, non-binding bilateral labor agreements can help, but will not bring the 
level of certainty to the sending-receiving relationship that workers, recruiters, and 
employers would like to see.  As the new insurance-based system settles into normalcy over 
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the next few years it will be interesting to observe what changes if any begin to affect the 
JSL rules.  Will, for example, the liability insurance diminish the importance of JSL? Or will 
the provisions continue to be relevant parts of the dispute process?  Issues of moral hazard 
must also be considered; as Hans Cacdac from the POEA explains, “recruiters would realize 
that they are not footing the bill and therefore they would be more careless in selecting 
foreign employers for our people.”  This clearly demonstrates a fear of the incentives that 
the new policy puts into place, and where some program actors feel the new policy will lead 
in reference to JSL.81   
By the completion of the policy process the recruitment industry felt that the entire effort 
on RA 10022, had in essence been a step in the wrong direction.  Whereas industry leaders 
had hoped to enhance worker benefits and protections while protecting their own financial 
liabilities, instead they argued that they have again been asked to shoulder excessive 
burdens not of their own making.  They have further argued that the insurance provisions in 
RA 10022 will actually increase illegal activities and unethical practices within the legal side 
of the industry.  Fernandez explained that: 
We are also interested in the worker’s protection.  Government does not 
have the monopoly of good intentions, we also have.  And now they are 
listening to us maybe we can start that way, but now that they have mangled 
the law we are back to square one.  We are now again focused on migrants 
who are again going to be abused.  We have to defend ourselves to the thief 
and then probably we need the money so collect as much as you can get 
from the worker so that when we go to battle we have money to fight 
government, instead of saying let’s join hands with [Congress] and let us obey 
the rules.  Now, no, I will just say - Don't get caught!  That will be the rule 
now.  Do whatever you have to do because it’s your judgment call, for sure 
don't get caught, because you're on your own.  So that means to say you are 
not propagating hate against hate instead of saying let’s be concerned about 
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our workers.  We cannot detach ourselves from what is happening, but with 
this kind of government mentality, no way!82 
The industry’s point is that as long as the relationship continues down the path of 
antagonism and blame, progress toward program improvements cannot be made.  Civility, 
tolerance and mutual respect are of course necessary first steps before true cooperation 
can be achieved, and cooperation between Congress and business is the primary stumbling 
block. Can the Philippines achieve meaningful economic developmental progress through its 
overseas employment program, or will it persist on its perpetual track of disorganized 
growth without meaning or effect?  Fault-finding and determinations of moral rightness in 
regard to the RA 10022 case study are in the end meaningless when compared to the 
primary lesson, namely that all sides must listen to each other if they wish for anything to 
change, let alone improve the economic situation in the country. 
It is plausible to make a connection between the motives of the legislators involved in the 
creation of RA 10022 and election year politics, but this needs to be examined further in 
future research.  Although concrete evidence of the timing of their actions has not yet been 
uncovered, the issue was raised almost universally by those interviewed for this chapter 
from across the spectrum of program actors.   The statements shared in this chapter from 
various senators in regard to how important the overseas employment program is to the 
national economy should come as no surprise to anyone who has looked into the size and 
scope of migration from the Philippines.  However, these sentiments now expressed must 
be translated into meaningful action to rectify the ongoing problems with the overseas 
employment program.  Based on its importance, and the declarations of these national 
leaders, the overseas employment program should then be put in its rightful place as a key 
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ingredient in the national development strategy so that program benefits can be maximized 
to benefit the whole country. 
Beyond what is not known regarding motives, there are a great number of things that we do 
know based on this case study.  First and foremost is that the overseas employment 
program policy-making process is dysfunctional.  The relational framework between 
government and business, as described in Chapter Two, and established by Evans et. al. is 
completely lacking from both the policy-making process itself as well as the relationship 
among key program actors generally.  Another key lesson is the apparent resistance to input 
displayed by the legislature, further compounded by a lack of executive leadership from the 
President.  As mentioned earlier, the legislature’s “we know better” approach demonstrates 
both the nature of the policy-making process and explains the patch-worked state of 
program governance structures and legal framework today.  Along with the need to improve 
government oversight of the overseas employment program, it is also necessary to ensure 
that the benefits of this program promote national economic development.  This case study 
highlights the serious need for a central planning body with both expertise and authority to 
coordinate policy efforts for the country’s economic benefit as was the case in Korea, Japan, 
and Taiwan.  As a captured moment in policy time, this case study examining the full process 
surrounding RA 10022 has proven definitively that the Philippines policy makers must do 
better at cooperating with each other if the overseas employment program is to be 
maximized for the economic benefit of the country as a whole.  This bill and the process in 
which it was debated, fought over, and compromised upon should be viewed at one level as 
a case study not only of the how the overseas employment program policy process works in 
the Philippines.  More broadly, it provides insight into troubling the lack of communication, 
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dialogue, and mutual understanding that characterizes the relationship between Congress 
and other major program actors.  
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Chapter Six: Making Migration Policy: Reflections on the Philippines’ Bilateral Labor 
Agreements  
Chapter Overview 
This chapter discusses the changing influences on Philippine migration policy destination 
states of migrant workers are exerting through bilateral labor agreements, defined as 
agreements between two states establishing a working relationship in regard to the 
exchange, recruitment, welfare, health, training, compensation, and rights of migrant 
workers.  As neo-liberal trade policies have become more common across the Asia-Pacific, 
labor agreements have proliferated as well.  Both bilateral and regional free trade 
agreements are now in place or under negotiation across the region.  Likewise, states are 
engaging in labor relations liberalization through bilateral agreements, particularly those 
concluded between states with labor surpluses and others with labor shortfalls.  Within 
these bilateral frameworks, new targeted migrant schemes have been introduced to 
expedite the process of getting workers to where they are needed.  Workers’ welfare has 
also been a hallmark of such agreements, but business involvement has been largely absent. 
I will analyze several cases of agreements between the Philippines and migrant worker 
destination states in an attempt to identify broad patterns found in bilateral labor 
agreements.  This research fills a void in the literature in regard to the structure and content 
of completed bilateral labor agreements between states.  Further analysis will be provided 
into how these completed agreements have impacted government-business relations within 
the context of the Philippines overseas employment program.  Although case studies from 
the Philippines are used, it is expected that analysis and conclusions drawn will have wide 
regional applicability.  This chapter should not be viewed as an appendage to the larger 
topic of government-business relations in the Philippine overseas employment program, but 
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instead as an in-depth exploration of an issue of significant importance to the program.  The 
three-fold objectives of the chapter are first to analyze completed agreements, second, to 
explore how government and business have interacted in both the Philippines and 
destination states in the pursuit of them, and third, I will argue that new creative 
approaches are required in order to assure that additional bilateral labor agreements (BLAs) 
will be forged with the states to which large numbers of overseas foreign workers deploy. 
The Philippines’ Aggressive Pursuit of Bilateral Labor Agreements 
The pursuit of BLAs is now a major component of Philippine migration policy and 
international diplomacy efforts.  In October 2007, Philippine Senate President Pro Tempore 
Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada was quoted in a Senate press release stating that “practically every 
day, we hear of Filipino workers being abused and maltreated by their employers abroad, 
especially in countries that our government does not have bilateral labor agreements with.  
Such agreements could prevent these misfortunes by laying down the necessary guidelines 
and provisions for the protection of our workers”1  Estrada’s comments clearly illustrate a 
desire for more BLAs.  His call for better assurances of safe working conditions for Filipinos 
abroad demonstrates one of the primary reasons for the Philippine government’s interest in 
developing new labor agreements with migrant destination states.  At that time, the 
Philippines only had bilateral labor agreements with 13 of the 197 countries which host 
Filipino workers, a figure that has modestly increased to 19 at latest count (see Appendix 
1).2  Estrada’s sentiments are not unique and illustrate a growing trend in policy making on 
Philippine overseas work.  Government officials, the Philippine Overseas Employment 
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Administration, overseas employment agencies, and even overseas workers’ welfare Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have expressed a desire for BLAs.3  Despite the 
weaknesses of BLAs and the tremendous difficulty in forging them, short of legally binding 
international agreements they are a useful tool available for states to enhance efficiency-
for-welfare, potentially leading to greater protection and profitability for the migrants and 
employers, as well as the sending and receiving states.  In this chapter ‘efficiency’ is 
conceptualized as any improvement in the sending, receiving, or processing of migrant 
workers between two relevant states.  These improvements can include (but are not limited 
to): financial savings for migrants and/or employers, up-front disclosure of labor migration 
cost responsibilities and other important information, reduction in time expended, removal 
of obstacles and bureaucratic hurdles, dispute resolution procedures, guidelines for migrant 
repatriation, guarantees of good working conditions, agreed procedures and guidelines on 
protecting worker health and welfare, and on dealing with problems that migrants may 
encounter while overseas. 
The number one destination for Filipino migrants, Saudi Arabia (see Table 6.1 below), has 
shown disinterest in the Philippine government’s numerous attempts to begin negotiations 
for a bilateral labor agreement.  Saudi Arabia has opposed engaging in negotiations with the 
Philippines due to the fear of a snowball effect which would then require them to sign 
similar agreements with other states that have workers in the kingdom.  Saudi disinterest in 
forging labor agreements is particularly difficult for Philippine officials as many Filipino 
migrants there have been victims of abuse including arbitrary incarceration, and violent 
crimes including beheadings.  Describing the nature and scope of the problems facing OFWs 
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in the kingdom, former Philippine ambassador to Saudi Arabia Antonio Villamor testified 
before the House of Representatives Committee on Overseas Workers’ Affairs in early 2011, 
explaining that 
70 per cent of Filipinos there are professionals or skilled workers and 30 per 
cent are low-skilled workers. However, the proportions are reversed when it 
comes to difficulties and problems, with low-skilled workers, including 
domestic workers, accounting for about 70 per cent of these and 
professionals for 30 per cent.4‖ 
There are tremendous challenges to concluding a BLA with Saudi Arabia.  Both sides have a 
strong need for each other, but it is the destination state in its role as ‘job supplier’ which 
holds significant negotiating power.  Because Saudi Arabia needs Filipino labor, the 
Philippines’ primary negotiating tool would be to cut off the supply of migrant laborers, 
which would of course harm the Philippines at least as much as it would Saudi Arabia.  Thus 
the strategy employed by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and 
the Philippine government has been to pursue agreements wherever possible and then to 
take what they can get, the theory being that any BLA, despite its non-binding status and 
limited applicability beyond certain professions, is better than no agreement at all.  The 
global demand-driven nature of international migration has put labor exporting states like 
the Philippines in a weakened bargaining position.5  Destination states are hesitant to 
undertake agreements for a variety of reasons, but two of the most common include first 
that “Filipino workers are subject to the same laws and regulations as nationals; 
consequently, they do not need any special attention” and second “labour receiving 
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Chapter Four for full quote. 
209 
 
countries have also argued that since the terms of employment are negotiated by the 
overseas Filipino workers and private employers or agencies, they do not want to get 
involved.”6   
As illustrated in the preceding chapters the Philippine government’s managed program of 
sending workers abroad on a contract basis has existed formally since 1974.  Since that time, 
the program has evolved from something originally intended to be temporary, into a 
massive program with a full range of bureaucratic entities charged with managing the 
process and related efforts.  In addition to the president and the Congress, the primary 
entities involved in concluding bilateral labor agreements are the Department of Foreign 
Affairs (DFA), the POEA, and the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).  Although 
BLAs have existed since the earliest years of the program, they have proliferated more 
broadly since the passage of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (RA 
8042), when (as discussed in Chapter Four) protecting workers became the dominant 
paradigm in Philippine migration policy.7  In regard to BLAs, Republic Act 8042 (RA 8042) 
states that: 
The State shall deploy overseas Filipino workers only in countries where the 
rights of Filipino migrant workers are protected. The government recognizes 
any of the following as a guarantee on the part of the receiving country for 
the protection and the rights of overseas Filipino workers: 
(a) It has existing labor and social laws protecting the rights of migrant 
workers; 
(b) It is a signatory to multilateral conventions, declarations or resolutions 
relating to the protection of migrant workers; 
(c) It has concluded a bilateral agreement or arrangement with the 
government protecting the rights of overseas Filipino workers; and 
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 Stella P. Go, Fighting For The Rights Of Migrant Workers: The Case Of The Philippines, In Migration For 
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(d) It is taking positive, concrete measures to protect the rights of migrant 
workers. (emphasis added)8 
 
Since 1995 bilateral labor agreements have taken center stage in Philippine diplomatic 
efforts with the DFA taking the lead but consulting with both the POEA and DOLE.  This new 
emphasis was further affirmed in 2010 with the passing of RA 10022, as examined in 
Chapter Five.   
Despite its tremendous importance the topic of bilateral and regional labor agreements has 
been often overlooked while considerable research efforts have been committed to bilateral 
and regional trade agreements.  When the ‘labor’ component is discussed it is normally 
relegated to an afterthought in relation to workers’ welfare.  No known research has been 
conducted on how completed BLAs influence ongoing efforts to secure additional 
agreements or how the contents of the agreements differ from one to the next.  Stella P. Go 
is one of the few scholars who have addressed BLAs in the Philippines primarily through the 
framework of workers’ welfare.  Her work highlights the enormous difficulty in securing 
meaningful labor agreements between source and destination states, as she explores at 
length the difficulties in negotiating by identifying the imbedded tension in the objectives of 
both sending and receiving states.  Go explains that for labor-receiving countries the 
primary objectives for entering into bilateral agreements include: (1) addressing the 
manpower needs of employers and the industrial sector; (2) promoting cooperation in the 
management of migration, both regular and irregular; and (3) promoting cultural/political 
ties and exchanges. For sending countries, on the other hand, the main objectives for 
entering into these agreements are: (1) ensuring continued access to the labor market of 
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receiving countries; (2) easing unemployment pressures; (3) promoting the protection and 
welfare of their workers; and (4) obtaining foreign exchange through workers’ remittances.9 
This chapter is different from Go’s research in that it will explore specific aspects of the 
most recently agreed BLAs in order to understand how the agreements themselves are 
evolving.  My analysis also helps to identify ‘selling points’ that can be emphasized in future 
agreements proposed to uninterested states.  
Since the 1990s, bilateral and regional trade agreements (RTAs) have proliferated with 400 
agreements registered with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/World 
Trade Organization (WTO) that were to be implemented by 2010.10  Efforts to attach labor 
agreements to trade agreements through the WTO have been a great source of controversy.  
Developing states, for example, have resisted efforts by developed states to impose 
worker’s protection as conditions in trade agreements, arguing that they are unfair and 
prohibitively expensive to implement.  Thus, efforts toward forging labor agreements have 
largely been approached from an economic cooperation perspective, with little attention 
given to how these agreements could be used as a component of a migration-for-
development strategy or for increasing efficiencies in sending and receiving. 
Regional organizations and trade blocs have largely rebuffed the pursuit of labor 
agreements as an independent policy objective intended to address labor shortages or 
surpluses in member states.  Nevertheless, the Philippines has taken a leading role in 
pressing for international and regional approaches to workers’ welfare through multilateral 
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agreements.11  Through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Philippines has pursued efforts to create agreements on 
minimum standards applicable to overseas migrants.  The Philippines has been active in its 
support of various International Labor Organization initiatives and was one of the few states 
to sign and ratify the UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.  Because the Convention has been almost 
exclusively ratified by migrant sending states rather than destination states, it does very 
little in terms of managing international migration and migrant welfare.  Bilateral labor 
agreements have thus become the norm for states wishing to address workforce shortfalls 
and surpluses.   
The research on which this chapter is based focuses on a broadly defined category of 
bilateral labor agreements, but it must be remembered that there are several types of 
agreements under the BLA umbrella, based on the extent of commitment and detail among 
the parties.  All of the agreements analyzed in the case studies used here are Memoranda of 
Understanding (MOU), sometimes called Memoranda of Agreement (MOA), which are less 
formal than legally binding BLAs in the form of treaties.  Despite being less binding than 
formal treaties, MOUs “can create more certain, formal mechanisms by involving the key 
players at different stages of design and implementation of the agreement.”12  Others 
include bilateral social security agreements which “enhance the cooperation between the 
social security authorities of the countries involved ... to ensure the adequate portability of 
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contributions and entitlements of migrant workers and their families.”13  Although bilateral 
social security agreements are beyond the scope of this chapter, it is clear that such 
agreements profit workers through benefit portability upon their return home. 
One of the purposes of this research is to go beyond the broad structural description of 
bilateral agreements set forth by other authors and to explore more deeply the substantive 
outcomes of recently finalized BLAs.14  By analyzing and classifying various agreements, 
patterns will begin to emerge from the agreements themselves which will provide insight 
into the motivations for both negotiating parties.  One dominant theme which runs 
throughout the spectrum of agreements included in this chapter is the effort to maximize 
efficiency in sending and receiving migrant laborers.  By exploring various efforts at 
increasing efficiency in the process, a model of efficiency in creating future agreements 
could be developed as an enticement to states that are reluctant to enter bilateral labor 
negotiations with the Philippines.  As we will see in the cases of the Philippines-Japan and 
Philippines-South Korea agreements, improvements in efficiency can be a powerful 
motivating factor in convincing states to both enter the negotiating process as well as to 
finalize agreements.   
In order to find a model agreement that might be attractive to Saudi Arabia, BLAs with four 
countries and four Canadian provinces will be analyzed.  By choosing two states from the 
Middle East, two from East Asia, and one from North America, a broad yet representative 
view of BLAs forged with different states, with a variety of motivations, will emerge.  The 
test of representativeness of the cases used is whether they provide broad geographic 
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coverage, and collectively account for approximately 250,000 or roughly 1/6th of deployed 
OFWs in 2009.  Table 6.1 illustrates the number of migrant workers deployed and re-
deployed between 2004 and 2009 in each of the five states included in this chapter, as well 
as Saudi Arabia which does not currently have a BLA with the Philippines, but is the number 
one destination for OFWs.  
Table 6.1 
Deployed Land-based Overseas Filipino Workers by destination (New hires and Rehires) 2004-2009 
Labor Agreement 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Growth 
Rate ’04-
‘09 
Bahrain 8,257 9,968 11,736 9,898 13,079 15,001 82% 
United Arab 
Emirates 68,386 82,039 99,212 120,657 193,810 196,815 188% 
Japan 74,480 42,633 10,615 8,867 6,555 6,418 -91% 
Canada 4,453 3,629 6,468 12,380 17,399 17,344 289% 
Saudi Arabia* 188,107 194,350 223,459 238,419 275,933 291,419 55% 
Korea 8,392 9,975 13,984 14,265 12,367 14,851 77% 
Worldwide 
(Millions) 0.93 0.98 1.06 1.07 1.23 1.42 53% 
* Saudi Arabia does not have a BLA with the Philippines but is the top OFW destination. 
Source: Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, Overseas Employment Statistics, 2009,  
http://www.poea.gov.ph/stats/2009_OFW%20Statistics.pdf. 
 
By taking up a discussion of bilateral labor agreements between the Philippines and the 
following five states, a model may emerge of the possible benefits, shortcomings, 
challenges, and opportunities in structuring and proposing future BLAs with states reluctant 
to move forward with the process, such as Saudi Arabia. 
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Labor destination country case studies 
Japan  
On January 12, 2009 the Republic of the Philippines and Japan signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding on the deployment and acceptance of Filipino candidates as nurses and 
caregivers.  The negotiations behind the agreement took place between the POEA and the 
Japan International Corporation of Welfare Services (JICWELS).  The MOU is expressly 
applicable for two types of employment in Japan, Registered Nurses, referred to by their 
Japanese name “Kangoshi” and Certified Care workers, or “Kaigofukushishi.”  The statement 
of purpose explains that the document’s objective “is to clarify the process of deploying 
Filipino candidates for Filipino ‘Kangoshi’, and Filipino ‘Kaigofukushishi’… and establish a 
concrete framework for cooperation between the POEA and the JICWELS with respect to the 
deployment and acceptance of Filipino candidates.”15  Filipino nurses and caregivers will 
only move beyond the ‘candidate- trainee’ status upon completion of the relevant 
examinations under Japanese law. 
The limited scope of the MOU is catered toward specific occupational shortages in Japan 
and the capacity of the Philippines to provide qualified nurses and caregivers.  The 
Philippines-Japan MOU is a perfect example of states engaging in mutually beneficial labor 
agreements for much the same reasons trade negotiations and agreements are pursued.  
Some migrant workers welfare groups may take issue with the MOU’s lack of attention to 
worker’s welfare, but will likely welcome the job security offered through a more rigorous 
contract framework between employer and employee.  There is a brief comment included in 
the agreement requiring host employers to pay USD 25 into a ‘worker welfare fund’, but no 
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further details are provided regarding this fund.16  It is assumed that this passage is referring 
to the migrant worker insurance scheme administered by the Overseas Worker Welfare 
Administration (OWWA), which currently requires a twenty-five dollar fee for participation 
in the program and provides emergency benefits to OFWs and their families.  The section of 
the MOU which covers contract guarantees and guidelines was likely high on the priority list 
of the POEA negotiators, while minimum worker qualification standards and training 
verification were undoubtedly high on the JICWELS priority list.  Another important aspect 
of the MOU is the framework established to deal with ongoing maintenance of the program 
and possible future problems.  Establishing a cooperative framework and working 
relationship between sending and receiving states is invaluable for the long term health of 
the bilateral agreement.  
Background verification and credibility is not limited to the prospective migrant worker side 
of the agreement, but extends also to the Japanese hospitals and medical facilities wishing 
to participate in the program.  These host institutions are not only required to pay a fair 
legal wage, but also must uphold the aforementioned contract requirements with migrant 
workers.  Mutually beneficial for both states is the section in the MOU which establishes 
guidelines for worker health inspections prior to departure.  This section seems particularly 
appropriate considering the nature of the work (healthcare) migrants will be engaged in.  
This protects the host country from exposure to health risks, but also ensures that migrant 
workers will be fit enough to cope with the difficulties of working overseas. 
There seems to already be movement on both sides to capitalise on the new cooperative 
framework.  In early 2009 the JICWELS website, for example, listed information on 
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application procedures and announced two eight-hour candidate information sessions in 
both Mindanao, and Cebu, with four eight-hour sessions in Manila.17  Evidently the JICWELS 
is taking the arrangement seriously and aims to utilize the MOU to meets its nursing and 
care worker labor shortfalls.  Although the Japan-Philippines MOU is limited in scope to two 
types of specialized workers, the document is inclusive of all aspects of the overseas migrant 
worker process from beginning to end.  The Japan – Philippines MOU is an excellent 
example of how specific occupational shortages in destination states can be met by human 
resources from the labor supplying country in a mutually beneficial way.  
An obvious benefit of the MOU to migrant nurses and caregivers is clear knowledge of what 
expenses they will incur in participating with the scheme.  The POEA has outlined where and 
by whom specific cost burdens will be borne: 
• Medical exam – worker 
• Medicare premium – worker 
• POEA processing – employer 
• OWWA contribution – employer 
• Airticket (PTA) – employer 
• Visa – worker 
• Cost of training – free 
• Board and lodging – free while on language training18 
 
In the past, unforeseen charges and fees have been unfairly placed upon the migrants 
themselves.  These unforeseen expenses are one of the major problems and sources of 
anguish and often debt for Filipino workers seeking employment abroad.  Although the fee 
responsibilities outlined by the Philippines-Japan MOU are clear and given up front, they are 
not as generous as those given by the Canadian provinces (discussed below).   
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Although the Philippines-Japan MOU establishes a comprehensive framework for mutually 
beneficial cooperation, the limited scope of the agreement, namely only including nurses 
and caregivers, demonstrates a common problem in bilateral labor agreements.  Recent 
statistical data available for Filipino deployments to Japan show that only one nurse 
deployed in 2009, but 1,536 of the 1,822 newly hired workers deployed as choreographers 
and dancers (broadly referred to as entertainers). 19  Therefore an agreement which 
included the statistically more significant entertainers group would have benefited more 
Filipino workers who are currently deployed.  A shortage of nursing and caregiver staff in 
Japan made a targeted MOU attractive enough to overcome lingering Japanese reservations 
about such agreements, but it seems that other employment areas have not reached the 
same critical level from which the Japanese are willing to undertake similar agreements.  In 
essence, the motivation behind the decision to forge a BLA with the Philippines came 
through cooperation and coordination among the Japanese government and Japanese 
businesses.  It was announced in February 2010, that the recruitment process for a second 
batch of nurses and caregivers had begun, and that “77 nurse positions and 101 caregivers 
for...82 Japanese health and caregiving institutions” had commenced.20  Despite the 
tremendous efforts in forging this agreement, not to mention its ongoing maintenance, 
these figures are low even when simply comparing them to the total number of OFWs 
deployed to Japan: 6418 (as of 2009, the most recent year for which statistics are available; 
see Table 6.1 above).   
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Although the process will probably be smooth for the 178 workers chosen from the POEA’s 
manpower registry who are successful in securing positions at the aforementioned 82 
Japanese health facilities, this outcome can hardly be considered widely beneficial to the 
majority of Filipino workers migrating to Japan.  This also does little to alleviate the current 
surplus of qualified Filipino nurses and caregivers in the Philippines who have passed the 
relevant board examinations, but have not yet been successful in finding work at home or 
abroad.  Nursing industry leaders in the Philippines are wrestling with serious issues related 
to the numbers of qualified nurses currently being produced in the country, and the 
extraordinarily low levels of job placement for those who pass the board exam.  For 
example, in 2008, 39,455 nursing graduates passed the qualification exam, but only 22,727 
nurses and caregivers deployed overseas as ‘new hires’.  While millions of poor Filipinos lack 
access to affordable health care, there are not enough positions available domestically to 
employ the thousands of health workers with demonstrated qualifications in the field.  
Consequently those health workers not placed overseas languish in unemployment or 
underemployment.21  Ultimately, this problem needs to be addressed internally in the 
Philippines, and Japan should not be faulted for ‘not providing’ as many nursing jobs as the 
POEA, nursing colleges, and individual nurses would like.  
Canada 
In contrast to all other bilateral labor agreements with the Philippines, individual Canadian 
provinces have opted for separate MOUs rather than a single national agreement.  Alberta, 
Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia have all agreed to separate MOUs outlining 
their respective labor relationships with the Philippines.  The reason for this approach seems 
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to be that each agreement can be adapted to the specific needs of each province.  
Saskatchewan led the way by first signing its MOU in December 2006, with the remaining 
three all signing in 2008.  There are common themes among all four documents, but each 
seems to vary on its specific objectives.  Each of the four provincial MOUs are discussed in 
chronological older, from the oldest to the most recent. 
The Saskatchewan government seems to take a very different approach than Japan to the 
forging of a bilateral labor relationship with the Philippines.  After the MOU was signed, an 
official press release from the Saskatchewan government explained that “initially, this 
initiative will focus on meeting critical labor market needs in occupations such as welding, 
metal fabrication, long-haul trucking and health care.  Saskatchewan employers will gain 
access to a large pool of skilled workers who intend to settle in the province.”22  Provincial 
Immigration Minister Pat Atkinson added “Opening our doors and helping people from 
around the world choose Saskatchewan will build our economy and make life better today 
for everyone, including new immigrants and build a strong future here for our young 
people.”23  It seems from the language used, that Saskatchewan views the MOU as a means 
for permanent settlement.  The MOU itself lists as a second ‘purpose’ that “the participants 
intend to work collectively for Filipino workers to work in, and/or immigrate to 
Saskatchewan under a process that is effective and clearly communicated to Saskatchewan 
employers and workers.”24   
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British Columbia was the second province in Canada to sign a MOU with the Philippines.  
The MOU is more precise than the Saskatchewan agreement with more specific details 
included under the sections on recruitment and selection of workers, costs of recruitment of 
workers, offers of employment and labour contracts, protection of workers, human resource 
development, and costs.  Similar to the Saskatchewan MOU, but unlike the Japan MOU, 
specifics are not given regarding targeted job categories or industries.  Clarification was 
given in a press release from the Ministry of Economic Development explaining that “the 
agreement will target sectors most in need of skilled workers: tourism and hospitality, retail 
and construction.”25   
The third Canadian provincial MOU with the Philippines was signed with Manitoba on 
February 8th, 2008.  The first stated purpose of the MOU is “to clarify and articulate the 
participants’ current intentions to promote and strengthen areas of co-operation in the 
fields of labour, employment and human resource development and employment.”26  The 
MOU does not mention specific types of migrant labor to target, but instead seems to 
broadly address all Filipino migrants to Manitoba.  Five priorities for collaboration and 
cooperation include: 
I. ensure that the needs of Employers for Workers with the appropriate skills are 
met through training and credential recognition activities; 
II. expedite the approval of selected individuals for employment opportunities in 
Manitoba, including efforts to support the work of the Canadian visa office in 
Manila in its processing of Workers’ work permits and visas; 
III. promote sound, ethical and equitable recruitment and employment practices; 
IV. share information to support initiatives, subject to privacy laws of the 
participants; and; 
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V. on prior agreement, explore a role for the International Organization of 
Migration to support the foregoing initiatives.27 
 
Although these five priorities seem rather general, each is elaborated upon, in turn, in later 
sections of the MOU.   
It should be noted, that the fifth point establishes a link between the MOU and a possible 
role for the International Organization for Migration (IOM) on related multilateral initiatives.  
The MOU does not specify which initiatives are being referred to, but an official press 
release from Manitoba Premier Gary Doer outlined several programs which involved trips to 
the Philippines by both provincial labor officials and business leaders to open up additional 
cooperation opportunities for both increased migrant labor to Manitoba as well as goods 
and services export opportunities to the Philippines from Manitoba.  Speaking of the value 
of the MOU, Doer stated that “this agreement builds on the close relationship that already 
exists between Manitoba and the Philippines” and that “by working together, we can ensure 
the ethical movement of people, improve the application process, strengthen worker 
protection and better meet the needs of employers.”28  Through their actions it is clear that 
the Philippine government considers the creation of new MOUs to be in its best interest, but 
it is statements from destination country officials such as those expressed by Premier Doer 
that illustrate how both sides can view bilateral labor agreements as beneficial.  When Doer 
speaks of “ethical movements of people,” he is likely trying to assuage the concerns of a 
domestic constituency that doesn’t want Manitoba involved in exploitative practices.  There 
are likely such constituencies in Japan, Korea and the other Canadian provinces but not in 
authoritarian regimes like those in Bahrain, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. 
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The most recent Canadian province to sign an MOU was Alberta in October 2008.  The 
Alberta MOU seems to have taken cues from the previous three agreements as it has the 
most comprehensive coverage of all stages of the migrant worker experience.  In previous 
MOUs there is occasional reference to labor laws in both the Philippines and the destination 
country, but the Alberta agreement expressly lists the relevant labor laws and codes 
applicable in both the Philippines and Alberta.  Another feature of this MOU is its focus not 
only on migrant worker’s welfare, but overall experience including economic compensation.  
The MOU attempts to remove one of the most negative financial aspects of overseas 
migrant labor from a Filipino perspective, namely placement fees.  The POEA, DOLE, and the 
Philippine Congress have all established rules regarding the placement fees charged by 
recruitment agencies.  Currently placement fees are not to exceed the value of one month’s 
salary for the prospective position.29  This of course can be a major sacrifice for workers who 
are in essence paying money up-front to secure a job.  The Alberta MOU has mandated that 
“employers will cover all recruitment costs related to the hiring of Filipino workers…hence, 
Employers and Sending Agencies in Canada and the Philippines are not allowed to charge 
recruitment fees in any form from the hired Workers bound for Alberta.”30  The same policy 
also exists in the other previously mentioned Canadian agreements although Alberta’s goes 
the farthest in explicitly looking out for the best interests of the migrant.   
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Bahrain 
In April 2007 the Philippines and Bahrain signed a MOU on health services cooperation.  Like 
the Philippines-Japan MOU, this document focuses on healthcare related migrants.  The 
second of the stated General Objectives is to: 
Create alliances between the Philippines and Bahrain’s recognized healthcare 
and educational institutions to produce sustainable international education, 
training, and professional/technical development programs that will increase 
the supply and improve the quality of competent human resources for 
health.31   
Next the MOU outlines five specific objective areas to address: exchange of human 
resources for health; scholarships; academic cooperation; investments; and technology 
cooperation.  The first category, exchange of human resources for health, includes five 
subcategories of its own that are worth mentioning and applicable to the actual exchange of 
migrant labor.  These subcategories include, recruitment; rights of workers; capacity 
building; mechanisms for sustainability of the development of human resources for health; 
and mutual recognition agreement on human resources for health.  The recruitment section 
contains general information on the need for labor contract creation which is legally 
acceptable in both states as well as internationally.  The recruitment subsection leaves all 
other matters related to contract creation up to the ‘contracting parties’. 
The next section on the rights of workers addresses compensation and worker welfare by 
simply stating that migrants “shall be provided equal employment opportunity in terms of 
pay and other employment conditions…the right to due process in cases of violation of the 
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employment contract.”32  Reference is made to ‘relevant International Labour Organization 
(ILO) conventions’ but specific rights and responsibilities of Filipino migrants are not 
elaborated upon.  The last three subsections only make optimistic statements about future 
cooperation in the areas of capacity building, program sustainability, and agreements on 
mutual qualifications recognition. 
Two of the MOUs more interesting main objectives involve scholarships and academic 
cooperation.  The section on scholarships proposes that: 
Scholarships under this Memorandum shall aim to develop human resources 
for health that can also serve as educators.  The Bahraini Government shall 
provide graduate and post-graduate scholarship programs that may be 
administered by providing scholarships to Filipino human resource for health 
to leading Bahrain Universities.  Upon completion of the program, the 
scholars shall be required to return to the Philippines under the 
administrative guidelines of the Philippine Government were they shall be 
required to serve in hospitals, universities and other health institutions.33 
This scholarship program seems to be a mutually beneficial arrangement for both states.  
The Philippines will gain valuable assets in those returning from post-graduate study in 
health related fields.  The returning person will not only benefit the Philippine health care 
system, but will also be a valuable teaching resource to healthcare students.  From the 
Bahraini perspective investing in top notch education for health care workers and then 
requiring them to return home in order to educate others makes perfect sense as it will 
improve the skill levels of health care workers coming to Bahrain in the future.  Equally 
beneficial to both states is the next section which proposes guidelines for health care 
student exchanges and internships.   
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Although the Philippines-Bahrain MOU covers the basics in terms of labor cooperation, its 
limited scope (health care workers only) brings forward some of the same problems related 
to the Japan-Philippines MOU.  Similar to Japan where Filipino entertainers make up the 
highest number of migrant workers, the dominant occupation of Filipino migrants in Bahrain 
are domestic workers.  A tremendous amount of effort has gone into formalizing a 
framework that benefits relatively few migrant workers.  It seems that once again an 
agreement could only be reached between both parties when the destination country 
expresses a strong need for a particular type of migrant, and consequently ignored all other 
migrant worker groups regardless of number (see Table 6.2). 
Table 6.2 
Deployed Land-based OFWs by Skill - New hires, 2008-2009 
Skill 2008 2009 % Change 
Household Service Workers 50,082 71,557 43% 
Waiters, Bartenders and Related Workers 13,911 11,977 -14% 
Charworkers, Cleaners and Related Workers 11,620 10,056 -13% 
Nurses Professional 12,618 13,465 7% 
Caregivers and Caretakers 10,109 9,228 -9% 
Laborers/ Helpers General 9,711 8,099 -17% 
Plumbers and Pipe Fitters 9,664 7,722 -20% 
Wiremen Electrical 8,893 9,752 10% 
Welders and Flame-Cutters 6,777 5,910 -13% 
Total Deployments - New Hires 376,973 349,715 -7% 
*This table depicts the top 9 occupational categories for newly hired land based OFWs.  This does not 
represent a comprehensive list of occupational categories, thus the sum of the nine categories does 
not equal the cumulative yearly new hire figure given above.  For a more comprehensive list of newly 
hired deployment skill categories please refer to the POEA’s statistical page. 
Source: POEA, 2009. 
 
United Arab Emirates 
The MOU between the Philippines and the UAE was signed within a few days of the Bahrain 
agreement in April 2007, but has a drastically different structure than all previously 
discussed agreements.  Instead of topical sections and sub sections the MOU simply has 
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fourteen articles and is significantly shorter than previous agreements.  The MOU focuses 
on joint initiatives toward contract formulation and approval through both the UAE Ministry 
of Labour and the Philippine Government.  Included are specific conditions for advertising 
job openings in the UAE which must include information on “conditions of employment 
especially the salary, accommodation, transportation and any other relevant terms which 
shall be verified by the Ministry of Labour in the UAE.” 
Articles seven through nine deal specifically with migrant rights and avenues of redress.  
These three articles seem to target areas where there have previously been problems, 
matters of jurisprudence, remittance rights, and a dispute resolution process.  Article seven 
specifies that labor contracts must be written in both English and Arabic and that in case of 
a legal dispute in UAE courts the Arabic text will prevail over English.  This may not be ideal 
for Filipino migrants, but in the very least having this crucial distinction determined 
beforehand will allow migrants to know where they stand legally.  Article eight 
unequivocally decrees that migrants are free to “remit all their savings to their country of 
origin or elsewhere in accordance with the financial regulations of the UAE.”34 The right to 
remit savings is central to a migrant’s core reason for undertaking overseas labor in the first 
place, thus reassurances of this fundamental right is a welcome inclusion to the MOU.  Last, 
article nine outlines the migrant dispute process explaining that complaints will first go 
through labor authorities, and if no settlement can be reached the dispute will go to the 
UAE judicial system.  Overall the UAE-Philippines MOU is a good starting point for future 
negotiations, but really must be expanded upon considering the high number of Filipinos 
living and working there (see Table 6.1). 
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Republic of Korea 
In May, 2009 the Philippines and the Republic of Korea signed two BLAs.  The first simply 
outlined a relational framework “on cooperation in the field of labor and manpower 
development”, and the second established the most comprehensive labor migration scheme 
ever attempted between the Philippines and a worker receiving country.  The second MOU 
formally brought the Philippines into a migrant labor scheme in operation in Korea since 
2004, known as the Employment Permit System (EPS).  The EPS established a state to state 
relational migration structure which manages the process from beginning to end, and 
prohibits involvement by recruitment agencies.  Korea’s efforts in establishing the program 
were aimed squarely at the problem of illegal immigration and widespread reports of 
abuses of migrants by recruitment agencies both inside and outside of Korea. 
Like many of the previously discussed documents the agreement does outline the various 
costs involved in the scheme, and roughly describes which parties will be responsible for 
what expenses.  The bulk of the expenses, including an application fee, fall on the workers.  
Before describing the fee breakdown the following explanation is given:  
The POEA, in consultation with the MOL [Korean Ministry of Labor], undertakes to publicly 
inform the workers of the legitimate fees to be paid on the following: 
a) Sending Fees 
(1) Application Fees 
(a) EPS-KLT Fee 
(b) Medical Examination Fee 
(2) Preliminary Training Fee 
(3) Re-Medical Examination Fee (only for those with lapsed medical certification) 
(4) Processing and other Fees 
(5) Visa Fee 
(6) Airfare 
b) On-site Fees 
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(1) Return Cost Insurance Premium 
(2) Casualty Insurance Premium35 
Although it is certainly helpful to have an outline of the fees a worker should expect to pay 
ahead of time, it seems in this case that cutting out the recruitment agency has only made 
modest cuts in the totals costs to be borne by OFWs.  Including airfare, insurance, and 
assorted fees, it is highly unlikely that OFWs will start working in Korea without having spent 
at least US $1,500.  This amount is possibly less than what might normally be paid by a 
worker deployed through an agency, but this amount would not be ‘painless’ from the 
perspective of OFWs and could still require families to borrow from unscrupulous lenders.   
Beyond the discussion of fees there are some promising signs in how the agreement frames 
the relationship and lays out cooperation on a variety of fronts.  It seems that despite the 
relative complexity of the program it does allow certain aspects of the process to move 
quickly.  By eliminating the recruitment agencies, the POEA acts as the sending agency and 
the Korean Ministry of Labor acts as placement agency filling the needs of Korean 
employers.  
From the Philippines ‘sending country’ perspective there are quite a few responsibilities 
being undertaken by the POEA in its role as ‘sending agent’ within the scheme.  Firstly, the 
POEA has committed to maintaining a ‘roster of applicants’ who meet the needs of listed 
skills provided by the Korean Ministry of Labor and the Human Resources Development 
Service of Korea.  Related to the roster, the POEA has committed to ‘provide assistance and 
support’ for the Employment Permit System – Korean Language Test (EPS-KLT).  The POEA 
manages applications to take the test, schedules testing venues, and even provides Korean 
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language study aids with sample test questions on its website.  Applicants to the EPS can 
only be included on the roster once they have passed the EPS-KLT.  Once on the roster, 
workers’ names will be available to Korean employers for one year; if they are not placed 
within that time frame they will need to re-apply but not re-take the EPS-KLT unless it has 
been longer than two years since they successfully completed the test.  Other POEA 
responsibilities include communicating with the Ministry of Labor once a worker has 
accepted the terms of the contract, providing a pre-departure orientation seminar on 
Korean customs and culture, collecting all necessary worker documentation in order to 
lodge visa applications on their behalf, and assisting workers in arranging flights to “ensure 
that workers enter Korea on the scheduled date.”36  Although the POEA has direct-hire 
programs with other states, exactly how efficient the POEA will be in implementing these 
procedures remains to be seen.  
On the destination side, the Ministry of Labor has committed to a standardized contract 
process which should help avoid contract disputes or miscommunications related to 
contract terms such as contract duration, pay intervals and amount, work hours, vacation 
time, and explanation of duties.37  By forcing all Korean employers wishing to participate in 
the scheme to use a standardized contract, there should be fewer contract disputes; 
handling disputes that do arise should also be less complicated.  Two stated objectives 
related to standardized contracts in the MOU is that first jobseekers “can fully understand it 
[contract] and decide whether or not to accept the offer based on his/her own free will” and 
that “the parties will exert sustained efforts through close mutual cooperation to find 
workable solutions to minimize labor contract cancellations by either employers or foreign 
                                                          
36
 MOU Philippines-Korea, 8.  
37
 Philippines Overseas Employment Administration, Standard Labor Contract, 
http://www.poea.gov.ph/docs/korea%20eps%20slc.pdf. 
231 
 
workers and inform each other of measures that they have taken.”38  Contracts are to be 
renewed every year up to the three year limit for the program, at which time the worker 
must return to his/her home country. 
Closely related to contract issues, the Ministry of Labor has also established a broad 
framework for handling ‘grievance counselling and handling’.  Korea has decided that its 
recently amended Labor Standards Act applies to both foreign and domestic workers.  
Among other things, this act sets forth 40 hours as the standard work week, with rules 
related to overtime, pay, workplace safety, and harassment.  The Industrial Safety & Health 
Act also applies to the work places of migrant workers under the scheme.  Rather than 
relying on the overseas representatives of DOLE, the POEA and the Philippine DFA to act as 
primary advocate for OFW rights, the Ministry of Labor has opened its Employment Support 
Centers around the country as well as in Seoul to take up grievance issues and to find 
workers new employment if necessary.  This system shows a level of commitment to OFWs 
and overseas migrants more generally, than any of the agreements previously discussed.  
Despite their relative strengths the Canadian and Japanese agreements do not offer such 
concrete mechanisms for the resolution of disputes and other problems, potentially leaving 
migrants feeling isolated with no one to advocate for them. 
Another interesting aspect of the destination side of the scheme is the reliance on 
mandatory insurance for migrant workers.  Mandatory insurance for OFWs has been a hot 
topic in the Philippines with recent legislation (see Chapter Five) that requires all newly 
hired workers to have coverage, paid for by their recruitment agency before departure.  In 
this case, there are four types of insurance coverage required for participation in the 
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scheme including departure guarantee insurance, guarantee insurance, return cost 
insurance, and casualty insurance.  The first two, departure guarantee insurance and 
guarantee insurance are paid for by the employer, and cover potential employer costs for 
severance payments, and overdue wage protection for the worker.  The second two 
insurance types are paid for by the worker and cover their return airfare home after the 
three year contract limit is reached, and coverage for “casualty, disease, or accident other 
than an occupational accident.”39  Rather than placing the burden of these insurance 
requirements on the worker up-front, the program allows for the insurance premiums to be 
directly debited from the worker’s account within 15-80 days of starting their employment.   
There is considerable skepticism toward this BLA from the recruitment industry in the 
Philippines.40  Recruitment agencies who once deployed workers to Korea, but have been 
excluded since the introduction of the EPS, have expressed skepticism that the POEA has the 
ability to get skilled workers through the process as efficiently as they once did.  One key 
argument made against the new arrangement, is that it places an even higher cost burden 
on a Korea-bound OFW.  To make their case, recruiters point to the number of fees which 
previously fell on them, but now fall on the worker under the EPS scheme.  A prominent 
recruitment agency owner explained: 
We were one of the first companies to open up Korea. During that time we 
were charging the workers something like 35,000 [pesos] per head. The 
government took it away because Korean government was then complaining 
– oh, the workers [have] paid too much and the agencies are charging too 
much and 35,000 pesos is too much so it has to be a government to 
government thing.  Now, that this is being done by POEA, ask each and every 
worker that goes to Korea from their own pocket, they pay their own ticket, 
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they pay their own orientation, everything, on their own pocket.  And how 
much are they spending now?  70,000 pesos at least!  Double.  So if you really 
look at it, are we not talking about welfare?  Of course.  In some of the 
meetings we say what percent is the welfare but is this really the right kind of 
welfare where in you double the cost of getting work in a particular country?  
Korea is the biggest joke, POEA is the one sending them and every worker is 
paying 70,000 pesos.  [Yet] they allow the workers to buy their own ticket 
just to reach Korea.  If my workers would pay their [own] ticket, immediately 
my license is cancelled. [Sic]41  
His figures, although not independently verified, do illustrate a possible flaw in the logic of 
state-state hiring schemes.  When the private sector deploys a worker from the Philippines, 
the POEA has mandated a maximum amount (generally equal to one month’s salary in the 
destination state) that the agency can charge the worker.  If the agency is no longer 
involved, and the destination employer is not covering airfare or other related fees, then 
these fees fall on the OFW. 
The recruitment industry’s attacks on the POEA and its perceived shortcomings may turn 
out to be true, but are somewhat irrelevant, as it was Korea who introduced this program 
and approached the Philippines to sign the MOU that ultimately excluded the recruiters 
from the Korean market.  The latest figures available show 14,851 deployments to Korea of 
which 13,657 were re hires, the remaining 1,194 new hires (see Table 6.1).42  The 2008 
numbers showed a -13.3 percent decline in deployments from 2007, though numbers have 
picked up again in 2009.  The decline was possibly due to the global financial crisis which 
severely impacted Korea’s economy, particularly its manufacturing and heavy industry 
sectors.  It will be interesting to follow the trends for the next few years find out how this 
new program might affect deployment statistics. 
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Overall the Philippine-Korea EPS agreement seems to be a model of efficiency with the 
welcome inclusion of worker focused protections and benefits.  The agreement seems to 
have struck the appropriate balance between the needs of employers and the needs of 
migrant workers.  There are shortcomings, such as airfares being paid by workers, and the 
prohibition of workers bringing along their families, but these drawbacks are counter-
balanced by clearly defined labor protection clauses, fair wages, paid vacation leave, and 
Korean supplied support services for migrants.  It is difficult to neatly compare the 
Philippine-Korea EPS with the other agreements discussed previously because of its unique 
framework for labor cooperation, but as with the other agreements there are significant 
advantages and disadvantages which leave room for future improvements.  The framework 
created bilaterally between Korea and the Philippines has been duplicated in bilateral 
agreements between Korea and other migrant sending states from the region. Thus, the 
system is multi-lateral in scope but is governed bilaterally through negotiated state to state 
agreements. 
Conclusion 
As evidenced by the case studies there are identifiable strengths and weaknesses in each 
agreement.  Some of the strengths of the Japanese agreement were a firm commitment to 
bilateral maintenance of the agreement, clearly delineated fee responsibilities, focus on 
program efficiency, and its comprehensive coverage of all stages of the process.  The largest 
weakness however was the decision to limit the agreement to nurses and caregivers.  The 
Canadian agreements excelled in their broad inclusion of many job categories, the 
absorption of costs by employers, openness to permanent settlement, focus on Philippine 
development, and inclusion of IOM labor laws.  Unfortunately the Canadian agreements 
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omit procedures for future agreement maintenance and cooperation which may make it 
more difficult to deal with future challenges in the relationship.  The agreement with 
Bahrain also has several strengths, such as its focus on developing Philippine healthcare 
through education and scholarship programs, its inclusion of a broad range of issues of 
concern to migrant workers, and reference to the IOM conventions.  The Bahrain agreement 
shares the same large weakness of the Japanese agreement in that it only applies to one 
category of migrant workers encompassing relatively low numbers (namely, healthcare 
workers), thus excluding the largest category of Filipino migrants in Bahrain, domestic 
workers, from coverage.  The UAE agreement does not have any outstanding strengths 
beyond its mentioning of up-front information on pay and working conditions, which is 
universally understood to be a basic right of migrant workers.  Two weaknesses in the UAE 
agreement are the preeminent status given to Arabic in dispute resolution and the 
monopolization of agreement oversight by the UAE Ministry of Labour.  Lastly, the Korean 
agreement, by far the most comprehensive, excels in several areas, namely: clearly 
delineated roles for relevant agencies in both states, standardized contract usage, high 
levels of protection and service access for migrant workers that in essence gives them 
comparable support and access to that which is available to Korean citizens.  The agreement 
falls short in its assignment of high fees to workers despite removing recruitment agencies 
from the picture.  The issue of mandatory insurance in the program could end up as either a 
strength or weakness depending on how well it meets the needs of migrants.   
Although no single agreement can be considered perfect, common strengths include fee 
coverage by employers rather than migrants, defined mechanisms for worker protection 
and welfare, and arrangements for ongoing maintenance of the bilateral agreement and 
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relationship.  The most obvious weakness from the case studies is the restrictive scope 
placed on some of the agreements, thus limiting their effectiveness in improving 
circumstances for the largest number of workers.  Vagueness and the non-binding nature of 
BLAs are also common weaknesses among many agreements, including those not discussed 
in this chapter but listed in Appendix 1.  Although these weaknesses are difficult to 
overcome within a tough negotiating environment, perhaps negotiators could convince 
interested states to use one of the stronger completed agreements, such as the Korean, 
Canadian, or Japanese agreements, as templates from which to start negotiations.  This 
would both show the prospective state what can be accomplished through coordination on 
the exchange of labor and would likely prove a better starting point for negotiations than 
the more vague, less formalized, agreements with Bahrain and the UAE.   
Aggressively pursuing new BLAs is a primary policy objective in Philippine overseas 
migration policy.  As for states not wishing to engage in BLA negotiations who host large 
numbers of Filipino workers, one possible strategy for the POEA, DOLE, and the DFA would 
be to highlight the potential benefits of such agreements rather than requesting worker 
protections that can be perceived as costly, entirely unnecessary or even insulting by the 
receiving state.  Certainly the Korean EPS and Japanese-Philippine agreement show how 
efficiency can be improved when the processes of sending and receiving migrants is 
streamlined and simplified in mutually beneficial ways.  It is clear from the Korean case that 
many welfare related protections can come as a result of pursuing greater efficiency.  There 
is potential for cost and time savings for both the migrants and the employers wishing to 
hire them when the recruitment and deployment process is formalized through agreements.  
Because issues like compensation, vacation/sick leave, working conditions, dispute 
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resolution, and employment contract standardisation are handled ahead of time, it is likely 
that judicial systems in places like Saudi Arabia would not be burdened with as many labor 
dispute cases, and incidents of employee absenteeism, abuse, and workers fleeing their jobs 
would be reduced.  Rather than framing BLAs solely around worker protection, perhaps 
efficiency, cost/time savings, and general improvements to the labor relationship should 
also be emphasized.  In pursuing better worker protection an additional negotiation strategy 
could be to suggest the inclusion of relevant ILO conventions previously ratified by both 
states in the text of the agreement, as was done in the Bahrain MOU.  Including reference to 
specific ILO conventions would lend the legitimacy of international labor norms to the 
agreement and make up for any inadequacies in the area of worker protection in 
destination states.  If both states have ratified the ILO agreements, neither has strong 
grounds to object to their inclusion in a BLA—regardless of whether or not the agreement is 
binding.  
Domestic support for BLAs fluctuates widely among countries and across the specifics of the 
BLA.  As mentioned previously, the conspicuous absence of states like Saudi Arabia, and the 
limited scope of professions included in certain agreements, diminish their impact on a large 
number of OFWs.  Some NGOs have even questioned the merit of dedicating so much time 
and resources into forging such weak agreements.43  Where both private and public sector 
organizations stand on particular BLAs depends largely on where they sit.  Worker welfare 
NGOs, for example, have pushed hard for more bilateral labor agreements, although they 
would prefer to see them as binding legal agreements which codify worker protections.  
NGOs are correct in their assertion that non-binding BLAs do not do enough to protect the 
welfare of workers, but considering the disinterest in non-binding BLAs by some states and 
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the important need for better protection, surely non-binding efforts to protect workers are 
better than no agreed-upon protection at all.  Philippine government officials in and out of 
the POEA have played a more tempered role, aggressively pursuing new agreements 
wherever possible that are as beneficial as possible to Filipino migrants.  Although worker 
welfare seems to be the dominant motivation by both NGOs and the Philippine government 
for forging BLAs, it would be constructive in the future if more consideration was given to 
how these agreements could fit into a comprehensive development strategy for long term 
sustainable economic development.  As mentioned earlier, efficiency should also be ample 
motivation to convince states to enter into BLAs.  Savings in time and capital will benefit all 
parties involved in the process, but particularly the migrants themselves who would relish 
the opportunity to cut out the overly complex paperwork, fee structures, and hasten the 
commencement of work and the receipt of salaries. 
As the global financial crisis has impacted economies around the world, it is interesting to 
see how nations are coping with migrant workers and how it has impacted efforts to forge 
new BLAs.  Korea, which has been hard hit by the economic slowdown, was scheduled to 
sign the agreement in January 2009.  It was announced in January that negotiations had 
been suspended and would resume in March.  No reason was given for the delay, but 
considering the difficulties facing the Korean economy, this might have been a contributing 
factor to the delay.44  The agreement was ultimately signed in May 2009.  It seems that 
there may be less interest in BLAs during lean times, much the same as interest in trade 
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liberalization initiatives has waned amid the current global financial crisis.  Indeed, there 
have been concerns that a return to protectionism which could damage recovery efforts.45   
In labor relations it seems there is also a risk of a return to protectionism.  Fears of 
protectionism in matters of labor during lean times are just as serious as in matters of trade 
although they are often overlooked.  When unemployment rates rise in receiving states, 
migrant workers are often targeted by locals as a group to blame for their frustrations.  It 
sometimes can be politically convenient for politicians to use migrant workers as a 
scapegoat, and in extreme cases even deport them.  For example, the governments of both 
Saudi Arabia and Malaysia recently issued orders to “fire expats first should they need to 
slash their work force as a result of the global economic crisis.”46  Nations that have signed 
BLAs could choose not to renew them when they expire, and states may be less willing to 
undertake new agreements in bad economic times.  Deployment data from 2009 (see Table 
6.1) however has shown that deployments have risen from 1.23 million in 2008 to 1.42 
million in 2009, largely allaying fears of massive OFW layoffs. 
After reviewing the case studies, what can the Philippines learn from the BLAs it has 
completed thus far?  It is clear that while aspects of the case study agreements could be 
used as a model in convincing reluctant states to engage in bilateral labor negotiations, no 
single archetypal model agreement exists.  The major constant is that the Philippines has 
crafted all agreements from a relatively weak position. The above analysis of the content of 
completed agreements highlights how each receiving state has widely differing rationale for 
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entering into bilateral labor negotiations, most often related to acute labor shortages in 
their own country.  There also seems to be widely differing objectives in crafting the content 
of individual agreements.  The role then for Philippine policy makers and negotiators is to be 
proactive in determining what the Philippines can offer reluctant states, and to customize 
their efforts in tailoring negotiations to the needs of target states.  This will not be easy, but 
by carefully emphasizing aspects of a prospective BLA most attractive to a specific state, 
diplomats will increase the likelihood of reaching the negotiation stage as well as seeing it 
through to a completed agreement.  Creative thinking and carefully crafted proposals will 
likely be required to forge a negotiation opening with the most reluctant states.   
In the case of Saudi Arabia, policy makers could propose a program to return stranded and 
runaway workers as well as those who have overstayed their visas to the Philippines.  There 
has been a longstanding problem in the kingdom of how to deal with stranded workers who 
lack the means to arrange their own return transportation.47  By focusing on proposing a 
solution to something perceived as a problem by the Saudis, sufficient interest may be 
generated on the Saudi side to engage in negotiations.  For some states the prospect of 
greater process efficiency or speed may work; in others, the prospect of a more controlled 
or orderly process of deployment may be attractive.  The task of policy makers and 
diplomats is to determine what changes to the status quo would be appealing enough to the 
destination state to motivate them into engagement on BLA negotiations.  
As illustrated in the previous chapters there are no clear signs that government and 
business relations are more cooperative regarding BLA formulation than they are across any 
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area of the overseas employment program.  Predictably, there is even open antagonism 
toward agreements which exclude the private sector entirely, as in the Korean case above.  
While the Japanese and Korean agreements exclude private sector participation in the 
sending state, the agreements with the Canadian provinces, the United Arab Emirates, and 
Bahrain all allow the private sector to fulfil a role within the agreement structure.  Through 
the relationships that they have cultivated with businesses in destination states, the 
Philippine recruitment industry could be a valuable resource for policy makers and 
diplomats in helping to create a demand for improved bilateral labor relations.  If there was 
a new focus on enticing reluctant states into BLA negotiation through an emphasis on the 
benefits to those states, perhaps the recruitment agencies with their networks and contacts 
in destination states could help negotiators in the DFA and DOLE determine which types of 
changes to the bilateral labor relationship might prove attractive enough for them to 
reciprocate with enhanced welfare protections for workers.  Many such relationships run 
deep, and have been forged over the nearly four decade history of the program.  As we saw 
in the case of Japan, it was the Japanese healthcare industry that pushed the national 
government to move forward on formalizing the bilateral labor relationship in order to 
expedite and streamline the process of finding, verifying, and placing workers as quickly and 
efficiently as possible.  Rather than allowing BLAs to become a wedge issue driving them 
apart, the relationship between government and business could prove to be the 
government’s most valuable resource in successfully completing ever more mutually 
beneficial agreements. 
Recent developments have shown that the Saudi Arabian elephant in the room is beginning 
to be noticed by Philippine policy makers.  In January 2011, the House of Representatives 
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Committee on Overseas Workers Affairs issued a report entitled Final Report of the 
Investigating Mission of the Committee on Overseas Workers’ Affairs to Saudi Arabia.  The 
report they produced is perhaps the most in-depth exploration of the Saudi-Philippine 
bilateral labor relationship, and specifically the myriad of problems facing OFWs in the 
kingdom, conducted by politicians since the beginning of the overseas employment 
program.  Following a detailed breakdown of a number of the most serious issues facing 
OFWs in Saudi Arabia, the committee made 12 recommendations to the Philippine 
government.  The first three recommendations have particular relevance for this chapter’s 
topic: 
1. Decertify Saudi Arabia as a country fit to receive domestic workers in 
accordance with Section 3 of Republic Act 10022, which states that “the 
Department of Foreign Affairs, through its foreign posts, shall issue a 
certification to the POEA, specifying therein the pertinent provisions of the 
receiving country’s labor/social law, or the convention/declaration/resolution 
or the bilateral agreement/arrangement which protect the rights of migrant 
workers.” 
2. Urgently press the Saudi government to negotiate a bilateral labor 
agreement with the Philippine government that would secure respect and 
iron-clad protection for the rights of all classes of Filipino overseas workers. 
This recommendation of the earlier mission to Saudi Arabia consisting of 
Reps. Rufus Rodriguez, Luz Ilagan, and Carlos Padilla (Nov 2009) is one that 
our mission strongly reiterates. 
3. Coordinate with other labor-sending countries such as Indonesia, Sri Lanka, 
and India to gain leverage vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia in order to secure respect for 
overseas workers’ rights.[Sic]48 (Please see Appendix 2 for a complete list of 
the committee’s 12 recommendations) 
The committee has taken a strong stance from the outset (recommendation 1 above) calling 
for Saudi Arabia to be declared unfit “to receive domestic workers” citing provisions in RA 
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10022 as discussed in Chapter Five.  This recommendation is significant as the number of 
vulnerable lower skilled workers, domestic workers in particular, is high in the kingdom (as 
attested by Ambassador Antonio Villamor, quoted at the outset of this chapter).  Although 
comprehensive statistics (new hires and rehires) are not available, we know that there were 
6,954 newly hired domestic workers deployed to Saudi Arabia in 2009, with many thousands 
more likely re-deploying for domestic work.49  Thousands of additional lower skilled workers 
deployed and re-deployed in 2009, meaning that the at-risk “low-skilled” worker pool could 
be quite large if the ambassador’s “30%” lower skilled worker figure is extrapolated to the 
1.1 million (2008) total OFW stock in Saudi Arabia.50  Banning domestic work in the kingdom 
could potentially impact tens of thousands of OFWs.  If this recommendation was 
implemented, it is likely that there would be considerable outcry from domestic workers in 
Saudi Arabia who have not experienced hardship or persecution, as well as opposition from 
the recruitment agencies who specialize in deploying domestic workers to the kingdom. 
Recommendation 2 confirms the assertion put forth in this chapter that forging a BLA with 
Saudi Arabia is an increasingly important policy imperative that must be pursued 
aggressively.  This recommendation will likely be welcomed by NGOs and individual OFWs, 
but does not provide recommendations as to how diplomats might find success in attracting 
Saudi Arabia into negotiations.  Likewise, recommendation 3 is an excellent idea but seems 
to frame the bilateral (or should other states get involved in negotiations, multilateral) 
relationship with Saudi Arabia as a zero-sum game.  As argued throughout this chapter, 
further steps and new creative approaches are required.  In this regard the House 
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committee has neglected the basic need in diplomacy for each side to perceive a benefit or 
gain in order for them to be willing give up something, in this case a certain amount of 
sovereignty for Saudi Arabia.  While it would be useful for Philippine negotiators to team up 
with like-minded diplomats from “Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and India”, if they are not 
collectively proposing something that will bring tangible benefits to the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, such as those things identified in this chapter’s case studies, what reason does the 
kingdom have to negotiate, notwithstanding the numbers of sending states facing them in 
solidarity across the table?  A better balance can be achieved in using the tools of marketing 
and diplomacy to entice Saudi Arabia into a mutually beneficial agreement, rather than an 
over-emphasis on leverage and turning what should be an effort toward creating mutual 
benefits into a confrontational exercise.  Leverage, of course, will and should be used in the 
negotiations, but need not be the only mechanism by which agreements are pursued. 
An interesting area for future research would be to gauge the feelings and opinions of the 
migrants themselves toward the agreements they are operating under, especially the new 
efforts at improving efficiency.  It will be important to track the statistical data coming out 
of states where BLAs have been implemented to find out what if any changes they have had 
to migrant trends and remittance figures.  The Philippines might also concentrate on more 
effective use of remittance incomes on the return side to leverage development at home.  
Within the framework of bilateral labor agreements, the Philippine government could 
establish mechanisms to incentivize remittance dollars for small business investment or 
migrant savings schemes.  This would allow the domestic economy to grow in a more 
focused way rather than by spending remittance dollars on household consumption.  
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Overseas Filipinos could then become investment partners and stakeholders in developing 
the domestic economy. 
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Chapter Seven: Comparative Approaches to Migrant Labor Programs 
This chapter analyzes three overseas employment programs from a comparative 
perspective.  As one of East Asia’s newly industrialized economies, Korea historically 
participated in overseas labor migration on a grand scale not dissimilar to that of the 
Philippines.  There are striking similarities between the objectives of Korea’s overseas 
employment program and the one undertaken by the Philippines.  There are also stark 
differences, chief among them is that by the late 1980s Korea all but discontinued exporting 
workers and by the early 1990s had become a net importer of labor.  This chapter 
endeavors to explore the similarities and differences of overseas employment policy 
approaches between Korea and the Philippines, with the goal of understanding what if any 
successful elements of the Korean approach could enable Philippine policy makers to 
improve national the developmental economic benefits of the overseas employment 
program.  In addition to a comparative analysis of Korea’s program, overseas employment 
program structures and strategies utilized in Indonesia will be explored as a counter-point 
example.  By investigating the various program arrangements in place across three states, I 
will seek insights into what policies have been successful, as well as how some states have 
pioneered innovative approaches to program management and benefit maximization.  
Special attention will be paid to the interplay between government and business in relation 
to the framework established in Chapter Two.  This chapter argues that although it will be 
difficult for the Philippines and Indonesia to replicate the development success achieved in 
Korea, the application of selected strategies and techniques utilized in Korea’s earlier 
overseas employment program could help bring better coordination of overseas 
employment programs with national economic development outcomes. 
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Korea 
Program History 
Academic interest in the topic of out-migration from Korea almost perfectly mirrors the 
phenomenon’s rise and fall.  That is, during the period in which Korea was a net-labor 
exporter, there was interest in the phenomenon from scholars.  In the years since Korea 
became a net-labor importer, research focus has shifted to this more recent phenomenon, 
with little to no research being published looking at the out-migration period as a whole, 
from a historical perspective.  Similarly, there has been little effort to situate the now 
discontinued program within Korea’s larger economic development strategy.  Shortly before 
the transition, Oh-Seok Hyun, director of the International Economic Policy Division of the 
Economic Planning Board (EPB) published perhaps the most comprehensive analysis of the 
role out-migration played in Korean economic development.  A key objective of his study 
mirrored one of the objectives of this dissertation, namely “to deal with strategic policy 
issues including policies for maximizing the impact of remittances on development with 
respect to the Korean economy and mechanisms for integrating the migration phenomenon 
into the process of national development plans and policy formulation.”1   Shortly after his 
study, Korea transitioned away from the large-scale exportation of laborers, but the 
objectives he identified have yet to be acknowledged or pursued in the Philippines.  
Consequently, understanding the rise, decline and ultimate discontinuation of overseas 
labor migration from Korea could provide valuable insight toward an understanding of how 
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the Philippines’ overseas employment program might be better utilized as a component of a 
larger national economic development strategy.  
The story of Korea’s overseas employment program began with the Park Chung-Hee’s rise to 
power through political coup in 1961.  As head of the military junta (before his formal 
election in 1964) Park’s government immediately set to work reforming national 
development strategy, starting with a shake-up in the relationship between government 
and business.  Haggard et. al. described the junta’s initial out-reach toward the business 
community: 
Two weeks after the coup, thirteen major businessmen were arrested. 
Although eight of these were induced to make large "contributions" to the 
government and were released, the investigation was broadened to include 
another hundred and twenty businessmen. The definition of "illicit" wealth 
covered the entire range of rent-seeking and rent-granting activities that had 
been pervasive, if not unavoidable, under Rhee: illegal contributions to 
political funds; illicit purchase of vested properties; profiteering from 
preferential access to government contracts and loans; and misallocation of 
foreign funds.  Though the government seized all outstanding shares of 
commercial bank stocks, thus gaining control of a powerful policy instrument, 
it compromised with large manufacturing and construction firms. In August 
1961, the final decision of the investigation committee demanded that thirty 
entrepreneurs refund an amount that was much lower than the initial 
estimates of illegally accumulated wealth. The reason for this shift in policy is 
summarized neatly by Kim Kyong-dong: "the only viable economic force 
happened to be the target group of leading entrepreneurial talents with their 
singular advantage of organization, personnel, facilities and capital 
resources" (Kim 1967:470).2 
In order to legitimize their revolution, Park’s regime needed to penalize the business 
community for their perceived wrongs and collaborative corruption with previous 
governments.  However, had they taken any meaningful punitive actions against the 
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 Stephan Haggard, Byung-kook Kim, Chung-in Moon, “The Transition to Export-led Growth in South Korea: 
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prominent business leaders identified through the commission, this might further harm the 
country’s economic prospects as well as their own developmental strategies. 
Rather than continuing on the path of import substitution industrialization (ISI), pioneered 
under Syngman Rhee (1948-60) and continued by his successor Yun Bo-seon (1960-62), Park 
pursued an export-oriented industrialization strategy (EOI) and relied on the same business 
people who his commission had investigated for corruption to accomplish his goals.  
Additionally, Park and his junta had to figure out how they could enact the structural and 
strategic changes to the nation’s economy without going through the enormously difficult 
task of completely rebuilding Korea’s government institutions and bureaucratic structures.  
To accomplish this, their “approach was to use the existing governmental apparatus, but to 
superimpose on top of it the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction and to appoint 
military men to key positions throughout the administrative structure.”3 
As described in Chapter Two, key among the recommendations made by the new Supreme 
Council for National Reconstruction was the introduction of the EPB which would sit at the 
apex of the bureaucracy, enabling it to both make macro-economic decisions for the 
country as well as enforce its policy objectives through oversight.   
From its initiation, the EPB came to have a powerful say over other ministries 
through the budget. The EPB's Bureau of Budget prepares the broad 
guidelines for the annual budget, collects annual proposals from the other 
ministries and evaluates their feasibility. The EPB's power lies in its ability to 
designate specific projects for which other ministries prepare the budgetary 
implications and, above all, in its power to adjust the budget estimates 
submitted by the ministries. A capital import bureau was also established in 
1961, and the EPB's power extended to the area of foreign borrowing. 
European investors refused to lend unless the government extended 
guarantees on loan repayment. Seeing an opportunity to further expand the 
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EPB's powers, the Bureau of International Cooperation, which oversaw aid 
relations and was the dominant bureau throughout the early 1960s, 
persuaded Park to establish more extensive controls on the import of foreign 
capital. In July 1962, the EPB was given the power to extend government 
guarantees to loans and to audit and oversee the activities of the borrowing 
firms. Finally, the EPB was given the power to select those capital goods 
imports and importers which qualified for government-aided deferred 
payment privileges. When coupled with new laws that transferred the power 
to approve and extend incentives to foreign direct investment from the 
Ministry of Finance to the EPB, the new ministry effectively gained complete 
control over Korea's import of foreign capital. These laws naturally gave the 
EPB a strong say over the money supply and industrial policy as well. In 1963, 
the special status of the EPB within the cabinet was further enhanced when 
its minister was also given the title of Deputy Prime Minister.4 
Although it may not seem immediately clear how Park’s imposition of the EPB and structural 
administrative changes are relevant to Korea’s overseas employment program, these 
changes and institutional arrangements put in place the necessary foundations to support 
Korea’s new EOI strategy from which, as we will discuss below, workers became one of 
those exports.   
Between 1962 and the mid-1960s there were several programs that sent Korean workers 
overseas.  In 1962 for example, “an agreement between the governments of Germany and 
the Republic of Korea made it possible for 247 young Koreans to work as miners in 
Germany.”5  Later, as many as 10,000 Koreans worked on various projects in Vietnam for 
the United States.6  These early out-migration experiences were only a glimmer of what was 
to come for Korean workers.  Like the Philippines, Korea’s foray into overseas labor 
migration only really started once the oil boom of the early 1970s was underway. 
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Through their newfound authority Park and the EPB (as mentioned above and in Chapter 
Two) were able to steer business decision making through incentives, loans, threats, and 
other methods to pursue export-oriented economic opportunities.  One such opportunity 
identified and pursued by the EPB was the major construction projects going out for bid in 
the Middle East.  Flush with “petrodollars,” Middle Eastern oil-exporting states embarked on 
massive infrastructure projects which far exceeded their own construction and manpower 
supply.  The scale of the petrodollar spending by oil-exporting states was remarkable with 
nearly $301.8 billion dollars spent on a variety of “physical and social infrastructure” 
projects between 1974 and 1986 in Saudi Arabia alone.7  Like the overall national economic 
EOI strategy, the “export” opportunity identified by the EPB in regard to the Middle East oil 
boom was Korean construction expertise.   
A fundamental difference between the approach of Korea when compared with the 
Philippines was the “packaged” corporate nature of the laborer sending process utilized by 
Korean construction firms.  While the Philippines engaged in “manpower only” exchanges 
between foreign employers and Philippine recruitment agencies, Korea offered all-inclusive 
“arrangements through which firms would contract not only to supply materials and design 
and supervision but also the workers required and to care for these workers off the job.”8  
This approach is consistent with the export-oriented nature of Korea’s economic 
development strategy, and also demonstrates that overseas labor migration from Korea was 
a component of a larger economic approach to national development.  The Korean “model” 
of sending migrants was inherently corporate in nature.  The same chaebols (business 
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conglomerates) that dominated Korean business and industry, and through which Park and 
the EPB pursued their policy objectives, aggressively pursued international construction 
contracts throughout the Middle East at the encouragement of government economic 
planners.  Disney explained that “in 1966 South Korea won a mere $11 million in 
construction contracts from the Middle East…[but that] between 1973 and March 31, 1977 
South Korea had signed $4.2 billion [cumulatively, not annually] worth of construction 
contracts in the Middle East.”9   
With the organizational might of the chaebols behind the effort to dominate booming 
construction demand in the Middle East, the numbers of Korean workers deployed to the 
region to work on large-scale projects likewise boomed.  The types of workers ranged widely 
and included both highly skilled workers, low-skilled laborers, as well as managerial and 
support staff.  While discussing Korea’s chaebol corporate style to doing business, Cumings 
described their method toward overseas labor migration: 
This extreme form of corporatism is perhaps best seen in the masses of 
construction teams that Hyundai has long sent to the Middle East; every 
worker would depart in Hyundai T-shirts and caps carrying Hyundai bags, 
would live and eat in Hyundai dormitories, and would use Hyundai tools and 
equipment to build Hyundai cities in the desert.10  
Deployment statistics (see Table 7.1 below) show a massive increase in the number of 
workers going to the Middle East during the oil boom years, coinciding with increasingly 
aggressive pursuit of contracts by Korean construction companies.  The final destination for 
approximately 70 percent of all overseas Korean migrants was in fact to the Middle East.11  
Although Middle Eastern states were perfectly eager to allow foreign companies to build the 
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infrastructure required across the Middle East, there was some trepidation about having so 
many foreign workers entering the region without guarantees that they would leave once 
the projects were completed.  This problem persists today in places like Saudi Arabia (see 
Chapter Six).  The Korean model of packaging all aspects of the construction project, 
including the laborers, was attractive to states that feared being overrun by foreigners.  
Halliday explained that: 
Sensing a long-term danger, Saudi Arabia, like Kuwait, seeks to contain the 
flood as best it can.  That is why it likes the new-style Korean contracts.  The 
contractor brings his entire workforce with him.  He takes it away when the 
job is done.  The Koreans have next to no contact with the local population 
while they are there.12 
 
Table 7.1  
Trends in Korean Overseas Migration 
  Year 
  1963-76 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Land-based 93,049 55,549 91,829 100,403 124,787 147,558 165,603 153,085 118,606 81,030 52,524 
Sea-based 59,002 14,074 18,169 20,587 21,649 27,556 31,252 31,192 34,067 39,215 42,751 
Total 152,051 69,623 109,998 120,990 146,436 175,114 196,855 184,277 152,673 120,245 95,275 
Source: Korean Ministry of Labour, adapted from Hyun, Oh-Seok, (1989) pp. 146. 
It should be noted, that not all Korean migrant workers deployed overseas worked for 
Korean companies.  There was a sizeable number of workers who deployed to work for 
other foreign firms, including international shipping companies.  In these cases, the Korean 
government exercised a great deal more involvement in these contracts than is the case in 
most “manpower only” sending states.  Arnold and Shah described the high level of 
oversight the Korean government exercised over foreign companies hiring Korean workers. 
In Korea, for workers employed by non-Korean firms, the Ministry of Labor 
examines contract conditions in terms of wage levels, duration of the 
contract, working hours, casualty insurance, transportation costs and living 
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conditions before it gives contract approval to KODCO (the Korean Overseas 
Development Corporation), one of the two recruiting agencies for workers 
employed by foreign companies in Korea.  Furthermore, the Korean 
government has set minimum requirements for accommodations, toilet 
facilities, sports and recreation facilities and drinking water in the camps and 
has forbidden workers to form labor unions while abroad.13 
This is a major departure from the weak oversight exercised by the Overseas Development 
Board in the Philippines during the 1970s, but may have been due to the types of Korean 
workers foreign employers were wishing to deploy.  If these workers were skilled, highly 
valued or desperately needed abroad then the Korean government could make these 
demands without significant objection.  Given that the Philippine work force consisted 
largely of low-skilled laborers, it is hard to see that such demands could have been made on 
employers.  Although we do not have a clear picture as to the level of skill levels of Korean 
workers deployed by foreign firms, we do however know what types of workers were 
deploying through Korean firms.   
Migrant workers employed by Korean firms include two categories of 
workers: regular employees posted to the branch offices and temporary 
workers who are employed on a contract basis only for the duration of 
overseas work.  Both types of workers are housed in the same work camp 
without exception.  However, the two groups differ in many respects.  The 
former consists mostly of non-manual workers such as executives, managers, 
engineers and clerks, while the latter consists entirely of manual, mostly 
skilled labourers … the former the regular staff of the company, represent the 
authority at the work camp while the latter are subordinates.14 
As illustrated in the quote above, although there were both permanent and temporary 
Korean workers constructing Middle East infrastructure, the vertically integrated structure 
of the “Korean Model” meant that despite the authoritative and subordinate roles of 
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migrant workers, they were all working for the same single company operating under the 
oversight of the Korean government. 15  No middlemen or third party destination state 
businesses complicated the arrangement nor added costs to either the employer or 
migrants themselves.   
By the late 1970s Korea’s packaged approach to overseas construction projects had won 
them a dominant position in the Middle East construction boom.  As part of packaged 
projects, the numbers of Korean workers in the Middle East rose steadily throughout the 
1970s and into the 1980s (see Table 7.1).  By the early 1980s, however, the seeds for the 
programs ultimate demise began to be noticeable.  This was due largely to rising domestic 
wages associated with the meteoric improvement in the Korean economy.  As the economy 
boomed, wages rose and the relative advantage of taking contract labor abroad eroded.  A 
further reason for the decline was the Korean government’s implementation of stricter 
guidelines on what types of skilled laborers could and could not be deployed overseas.  This 
was due to rapidly increasing domestic demand for certain types of skilled workers.  If 
critical skilled workers had been allowed to continue going abroad, this could have 
undermined the EPB’s economic development strategy.  As seen in Table 7.1 above, the 
numbers of deployed Korean workers declined rapidly after 1983, likely due to the decline 
of oil prices in the early 1980s resulting in fewer construction projects in the Middle East.  
With rising wages in Korea, lower wage economies such as the Philippines, Bangladesh, and 
Indonesia became increasingly more competitive. 
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Korea’s transition from “labor exporter” to “net-labor importer” took place between the 
late 1980s and early 1990s and occurred for a variety of reasons.  Primary among the 
reasons was the aforementioned rise in domestic labor costs, although some scholars have 
argued that the decline in the number of large construction projects in the Middle East was 
also to blame.16  Regarding this transition period, Kim explained that: 
During the rapid industrialization period of the 1960s–70s, South Korea was a 
typical example of a labor force exporter country, sending workers to the 
U.S., Germany, Japan, and the Middle East. However, rapidly increasing 
domestic wages and the population’s reluctance to engage in so-called 3-D 
jobs (“dirty, difficult, and dangerous”) as an unpleasant concomitant aspect 
of South Korea’s remarkable economic growth has resulted in a shortage of 
necessary labor power in some manufacturing sectors, particularly those that 
affect small firms in labor-intensive, service areas.17 
This did not however spell the end of Middle East construction projects for Korean 
companies, as they continued to pursue major regional opportunities (see Table 7.2 below).  
Due to higher wages in Korea, they needed to hire less expensive workers in order to stay 
competitive, resulting in the recruitment of a variety of workers from both South and 
Southeast Asia.  Throughout the 1980s and into the early 1990s the ratio of Korean workers 
versus workers from other countries on Korean construction projects dropped markedly as 
demonstrated in Table 7.2 below. 
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Table 7.2 
Korean/Foreign Worker Employment Ratio in South Korean 
Overseas Construction Projects 
  1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1994 
Korean Workers % 89.1 72.9 57.3 33.8 18.9 12.9 
Foreign Workers % 10.9 27.1 42.7 66.2 81.1 87.1 
Source: Korea Overseas Contruction Association, Adapted from Kybang, Lee, South Korean 
Construction Industry in Southeast Asia, pp. 147 from ASEAN and Korea: Trends in Economic and 
Labour Relations by Siregar, Reza Y., 1997. 
Developmental Contributions 
The corporate approach to overseas labor migration has both advantages and disadvantages 
that can be easily identified throughout Korea’s experience in the Middle East.  Among the 
advantages is low-uncertainty from the workers perspective in regard to what the 
circumstances and particulars of his or her work will be in the foreign state.  This can be 
attributed to the package style utilized by the Koreans.  By keeping the contractual 
agreement between an employee and a single domestic employer, subject to the 
jurisdiction and oversight of the Korean government, it is possible to avoid abuses, contract 
violations, and related problems that plague the “manpower only” model utilized by the 
Philippines, Indonesia, and other states.  The worker further has all of their personal needs 
(food, shelter, recreation) provided through their Korean employer.  Expenses related to 
transporting the worker to and from the destination state were also shouldered by the 
employer, further reducing the workers up-front financial burdens.  An additional advantage 
to Korean workers was that by deploying together, workers were not required to learn a 
new language in order to interact with workers from different states.  They were also more 
likely to cultivate camaraderie and even friendships among their countrymen/co-workers, 
which likely contributed to higher morale and job satisfaction. 
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As mentioned above, the vertically integrated structure of Korean construction companies 
provided some advantages to the arrangement, particularly in terms of strict government 
regulation over all stages of the process such as living conditions, contract standards, 
working conditions, and wages.  LaPorte explained that: 
By using the enclave-type contract approach, the Korean government 
attempts to ensure that the maximum economic benefit from overseas 
employment accrues to the government, while concern for the safety and 
welfare of its overseas workers contributes to worker productivity and 
quality control.  These factors in turn contribute to improved managerial 
control and hence improved management efficiency, since direct government 
involvement in the contracting and recruiting of qualified workers leaves little 
to chance.18 
Many of the problems which plague migrant-sending states stem from the multi-tiered 
nature of overseas employment and the inability to implement effective oversight at the 
various levels of the process when workers are deployed through the “manpower only” 
model.  Keeping structural program arrangements “all-inclusive” appears to diminish many 
of the worst aspects of overseas labor migration.  This is not to say, however, that the 
approach is not without its disadvantages. 
The disadvantages to the Korean model were numerous, and varied widely from social and 
cultural challenges to economic difficulties.  Preeminent among the disadvantages was the 
hard existence of being a worker in the Korean labor camps.  Although their needs were 
met, the rigor of the work and living conditions were hard.  After describing a program 
where Korean soldiers could receive an early discharge from military service by working 
overseas, Disney described conditions in Korean construction work camps in the Middle 
East. 
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Once they get to the Middle East, these ex-soldiers will find life little different 
from that in the army.  The workers are housed in isolated compounds built 
by the construction firms where they are supplied with Korea food, tapes of 
Korean TV shows and cassettes of Korean music.  They are isolated from 
other workers, both from the indigenous population and from other 
countries, and from any danger of political ‘infection’.  At one stage, South 
Korean workers marched to job sites in military formation wearing their job 
uniforms.19 
The isolation and difficulty associated with adapting to this military-style work and living 
environment must have made the experience even more difficult for some workers.  In 
1977, the Korean government and construction companies responded quickly to improve 
conditions in the camps after Korean workers rioted and caused damage to the port they 
were constructing in Saudi Arabia.20  In response conditions, wages, and other creature 
comforts were improved for workers although the mythos of the unflinchingly diligent and 
longsuffering Korean laborer was shattered.   
Another disadvantage, not unique to the Korean case, was the difficulty faced by workers 
after they returned home to Korea.  Many workers found it challenging to re-integrate into 
Korean society at large, or even their own family, as well as the more practical difficulty of 
finding a job once back home.  Some of these complications were perhaps exacerbated by 
the highly regimented, if not militaristic, conditions returning migrant workers had grown 
accustomed to while abroad.  To combat the problem of securing employment once back 
home, the Korean government “launched an experimental retraining programme in early 
1986 for displaced workers with vocational training centre facilities.”21  Additionally, the 
climate of the Middle East was significantly different from that to which workers were 
accustomed.  Hard physical labor in such a demanding climate meant that returning workers 
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often reported “deteriorating health” problems.22  The “3-D” (Difficult, Dirty, Dangerous) 
nature of the construction work in the Middle East may have exacerbated the health 
impacts on migrant Korean laborers.   
Figure 7.3 below illustrates the unemployment rates in both the Philippines and Korea.  
Between 1980 and 1990, it can be observed, Korean unemployment dropped from 5.2 
percent to 2.5 percent.  As the booming Korean economy drove domestic labor demands 
ever closer to full employment wages and competition for workers increased, thus 
decreasing wage incentives for Korean workers to go overseas.   
Figure 7.3: Korea - Philippines Unemployment Rate 1970 - 2009 (5 year intervals) 
 
Source: 1980-2009 World Bank, Korea 1970 & 1975 Hyun, 1989, Philippines 1970 & 1975, Solon & 
Floro 1993. 
The issue of wages cannot be overstated in its importance to the overall decline of out-labor 
migration from Korea.  As illustrated in Table 7.4 below, from 1976, when Korean labor 
migration started to experience its largest yearly increases, until 1983 when the 
phenomenon began to decline steadily, the wage variation between Middle Eastern versus 
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domestic employment dropped from an average of 4.1 times the domestic rate down to 2.7 
times the wages for the same jobs in Korea.  Thus, the “3-D” jobs abroad transitioned away 
from Korean to foreign migrant workers, as Korean workers demanded prohibitively high 
pay to do such work. 
Table 7.4 
Comparison of Wages of Domestic and Overseas Employment 
(Unit: 1000 Won) 
  1976 
 
1983 
  
Middle 
East (ME) 
Domestic 
(D) 
Difference 
(X higher) 
 
Middle 
East (ME) 
Domestic 
(D) 
Difference 
(X higher) 
  
Total 
Wage 
Total 
Wage ME/D   
Total 
Wage 
Total 
Wage ME/D 
Odd-jobman - 54.3 - 
 
459.3 155.8 2.9 
Carpenter 339.7 62.9 5.4 
 
522.2 262.3 2 
Electrician 314.3 89.8 3.5 
 
573.2 165.8 3.5 
Welder 328.4 64.4 5.1 
 
614.7 218.8 2.4 
Piping Worker 294.7 92.1 3.1 
 
572.6 210.4 2.7 
Other Const’n 
Skilled worker 285.8 86 3.3 
 
555.4 200 2.7 
Heavy Equip’t 
Operator 363.4 84.5 4.3 
 
667 283.4 2.4 
Average 321.1 76.3 4.1   566.3 213.8 2.7 
Note: Wages in 1976 are for employees working only in the Middle East.  Wages of overseas 
employees in 1983 are for employees working in all foreign countries. 
Exchange rates: 1$: 485 Won in 1980, 1$: 761 Won in 1983. 
Source: Park and Chae (1984), adapted from Oh-Seok Hyun, pp. 161, 1989. 
By the early 1990s, Kim explained, it was “not an exaggeration to say that South Korea has 
begun to enter the advanced country syndrome, where cheap labor acquired from other 
countries becomes necessary due to acute domestic labor shortages.”23  In 1990, only 
“56,000 Korean workers went abroad, a reduction of 72 percent compared to 1982, the 
peak year for overseas migration of Korean workers.”24 
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 Kim, “Migration of Foreign Workers,” 317. 
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As mentioned in Chapter Three, it was the lure of petrodollars that also motivated Park and 
Marcos to formalize their countries’ involvement in the oil boom construction spree.  
Speaking of the demand for skilled construction workers in the Middle East, Gibson and 
Graham explained that: 
Skilled tradesmen such as carpenters and electricians compose a large 
proportion of the migrants.  Filipino labor is in particular demand because 
workers are fluent in English and are more likely to be able to converse with 
the professional construction elite drawn from many different nationalities.  
More importantly, Filipino labor is competitively priced.  In 1979 Filipinos 
worked for 60 percent of the wages received by South Korean laborers.25 
Exactly why Korean laborers were higher paid can be speculated upon, but the more 
important point is that Filipino workers were perceived as valuable workers because of their 
ability to speak English as well as the relatively low cost of employing them.  Korean workers 
may have been more expensive due to the higher wages they negotiated in order to make 
working abroad justifiable from their perspective, especially as the domestic labor market 
became more competitive, whereas Filipino workers had fewer domestic employment 
options and were thus willing to take work abroad for less. 
Perhaps the most important direct developmental benefit of Korean overseas migration was 
the remittances that workers sent home.  In 1976, before domestic wages caught up (see 
Table 7.4 above), a carpenter working overseas could expect to make 5.4 times the wage of 
a carpenter performing the same labor back home.  By 1983 however, this same carpenter 
was only making double the domestic carpenter’s wage which might have made the 
hardships associated with working abroad less bearable.  Simply put, wage incentives for 
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 Katherine Gibson and Julie Graham, “Situating Migrants in Theory: The Case of Filipino Migrant Contract 
Construction Workers,” Capital & Class 10, no. 2 (1986): 48.  
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seeking work abroad decreased dramatically as domestic pay rose.26  This was especially 
true for workers maintaining a family back home.  Single workers could still take advantage 
of higher pay rates abroad while having their living expenses covered, saving a great deal 
over the period of the contract. 
In 1996, a year prior to the financial crisis which rocked Korea as well as the rest of Asia, 
Chaudhuri described the remarkable transition that had been wrought upon the Korean 
economy. 
The economic condition of South Korea in the 1950s was dismal. In fact when 
Park took over, the economy was passing through a severe crisis with 
decreasing growth and rising unemployment (Schwartz, 1989, p. 240). In the 
1950s, South Korea like India was a typical low income Third World country. 
Today she is way ahead. … As a result of rapid economic growth, 
manufacturing became more important than agriculture by the late 1980s, 
with the former accounting for 27.7 percent of the employment and the 
latter 20.7 per cent (Yoo, 1990, p. 7).27 
Foreign construction projects and overseas employment were clearly a component of a 
larger national economic development strategy in Korea.  The benefits of the overseas 
employment program were maximized in relation to national development goals.  The 
program itself was eventually discontinued when the benefits of continuing it diminished to 
the point that it no longer contributed to national economic development goals in a 
substantial way. 
Indonesia 
Relatively late in joining the labor export game, Indonesia did not begin large-scale 
international labor migration until the 1980s.  The fact that Indonesia would get involved in 
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exporting labor is not surprising considering the religious ties the country has with the 
Middle East, Saudi Arabia in particular as the destination of those conducting the pilgrimage 
to Mecca.  What is surprising, however, is the fact that Indonesia was so late to enter the 
labor export game.  Indonesia only deployed 3,675 workers abroad in 1977, but that figure 
jumped to 46,014 by 1985 (see Table 7.5 below).28  Since the 1980s the numbers have 
continued on a similar upward trajectory to the Philippines, reaching 632,172 in 2009.29     
Table 7.5 
Number of Indonesian Workers Deployed Overseas 
Through the Ministry of Manpower 1980 - 2009  
(5 year increments) 
Year 
Middle 
East 
Malaysia/ 
Singapore Other Total 
1980 7651 720 2007 10378 
1985 35577 6034 4403 46014 
1990 60456 18488 5130 84074 
1995 99661 57390 19130 176180 
2000 129160 217407 88640 435210 
2005 177010 226974 70317 474310 
2009 375217 156693 100262 632172 
Source: (1980-2005) Anis Hanim Asyari, “Indonesia’s Administrative and Legislative Measures on 
Labor Migration From a Rights-Based Perspective,” (PhD diss, Mahidol University, 2008) / (2009) 
Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration, Indonesia2011 
http://pusdatinaker.balitfo.depnakertrans.go.id/katalog/download.php?g=2&c=17. 
Similar to the situation in the Philippines, private business plays a dominant role in 
facilitating overseas labor migration from Indonesia.  Government involvement and 
regulation of overseas migration has been a relatively late development.  Asyari explained 
that “until the late 1980s, the migration of Indonesian workers took place without any 
significant intervention of the Indonesian government.”30  Many scholars (Lindquist 2010, 
Asyari 2008, Spaan 1994) have identified the domination of international migration from 
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Indonesia by middlemen and brokers.  With little government oversight these conditions 
fostered widespread abuses against workers seeking opportunities abroad.  Similar to the 
black market recruiters in the Philippines, each time a broker or middleman is inserted into 
the deployment process prices go up, usually for the worker.   
The gendered nature of migration from Indonesia is also similar to the overall picture from 
the Philippines, with a large number of female migrants leaving to work as domestic helpers.  
In 2006, “80 percent of the migrants [sent abroad] were women”, a problem that can be 
traced back to the 1980s.31  By the time Indonesia developed greater interest in pursuing 
overseas employment opportunities in the early 1980s, the nation faced two problems.  
First, other states with more firmly established presences across the Middle East 
(Bangladesh, Pakistan, and the Philippines) had connections and relationships, which meant 
they received the lion’s share of the more lucrative “highly skilled” labor contracts.  Second, 
by the mid-1980s the explosion of construction and infrastructure projects across the region 
began to slow, thus increasing competition among the longer established states in the 
Middle East.  Unable to crack the more lucrative contract labor categories but still wishing 
“to extend employment opportunities, to mitigate the unemployment problem, to increase 
skills and working experience abroad and to improve the foreign exchange position,” 
Indonesia aggressively pursued lower skilled domestic contract labor which was 
experiencing rapid increases in demand.32  
Demand for domestic workers across the Middle East and greater Asia grew steadily from 
the 1980s and provided foreign currency based employment for migrants willing to risk the 
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well documented problems associated with domestic labor.  As seen in Table 7.5 above, 
Indonesian participation in overseas migration increased steadily throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, reaching 176,180 annual deployments in 1995.  Between 1995 and 2000 two related 
events further boosted overseas migration numbers from Indonesia.  The first was the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997, which severely impacted the value of Indonesian currency (Rupiah), 
and resulted in widespread layoffs and high unemployment.  The second was the 1998 
downfall of President Suharto who had ruled Indonesia since 1967.   
The impact the financial crisis had on out-migration is difficult to directly correlate, but from 
a purely numerical analysis (Table 7.5) the increase from 176,180 in 1995 to 435,210 in 2000 
shows a very large increase in a short time-span.  The likelihood that high domestic 
unemployment and a devalued national currency motivated a rapid increase in overseas 
employment participation is not an unreasonable conclusion to make.  Nevertheless, it 
seems to be an assertion that can only be made tenuously considering the serious lack of 
data on the subject.  Evidence in regard to the impact of Suharto’s resignation on the 
management and future direction of Indonesia’s overseas migration program, however, is 
far clearer.  Throughout the Suharto period, as mentioned previously, recruitment agencies 
were the primary drivers of overseas migration.  While there was limited governmental 
oversight of private sector labor recruitment prior to the 1998 end of Suharto’s rule, major 
migration-related legislation, reform and government action have occurred since that time. 
In the political turbulence of the years following the departure of Suharto a variety of 
migration-related reforms were implemented beginning with Ministerial Decree No. 204 
(1999), which urged the “various stakeholders to undertake reform” and required them to 
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issue regular progress reports on their efforts.33  Following the policy groundwork laid down 
in Ministerial Decree No. 204 the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration went even 
further in 2002 issuing Ministerial Decree No. 104A which: 
Set the tone for the development of public management of Indonesian 
labour migrant placements and was an early prototype for the formal 
recognition by the government of the need to regulate labour migration from 
Indonesia.  Indonesian labour migrant export business circles and social 
networks had commenced working with national manpower officials before 
the regime collapsed in 1998 to outline the need to implement a policy on 
trade in manpower not only at the national level but on an international 
scale.  Ministerial Decree No. 104A was thus predominantly a tool to support 
labour migration of Indonesian nationals while attempting to protect workers 
in especially vulnerable sectors by focusing on the least regulated sectors 
such as domestic workers and caregivers.[sic]34 
Both Ministerial Decree No.s 204 and 104A sought to begin a process of shifting the 
regulatory role of the Indonesian government over migration from one of loose oversight to 
one more similar to the “welfare/protection” focused regulation already in existence in 
other major labor exporting countries, the Philippines, in particular. 
Much like the introduction of RA 8042 in the Philippines, the high point of legislative efforts 
to reform the overseas employment in Indonesia, and specifically government regulation 
over it, came in 2004 with the introduction of Law No. 39: the National Law on the 
Placement and Protection of Indonesian Overseas Workers.  Ananta argued that the three-
part mission of Law No. 39 was “to bring about (1) better management of migration flows 
(2) [the] establishment of institutional mechanisms for the placement and protection of 
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Indonesian migrant workers; and (3) advocacy.”35  Structurally, Law No. 39 created the 
Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia (National Agency for 
Placement and Protection of Indonesian Overseas Workers or BNP2TKI), a national body 
dedicated to managing the overseas employment program under the direct supervision of 
the president.  Prior to the creation of BNP2TKI under direct control of the president, the 
Centre for Overseas Employment (1984-1994) and the Directorate of Overseas Manpower 
Services (1994-2007) operated as appendages to the Ministry of Manpower.36  
The primary focus of Law No. 39, as the new “keystone” legislation for the Indonesian 
overseas employment program, seems to be a new emphasis on an enhanced yet flawed 
worker welfare focus and program efficiency improvements aimed at addressing the old 
goal of utilizing overseas employment to reduce domestic unemployment.37  Clearly absent 
from the post-Suharto reform era is any coherent legislative or bureaucratic attempts to 
place Indonesia’s rapidly growing overseas employment program, and its subsequent 
remittance income, into a national development strategy framework as was done in South 
Korea.  Also conspicuously absent from the reformed overseas employment program 
bureaucracy is any association with the Indonesian equivalent of Korea’s EPB which could 
coordinate all economic activities at home and abroad in order to maximize their 
developmental potential for Indonesia.   
Unfortunately for individual migrants early reports of the effectiveness of the new worker 
welfare focus have been less than outstanding.  Citing 2006 remarks given by Indonesian 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Ananta explained that “there [have] been many 
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brokers operating in both departing and returning overseas workers, that those brokers and 
sponsors had created vulnerability and discomfort [for] the overseas workers … for instance, 
there [has] been many cases of falsification of documents, too high fees, illegal fees, and 
illegal placement of overseas workers.”[sic]38  The International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) has been critical of the structures and new policy emphasis enshrined in Law No. 39, 
stating that: 
Despite recent initiatives at the national level, government reforms have, 
overall, been ad-hoc in nature and have not constituted a coherent and 
comprehensive strategy towards addressing the many complex issues 
pertaining to labour migration management in Indonesia, especially the 
protection of labour migrants’ rights and the extent of irregular migration.  
National Labour migration laws and policies in Indonesia are still primarily 
concerned with reducing local unemployment, and thus tend to focus more 
on facilitating the outflow of migrant labour rather than creating a protection 
mechanism for migrants.39  
Improvements are clearly being made but there is a desperate need in Indonesia for both 
improved worker protections as well as strategic alignment between the program and the 
national economic development strategy. 
Conclusion 
While the Philippines, Korea and Indonesia are vastly different states with divergent 
histories, religions, and cultural heritages, each has engaged upon a path of economic 
development, and each has at one time engaged in a formalized overseas employment 
program with some degree of governmental involvement or oversight.  The fact that Korea 
is no longer a net exporter of migrant labor but rather a net importer actually makes its 
inclusion in the analysis particularly valuable.  One of the purposes of this chapter was to 
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discern what steps, events, decisions, led to this transition and whether or not Korea’s 
migration program directly contributed to that country’s rise from developing to developed 
nation status.   
In exploring these questions, some answers were forthcoming while others remain elusive.  
In regard to the question regarding the role overseas employment played in Korea’s 
economic development, there can be no doubt that the overseas employment program did 
aid in national economic development efforts.  However the extent of the aid rendered 
through direct remittances seems less crucial than the “total-package” approach to overseas 
construction projects pursued (at the Korean government’s request) by Korean construction 
firms utilizing Korean laborers.  In Korea, the EPB incentivized the private sector into moving 
in directions most in line with their economic goals.  This same principle applied to the types 
of skills and experiences planners desired Korean migrant workers to gain while abroad.  
They closely regulated the type and number of migrants allowed to go abroad, thus 
preventing any possibility of strategically important worker shortages or brain drain.  This 
was particularly important for Korea as the bulk of their developmental efforts were not 
through migration but domestic industry and manufacturing. 
The Philippines, when compared with cases used in this chapter, falls as a middle example of 
an organized approach to managing an overseas employment program but without clear 
overarching goals to guide the program within a larger development framework, as was the 
case in Korea.  Though originally motivated by the same desires to reduce domestic 
unemployment pressures that motivated Indonesia and to some extent Korea, the original 
temporary intent of the overseas employment program in the Philippines has become 
“permanently temporary” (described in Chapter Three).  This has created an intense 
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dependence on the program for the health of the national economy.  In contrast to Korea, 
the Philippines not only has less bureaucratic capacity but also a total absence of any 
meaningful overarching strategic planning body similar to Korea’s EPB able to ensure that 
the program is used for maximum economic benefit and effectively linked to the broader 
national economic development strategy.  The National Economic Development Authority 
(NEDA), as described in Chapter Three, has some of the needed expertise to fulfill such a 
role, but none of the authority or the mandate held by Korea’s EPB.  While Korea was 
restrictive in the type and number of certain categories of workers which were allowed to 
go abroad the Philippines has not been so selective.  This is perhaps due to the lack of any 
meaningful national development strategy based domestically that would require a 
particular type of worker or skill set.  In fact, whole new industries have been spawned to 
train workers, nurses for example, not to fill domestic requirements but specifically to cater 
to overseas demand.   
Indonesia, as a late entrant into the overseas employment game, stands as a third example 
of a state that neither has the bureaucratic structure of the Philippine overseas employment 
program (though it is making good strides toward such) nor Korea’s big-picture strategic 
view of utilizing overseas employment as a component within a larger development 
strategy.  Indonesia’s post-Suharto efforts to move from a laissez-faire approach to a more 
managed overseas employment program has seen considerable progress in a short period 
of time, but the overwhelming consensus seems to be that considerable more reform is 
needed.  Additionally, like the Philippines, Indonesia suffers from a total absence of any 
correlation between economic development planning and the overseas employment 
program.  If temporary “unemployment pressure relief” is really the full extent of the 
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governments’ view of the program’s purpose, why then go to so much effort in the post-
Suharto era to improve efficiencies, worker welfare, and program management and 
promotion?  The obvious answer is because the program has proven its ability to generate 
substantial remittance income.  It could prove more beneficial if program management is 
improved.  
There is much room for further improvement in how Indonesia approaches management of 
its overseas employment program.  In particular, emphasis should be paid to program 
objectives, and how the program fits into the national economic development plan.  Should 
they continue to follow a path of the “Philippine model” and fail to address the important 
step of integrating its overseas employment program with the context of national economic 
development goals and strategies, they may face the same problems that currently exist in 
the Philippines today.  Namely, they will have highly organized and robust program 
structures and institutions driving a large overseas employment phenomenon that affects 
millions of citizens directly and indirectly without any overarching goals or objectives to 
work toward or achieve.  Depending on how much attention Indonesia pays to “other” 
aspects of its national economic development strategy, it could also find that pursuit of the 
Philippine model may lead to an intractable dependence on remittances and continued 
overseas migration as the domestic economy and industry atrophy to unsustainable levels. 
The acute labor shortages faced by Korea in recent years, the origins of which are 
mentioned above, have culminated in the creation of the Employment Permit System.  This 
is part of a highly regulated governance structure to manage incoming migrant laborers (see 
Chapter Six).  Similarly, the export program as it existed in the 1970s and 80s was also highly 
orchestrated with a large measure of government prodding, interaction, and oversight over 
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the businesses involved in facilitating worker migration overseas.  This government-led 
transition was overseen by highly qualified economic planners in the EPB.  We have no proof 
to date of a state developing its economy purely through overseas employment migration, 
but Korea stands as an example of a state which maximized such a program’s potential in 
conjunction with other economic efforts and in concert with a national development plan.   
The key ingredient in Korea’s apparent migration-toward-development synergy seems to 
have been first, having capable economic planners with the skills and authority to 
coordinate national developmental efforts, and second to have the foresight to see beyond 
the temporary benefits of short-term overseas employment in favor of a longer term vision 
that placed overseas employment programs as a component of a wider national economic 
development strategy.  The prospect of implementing these key ingredients in the 
Philippines and Indonesia will pose tremendous challenges, but is not an unachievable goal.  
The Philippines has, and Indonesia is creating, a governmental structure intended to 
effectively manage large overseas employment programs.  Both states also have ongoing 
national development plans (short, medium and long term) run by dedicated development 
planning agencies.  It would thus be a matter of empowering the development agencies, 
assuring the qualifications and capabilities of those working within it, and tasking them with 
integrating their respective overseas employment programs within the larger national 
development strategy.  The capacity and embedded autonomy (see Chapter Two) of both 
the Philippine and Indonesian bureaucracies will need to be strengthened and improved if 
any of these changes are to take place.  As argued in previous chapters, since the programs 
exist and are so highly developed why not utilize them toward achieving greater economic 
development?  If Indonesia and the Philippines were to do so, they too like Korea might 
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eventually reach a point where their overseas employment program is no longer necessary.  
Although the road to accomplishing such a course correction would be difficult, the pursuit 
of such a goal would certainly pay dividends in both the short and longer term.   
Crucially important of course, given the scenario I just described, is the quality and integrity 
of the “other” development strategies implemented alongside the new developmentally 
focused overseas employment programs.  If economic planning bodies are improved, 
strengthened, and empowered it is likely that all avenues of their development planning 
would likewise improve including their domestic economic initiatives.  Were they also to be 
empowered like Korea’s EPB they could be given oversight and regulatory authority thus 
enabling them to discern weak links in the government bureaucracies historically plagued 
with acute corruption.  Budgetary control was a key “check” exercised by the EPB to assure 
that other governmental agencies and departments went along with their national 
economic development plans and strategies.  Such control could be given to NEDA as well as 
the equivalent body in Indonesia to further empower them to firmly take the reins of 
economic development policy and implementation.  Entrenched interests and corruption 
are not easily done away with, but by setting goals along these lines, and by making 
structural and policy changes in line with the tactics utilized in Korea, both the Philippines 
and Indonesia can move along a path eventually achieving results similar to what has 
occurred in Korea.  Even though the path from the current reality in both states to the 
Korean experience is a long one, it is a path worth traversing as the rewards are great.  Even 
if the Philippines and Indonesia are not fully able to replicate the success of Korea, if 
emulating their success even brings minor developmental improvements to both states then 
the effort will not have been in vain. 
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Chapter Eight: Bringing Government and Business together to maximize developmental 
outcomes 
This chapter draws out the main themes of the thesis with the goal of placing them into a 
single coherent picture that may be of some help to government planners and policy makers 
in the Philippines.  After combining the key points from previous chapters, a series of policy 
recommendations are made regarding the future of the overseas employment program in 
the Philippines.  Lastly, final thoughts on key concepts are shared and areas of potential 
future research stemming from this thesis are considered. 
Review of Chapters 
In Chapter One, I briefly introduce the rationale for exploring the interaction between 
government and business within the overseas employment program.  Given the overseas 
employment program’s contributions to the Philippine economy, I then propose that it 
should be established as a central component of the national economic strategy.  The 
chapter concludes with a brief history of early external migration from the Philippines and 
an overview of chapters. 
Chapter Two introduces the government-business framework, and some of the ideas and 
concepts pioneered by Evans, Haggard, Maxfield, Schnieder, Woo-Cumings, MacIntyre, and 
Hutchcroft.  The logic of two-level game theory, I demonstrate, enables us to examine the 
dual national and international nature of the overseas employment program.  By applying 
the government-business framework, combined with two-level game theory, I  
reconceptualize the overseas employment program, and the primary actors who drive it, 
within the larger context of a coherent national development strategy.  The analysis then 
proceeds to show how the government-business framework was successfully applied by 
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Korea, Japan, and Taiwan.  These states combined long-term development planning by an 
empowered central planning authority, with embedded ties promoting its cooperation and 
coordination with the private business sector.  Although the government-business 
framework has traditionally been characterized by industrialization-based development 
strategies, I argued that the same principles, practices and techniques could be applied to 
the overseas employment program in the Philippines. 
In Chapter Three I traced the major historical developments of government-business 
relations in the overseas employment program from its origins in 1974 through the early 
1990s.  I argued that major tension and not infrequent animosity has existed between 
government and business since the earliest days of the program.  Furthermore, through 
careful analysis, it was demonstrated that the program has evolved piece by piece with no 
single objective or overarching goal as to what the program’s objectives should be.  The 
Marcos, Aquino, and Ramos Administration’s failure to position the overseas employment 
program squarely within the national economic development plan or to set achievable goals 
and targets for how the overseas employment program could contribute to developmental 
outcomes, I argue, helped to make overseas labor migration from the Philippines 
“permanently temporary.”1 
My focus in Chapter Four is on what remains the largest single legislative attempt at 
regulating the rapidly growing overseas employment program.  The 1995 act, RA 8042, had 
its genesis as result of public outcry related to the execution of OFW Flor Contemplacion in 
Singapore in 1995.  The Contemplacion saga and the subsequent creation of RA 8042, I 
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argue, signaled the new predominance of ‘workers’ welfare’ which has dominated every 
aspect of the overseas employment program ever since.  Through in-depth analysis of this 
legislation, two major themes emerged: first, a lack of acknowledgement of how important 
the overseas employment program had become to the Philippine economy, and a lack of 
guidance for development planners (such as the National Economic Development Authority 
[NEDA]) to include the program as a component in future national development plans, and 
second, an absence of plans to improve cooperation among stakeholders (including 
overseas Filipino workers [OFWs]) in the overseas employment program, thereby improving 
welfare and program benefits through coordination and mutual respect rather than 
antagonism, mistrust, and threats.   
Chapter Five chronologically covers events from the conclusion of Chapter Four to the 
present, but is at its core a case study on another major piece of overseas employment 
program legislation.  This bill, RA 10022 (2010), was an attempt to correct many of the 
mistakes made in the rush to pass RA 8042 in 1995, and the problems that had developed in 
the intervening years.  Through interviews with key actors and policy makers, my analysis 
provided insight into the troubling shortage of communication, dialogue, and mutual 
understanding among major program actors—particularly among Congress and nearly 
everyone else: the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), the recruitment 
agencies (RAs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  My analysis showed that the 
constructive relational framework between government and business, as described in 
Chapter Two, is woefully lacking from both the policy making process itself as well as the 
relationship among key program actors generally.  I argued that much of the blame for the 
shortcomings of the bill rest with the legislature, but that the executive branch essentially 
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abdicated its responsibility to provide leadership on this critical issue.  The executive could 
have shored up its key agency, the POEA, which had much to contribute to major policy 
formulations.  The executive seems not to have done this.  But we do have an example of a 
strong executive aggressively pushing reform, specifically Ramos in the 1990s in regard to 
matters outside the overseas employment program, and it is this example from Philippine 
policymaking that could be emulated today.   
The international side of government-business relations was the focus of Chapter Six, which 
centered around the Philippines recent strategy of pursuing bilateral labor agreements with 
states which host Filipino workers.  Analysis of completed agreements between the 
Philippines and Japan, four Canadian Provinces, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, and Korea 
was used as a case study to explore how government-business relations were impacted by 
completed agreements, and how government-business relations impact the negotiations of 
new agreements.  I argue that a better balance can be achieved using the tools of marketing 
and diplomacy to entice reluctant states that host a large number of OFWs like Saudi Arabia 
into a mutually beneficial agreement, rather than over-emphasizing leverage.  The goal 
should be the creation of mutual benefit and the minimization of confrontation. 
Finally, Chapter Seven explored the mechanisms and policies used to manage overseas 
employment programs in Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines.  The Korean case, in 
particular, was significant because Korean development planners successfully used overseas 
labor migration as a component of a larger national economic development strategy that 
eventually eliminated the need to send workers abroad.  Although it would of course be 
difficult for the Philippines and Indonesia to replicate the development success achieved in 
Korea, attempts to apply certain Korean strategies and techniques would have the potential 
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to foster better coordination of their overseas employment programs with national 
economic development strategies.  Through my analysis, I conclude that significant 
challenges stand in the way of both Indonesia and the Philippines achieving results on the 
same miraculous scale as Korea, but that, if followed, the Korean example could lead to 
meaningful improvements for both states.  
Major Themes and Observations 
A detailed exploration of the Philippines’ official state policy toward the overseas 
employment program has been undertaken throughout this thesis.  From the program’s 
inception, through the furor of the Flor Contemplacion saga and even until today, 
presidents, legislators, and top bureaucrats have commonly referred to the program as 
“temporary” or “stop-gap” and rarely acknowledged the economy’s very heavy reliance 
upon it.  Indeed, if the program was discontinued immediately or unexpectedly interrupted, 
the Philippine economy would likely collapse.  Despite occasional claims to the contrary, the 
overseas employment program must be considered a major (if not the major) component of 
national development strategy.  This reality is highlighted by the fact that other states, as 
mentioned in Chapter Two, including Indonesia have modeled their overseas employment 
program structures on those supporting the Philippine program.2  
Section 2 of RA 8042 contains a clearly defined policy position on where the overseas 
employment program belongs within Philippine economic development planning:  “the 
state does not promote overseas employment as a means to sustain economic growth and 
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 Center for Migrant Advocacy, “The Philippines: A Global Model On Labor Migration?,” Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung,  2
nd
 ed., June 2009. 
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achieve national development.”3  In response to this passage, Graziano Battistella argued 
that: 
At first sight this statement appears a major declaration, that should settle 
the issue once and for all.  However, additional scrutiny is warranted.  What 
lies behind is a controversy with political consequences.  The number of 
Filipinos going overseas has reached such magnitude that any observer would 
easily conclude that the state has a deliberate labor export policy.  Those 
actively supporting such policy simply indicate that the current level of 
unemployment and underemployment in the Philippines makes overseas 
employment inevitable.  The Philippines has such a large number of overseas 
workers because it can count on a qualified work force and has developed 
the recruiting and deployment process to a level of sophistication unknown 
to other countries.  In this regard, the recruiting industry deserves the 
recognition for its accomplishments.4 
It has been said that the first step toward fixing a problem is admitting that you have one.  
In the case of economic development in the Philippines, the first step toward making 
progress is to first admit that the overseas employment program is the keystone to its 
development strategy and second, figure out how this program can be used in conjunction 
with other strategies to achieve meaningful developmental progress. 
National Development Strategy and Institutional Deficiency 
In Chapter Seven, a great deal of time was spent analyzing the role migration has played in 
Korean economic development.  There is a significant body of literature dealing with both 
Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) as practiced in Korea before the time of Park, and 
Export Oriented Industrialization (EOI) as it was pursued after he came to power.  Analysis 
of these development strategies has been explored by many others, and this debate clearly 
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falls beyond the scope of this thesis although they are important contextual pieces to 
understanding national economic development strategies.  From the Korean "packaged" 
approach to labor migration, migrant workers were an export (although well looked after) 
like other export products being offered to the world.  So in order to understand Korean 
labor migration, one must understand their EOI strategy.  As mentioned in Chapter Three, 
Marcos also attempted to implement an EOI strategy for which his overseas employment 
program was a part.  For the reasons covered in Chapter Three, his EOI strategy never really 
got off the ground.  Hawes offered a comparative explanation as to why EOI took off so 
successfully among the East Asian tigers, but faced such difficulties in the Philippines. 
In two important ways, then, the Philippine transition to export oriented 
development differed from that in Taiwan and South Korea.  First, the 
political sphere was much broader in the Philippines during the import-
substituting phase.  This was so not just domestically but also in the sense 
that international investors had stronger links to local capitalists and through 
them more influence in shaping the local path to development.  Second, 
because the political sphere was broader in the Philippines, the state had less 
relative autonomy.  The transition to export-led development, in 
consequence, involved greater conflict.…In this the Philippines was again 
more like Latin America than Taiwan and South Korea. [emphasis added]5 
As outlined in Chapter Two, Evans argued for the need for embedded autonomy between 
the private and public sector in order for meaningful economic development to occur.  
Throughout this thesis it has been shown that this necessary component was missing from 
both national economic policy as well as within the overseas employment program.  Hawes, 
in the quote above, confirms that the pluralistic demands of politics in the Philippines have 
acted as a hindrance to striking the right “autonomy” balance.  Central economic planning 
authorities in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan not only had the necessary knowledge and expertise 
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 Gary Hawes, The Philippine State and the Marcos Regime: The Politics of Export, (Ithaca, NY, Cornell 
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to get their countries on the right track, but also the authority (autonomy) to do so.  This is 
desperately needed in the Philippines, particularly at NEDA, but also at the POEA in regard 
to the overseas employment program.  They currently have much, but not enough, of the 
necessary knowledge and skills to get their respective charges on target, but wholly lack the 
authority to do so.  The time has come for the Philippine legislature to step back from its 
present micro-management approach on both the economy and the overseas employment 
program, and instead empower and support entities like NEDA and the POEA so that they 
can more effectively fulfill their mandates. 
Overseas labor migration has become the latest in a series of strategies designed to allow 
the economy to limp along without the development of a coherent development strategy.  
In the Marcos era, as explained in Chapter Three, development plans laid down by NEDA 
were subordinated to the interests of Marcos’ cronies.6  As Hutchcroft succinctly put it, “as 
long as the system was being lubricated by external funds, there was no need to make any 
hard decisions regarding contending economic paths.”7  Prior to the closure of the US bases, 
foreign loans and international aid (particularly from the United States) filled that role.  
Since the bases closed however, overseas labor migration, and their subsequent 
remittances, have taken over as the economic life-raft that inhibits sustained efforts toward 
the emergence of a more coherent economic development strategy.  On this point 
Battistella added that “labor export avoids the social unrest that would emerge from an 
additional number of unemployed or underemployed workers and provides the government 
with foreign exchange to sustain a type of development which perpetuates the need for 
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many to go abroad.”8  The task for the future is to put the overseas employment program at 
the center of development planning. 
Bureaucratic Reorganization and Reform  
The overseas employment program bureaucracy is large, inefficient, with too many 
overlapping and unclear responsibility and authority arrangements.  Some of the functions 
held by various agencies could easily be merged into sub-organizations, or even simply 
departments, within the POEA.  Some offices, such as the Overseas Workers Welfare 
Administration (OWWA) could simply be absorbed into the POEA.  These changes would 
benefit program efficiency, but would also simplify the paperwork process for OFWs.   
On a larger scale, as previously mentioned, the unique international nature of the overseas 
employment program presents particular challenges to all government departments tasked 
with governing its various parts.  Many problems center on the jurisdictional and expertise 
mismatch between the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the Department of Labor 
and Employment (DOLE), where the DFA has responsibility over foreign affairs but does not 
necessarily have expertise in labor matters, while DOLE has responsibility over labor matters 
but does not have expertise in foreign affairs.  DOLE, which oversees the POEA but has 
responsibility for all matters related to labor, is in need of being separated from the POEA to 
enable it to better focus on its domestic responsibilities.  The POEA, which is able to commit 
the full measure of its attention to the overseas employment program, needs to be 
separated from DOLE and given greater responsibility as lead agency on overseas 
employment program matters.  One possible solution would be to transform the POEA into 
the Department of Overseas Employment, with the new department head elevated to a 
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member of the President’s cabinet.  DOLE would retain its current mandate and 
responsibilities, albeit limited only to domestic labor and employment issues.  All matters 
related to the overseas employment program, including oversight of the private recruitment 
agencies participating in the program, would be managed by this new department.  If the 
overseas employment program is important to the national economy, it therefore must play 
a larger role in the nation’s economic development strategy and it would therefore be 
appropriate to elevate, streamline, and generally improve the bureaucracy that oversees 
the program.   
Many of the failures of the program bureaucracy in the past few decades, particularly the 
appalling lack of support for OFWs while abroad (Chapter Six), have occurred as result of the 
acutely dysfunctional and disharmonic relationships that exist between the POEA, DOLE, 
and the DFA especially in dealing with issues in the destination state.  Under the suggested 
solution, there would only be two entities—DFA and the new Department of Overseas 
Employment—that would need to cooperate on matters such as terms for new bilateral 
labor agreements (BLAs), verification of foreign employers, and general OFW assistance 
while abroad.  Once the overseas employment program is elevated to its proper place both 
structurally within the national economic development plan, and psychologically within the 
national psyche as something that the Philippines is capable of doing better than anyone 
else, having a cabinet-level department representing this undertaking could be easily 
justified.  The creation of this new department would show that the Philippines takes its 
program seriously. 
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NEDA and the National Development Plan 
As demonstrated at length in Chapter Two, and mentioned throughout many other 
chapters, the Philippines is in desperate need of a central planning authority to fill the roles 
played by such agencies in Korea, Japan, and Taiwan.  This agency or department must not 
only be adept in economic planning but must also be given the necessary authority to 
pursue a consistent long-term, realistic, development strategy.  Unfortunately NEDA has 
within its history demonstrated the former skills but not the latter authority.  In many cases, 
they are given the privilege of creating reports and development plans that are then ignored 
by the executive and legislative branches as well as the rest of the government bureaucracy.  
Despite the tremendous work that would be required to turn NEDA into an organization on 
par with Korea’s Economic Planning Board (ECB) or Japan’s Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI), it is the best organization to fill the role considering that it has a 
mandate as “the country’s independent economic development and planning agency” in the 
1987 constitution.9  NEDA’s 2004 medium term development plan for the country contained 
shockingly little on the overseas employment program and how it fit into the country’s 
larger developmental objectives.  After exuberantly praising the redeeming nature of OFW 
remittances on the Philippine economy, the extent of the migration-specific language of the 
development plan was remarkably vague: 
Notwithstanding the positive effects of overseas employment, there is also a 
need to address its pitfalls such as the problem on brain drain (caused by the 
exodus of Filipino professionals) and the need to introduce interventions that 
would translate the overseas Filipino workers’ remittances into productive 
investments.  The promotion of migration and development for productive 
investments from remittances shall also be pursued. This means that migrant 
workers shall channel their resources to productive pursuits where the 
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country would continue to gain from labor migration while at the same time 
minimizing its downsides.10 
There is no action-plan or outlined steps for how these apparent goals will be accomplished.  
After repeatedly expressing the important role that OFW remittance income plays in 
rescuing the national economy, how is it that NEDA planners could decide that the topic 
literally does not warrant more than four or five sentences attention in a 315-page report?  
Prior to listing the “goals” above, the updated medium term development plan made these 
statements about the role that remittances have played in promoting economic growth and 
stabilizing the Philippine economy: 
• Record levels of overseas remittances coupled with increasing export 
earnings led to an improvement in the country’s credit outlook. 
• For 2007, the country’s BOP surplus more than doubled to a record high 
of US$8.6 billion, given the reversal of the country’s capital and financial 
account balance, from a net outflow in 2006 to a net inflow. The surplus 
is partly attributed to the strong surge in OFW remittances, growing at an 
annual average of 19.1 percent for the period 2004-2006. 
• Strong consumer demand supported by record levels of remittances from 
overseas Filipinos and a liberalized environment in transport, 
communications, and retail trade spurred growth in the [services] sector. 
• The trade services sector gained from strong remittances from overseas 
Filipinos… 
• Foreign investments flowed in and overseas Filipino remittances 
increased, driving the peso to appreciate against the US dollar.11 
If OFW remittances were so crucial to positive outcomes in the national economy, surely the 
topic warrants greater attention be paid to it in the national development plan.  NEDA has 
the mandate, so the next step should be to put together a plan to improve its capacity in 
order to better emulate Korea’s ECB and Japan’s MITI.   
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Speaking of the importance of competent bureaucratic administration over development 
policies Haggard et. al. explained that: 
Economic development strategies are not simply packages of discrete 
policies, but involve the development of administrative capacities, both to 
permit their coherent formulation in the first place, and to insure their 
implementation. The economic reforms usually associated with Korea's take-
off were predated by administrative reforms and an alliance with the military 
that dramatically enhanced the position of the technocrats within the 
bureaucracy (emphasis added).12 
As highlighted throughout this thesis, there is a serious lack of consistent, realistic, long-
term economic development planning in the Philippines.  Unfortunately, what development 
planning that does occur is completely ignored by those who shape national policy.  Highly 
educated and well-compensated central planners with the authority to promote long-term 
sustainable economic development could lead to dramatic improvements for the 
Philippines.  Imagine what they could do toward building a balanced development plan with 
the already booming overseas employment program at the center of the nation’s economic 
portfolio.  Rather than always pursuing policies reactively, a realistic long-term plan with 
overseas employment situated in the center, the country could pursue whichever other 
economic strategy goals they wished to complement it.  Planners could then develop a plan 
to maximize remittance income toward accomplishing those goals.  It has been repeatedly 
argued through this thesis that the overseas employment program is already up and 
running. Why not make it part of the plan? 
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The Recruitment Industry and Government-Business relations 
Throughout this study the story of the government-business relationship has remained 
largely the same.  As one studies the overseas employment program, there are a variety of 
descriptive words that come to mind including: adversarial, distrustful, suspicious, and 
corrupt.  As noted in Chapter Three, President Corazon Aquino referred to OFWs as “Bagong 
Bayani” or new heroes because of their willingness to seek employment opportunities 
abroad thereby rescuing the beleaguered Philippine economy.  These sentiments have not 
changed since President Aquino coined the phrase in 1988.  As mentioned in Chapter Five, 
senators and current leaders are still making reference to how crucial OFW remittances are 
to the vitality of the national economy.  While these references may simply be populist 
political propaganda tools, they also serve as clear acknowledgment of how crucial the 
overseas employment program has become to the national economy.  Regardless of the 
motives of those politicians who use these phrases, and without any lack of respect and 
appreciation due to the tremendous dedication and sacrifice made by millions of OFWs, 
they may have missed one correlation that must be drawn if the “new hero” narrative it to 
be fully appreciated.  Rene Cristobal, a widely respected businessman who practices what 
he calls “ethical recruitment” and does not charge any of his workers fees, made the 
following observation in an interview: 
I am glad you are touching on the recruitment industry because it is not given 
the right credit for what it is doing.  Because it is the recruiters who are 
promoting overseas employment and the government is not supposed to do 
that.  Whereas they say the savior of the [country], I am Bagong Bayani 
foundation chairman, and we are going to give awards now and we call them 
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the new heroes, but who made them the new heroes? Who deployed them 
there? It’s the private sector, it’s not the government!13 
There is a fair measure of sense in the argument Mr. Cristobal makes that without the 
recruitment industry there would not be OFWs, and by association nor would there be an 
economic lifeline for the national economy.  At the same time, the government has a 
necessary role of ensuring basic minimum standards and, as described in Chapter Four, 
most “good” recruitment agencies operating on the legal side of the program favor 
regulation as a way of weeding out the “bad” RAs and the unfair competition that they 
provide. 
In the course of this study it became clear that the vast majority of RAs operating within the 
legal framework, long for the day when they will be embraced as partners and not enemies.  
There are also many examples of recruitment agencies who even today go above and 
beyond what is required of them regarding their obligation to the workers they deploy.  
These satisfied OFWs choose to re-deploy through them when their contracts expire rather 
than to deal directly with foreign employers, despite the higher cost of deploying through an 
agency.  In other words, RAs play a vital role in accomplishing the overseas employment 
program.  Not all of them are predatory toward OFWs, but those that are predatory are 
often very predatory.  As a result government (primarily the legislature) finds the industry a 
convenient place to assign blame when an OFW dies or is tragically mistreated while abroad.  
Although there is a tension between the POEA and the recruitment industry, the POEA does 
not generally publically blame the entire industry as does the legislative and executive 
branches.  On this matter, Battistella argued that “if labor export is a clear government 
policy, then the government is directly responsible for the problems affecting migrant 
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workers.”14  The tension that exists between the recruitment industry and the POEA is more 
one of program participant (RAs), and the POEA’s status as program gatekeeper.  So 
disputes arise over issues of licensing, fees, and other more mundane program minutia.  It is 
not likely that the tension among the actors involved in the operation of the overseas 
employment program will be completely diminished by formally positioning the program 
within the national development plan, but a little tension among program actors, preferably 
much less than exists now, would not necessarily be a bad thing.  The industry must be 
consulted with more on policy decisions related to the overseas employment program.  
There have been too many examples, such as the bilateral labor agreements (BLAs) from 
Chapter Six, where the recruitment industry offers advice on key issues, is ignored, and 
ultimately is proved right.  The pitfalls it warned against could have been avoided.  The 
tension will persist regardless of the extent of their involvement, but with greater input, 
they would be able to assist government policy makers (both at the POEA bureaucratic level, 
and the legislative level) to see the reality of the situation at home and abroad.   
Migration is the development strategy: Acknowledge it and utilize it 
At various points in this thesis the argument has been put forth that despite occasional 
claims to the contrary the overseas employment program is in reality a major element of 
the national economy and therefore deserves acknowledgement.  Acknowledgement of the 
program’s status, it would seem, is a necessary first step before the program can be adapted 
more effectively into the national economic development strategy to maximize program 
benefits for developmental outcomes.  Former Ambassador Reynaldo Paruñgao offered a 
possible explanation why national leaders (and the nation as a whole) have been so 
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reluctant to embrace the reality of the Philippines dependency on the overseas employment 
program.   
Today you try going to Taipei and you hold a Philippine passport, you have 
not done anything, they don't even classify you, as to what class of Filipino do 
you belong.  They think that you are a contract worker and you will do some 
monkey business there.  See, so that’s how bad the situation has become.… 
When we travel we have a way of disguising ourselves so that’s the situation.  
There are social consequences; obviously we are a proud people and a proud 
country so we do not admit openly that we have a program to send our 
people, our warm bodies, outside for work.  So this is a program, this is 
something we call a “phenomenon” not a program that is deliberately 
pursued by government as a matter of strategy, you see?  So there are 
ambivalent positions even with government, why?  We know that there is 
some kind of stigma that goes with it, and you know pride is something that’s 
built in us.  So whenever we see a doll of a Filipino manufactured in London 
depicting the Filipino as a domestic helper you can imagine the uproar that 
happened here.  That happened in London, that happened in another 
country, Spain I think.  So this became an international matter for us.  I have 
to confess, the point is we are also hypocrites in not admitting what really is 
our status today in the eyes of the international community.15 
In Chapter Five, during the discussion on the Senate’s role in the creation of RA 10022, 
several examples were given of senators hailing the importance of the program to the 
national economy.  There seems little point in continuing to deny the obvious reality that 
the overseas employment program is a (if not the) dominant economic driver of the 
Philippine economy today and it should therefore take a prominent place in the national 
economic development strategy.  The sentiments shared above by Ambassador Paruñgao 
highlight one of the key reasons that until now has prevented leaders and the national 
consciousness generally from admitting this reality.  The problem is inherently 
psychological.  As Paruñgao mentioned, the Philippines is a proud country.  Indeed the 
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Philippines has a rich culture and a robust history, and many would find it a blow to national 
pride to acknowledge that millions of Filipinos must work abroad for the foreseeable future 
in order to keep the country afloat.   
Nevertheless, how does the continual denial of the current reality of the importance of the 
overseas employment program, and the country’s reliance and dependence upon it, change 
anything?  It is time for national leaders to overcome their apprehension.  Instead of being 
ashamed of the overseas employment program, and what other states might think or say 
about them, it would be more constructive to embrace the overseas employment program 
and make it as well-run and as developmentally effective as it can possibly be.  There have 
been moments of pride for the overseas employment program, when groups like the IOM 
and other states have looked to the organization of the Philippine program as a model of 
how to build a national labor export program.  OFWs are proud of the work they do abroad, 
and even prouder of the role they play in supporting their country and families back home.  
Their spirit contradicts those who continue to want to pretend that this massive effort—
sanctioned, overseen, and encouraged by all levels of government, and implemented by a 
huge industry in the private sector—is only a temporary phenomenon and thereby not 
worth including in strategic economic development planning.  While other industries have 
risen and fallen in the Philippines over the past 40 years, only one has maintained a steady 
positive trajectory and continues year after year to do more for the national economy.  
Overseas labor migration is the reality in the Philippines and it should be fully embraced as 
such.  
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The President and Congress 
In tracking major legislation through the nearly four-decade history of the overseas 
employment program, this thesis has highlighted several patterns of behavior regarding 
how the executive and legislative branches differ in how they interact with the program.  
The ongoing denial of its official status aside, the executive and legislative branches have 
seemed content to ignore the program completely except in rare circumstances where 
some political advantage could be achieved through very public legislative or executive 
action.  This was certainly the case for the most recent major legislative overhauls in 1995 
and 2009.  In the case or RA 8042 (1995), action only occurred after the national uproar over 
the execution of Flor Contemplacion.  In the case of RA 10022 (2010), it seems, at least 
anecdotally, to have been motivated by campaign politics as a public relations exercise.  In 
both cases political expediency seems to have taken precedence over careful methodical 
policy proceedings in making certain that whatever policies were decided upon really would 
be beneficial to OFWs and would improve the overseas employment program overall.   
The December 2008 administrative order by President Macapagal-Arroyo, described in 
Chapter Five, ordered the POEA to ramp up its efforts in finding opportunities for OFWs.  
This came only after there was a perceived threat to the continuing inflow of remittance 
income.  Prior to issuing the administrative order, President Macapagal-Arroyo took little 
interest in the inner workings of the POEA and the overseas employment program generally.  
Not only does her sudden concern for the welfare of the program in the face of the global 
financial crisis betray the program’s true importance and its central role in stabilizing the 
Philippine economy, but it is consistent with the pattern of behavior for all presidents from 
Marcos until today: ignore the program except when there is a problem or when an idea 
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occurs to them of how the government might avail themselves of a larger piece of the 
remittance pie.  The latter can be traced to the early 1980s, with Marcos’s aborted attempts 
to skim remittances by requiring their transference through official government-controlled 
channels (see Chapter Three). 
The similarity then between the executive and legislative branches in regard to the overseas 
employment program is that they both seem not to care about the program except when 
they absolutely must, or when attention to it will benefit them politically, or when a failure 
of attention to it could hurt them politically.  The executive and legislative branches are 
dissimilar to each other in regard to how they actually interact with the program during the 
rare moments that they do become involved.  While the legislature seems to think that they 
are qualified to micromanage program policies (and, in the case of RA 10022, completely 
ignore the advice and consent of all relevant program actors), the executive branch has 
seemed content with occasional but not consistent attention to program directions.  During 
the Contemplacion saga, for example, Ramos ordered the creation of the Gancayco 
Commission which, after conducting its investigation, made recommendations to the 
President and the legislature. 
It seems unfortunate that throughout the various case studies and chronological policy 
studies conducted in the chapters of this thesis, more often than not the legislative and 
executive branches seem to be themselves obstructing the smooth operation of the 
program.  The overseas employment program has enough difficulty simply overcoming 
routine operational challenges because of the inherently international nature of the 
enterprise, which makes executive and legislative branch meddling, as was the case during 
the Marcos years and appears to be the case again during the RA 10022 saga, even more 
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burdensome on the OFWs and those charged with facilitating the program.  If the “meddling 
moments” described throughout these chapters have proven anything, it is the need for an 
independent planning authority more closely resembling those utilized by the Asian tigers in 
their well-documented rise from developing to developed nation status.  Under this new 
arrangement the President, who appoints the head of NEDA, could coordinate closely with 
the planning authority and play an active role in helping the nation accomplish the 
development goals they have set.  The long-term, consistent vision that these central 
planning authorities provided could do wonders for the Philippines as opposed to the 
current business-as-usual patchwork approach to development planning which has been 
driven by the executive and legislative branches.  Recruitment industry leader and advocate 
Loreto B. Soriano explained his theory on the relationship between the actions of the 
executive and legislative branches and their collective sense of guilt.  
They [government] have to do something because of that guilt feeling.  They 
have to do something about it so that they are the champion even if they are 
over it already.  By letting [OFWs] go [the government] already failed in [its] 
constitutional duty to provide them jobs in the country, so there is a guilt 
there.  So to offset that guilty thing themselves and in the public mind they 
come up with the rules.16 
The guilt-as-motivation angle is as difficult to prove as is the premise, put forth in Chapter 
Five, that political expediency and election year populism also could have motivated their 
decision making.  Nonetheless, guilt may indeed be a motivating factor to consider when 
assessing the behavior and policy-making decisions taken by the legislative and executive 
branches in recent years and throughout the history of the program.  
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Necessary Steps 
Educational training 
While a great deal of professionalism exists in both government and business spheres of the 
overseas employment program, there are presently no degree or certificate programs in the 
Philippines to train and prepare either business people or future civil servants to work in the 
unique environment that exists within the program.  Leading universities in the Philippines 
offer advanced degrees in Public Policy, Public Administration, Leadership, and Governance.  
The University of the Philippines’ National College of Public Administration and Governance 
(NCPAG) and Ateneo de Manila University’s Graduate School of Leadership and Public 
Service both have strong reputations for training future leaders and civil servants.  These 
learning centers and the curriculum they rely on, though outstanding, does not include 
courses or seminars on the unique challenges involved in managing a large international 
scheme with the complexity and scale of the overseas employment program.  New degree 
and certificate programs should be added which combine recruitment management training 
with the traditional Public Policy/Public Administration curriculum.  As with these existing 
programs, it would be prudent to include emphasis on ethics training.  Rather than simply 
learning how to be a civil servant, it is not difficult to imagine how educational training with 
a migration management focus could benefit the government agencies that manage the 
demands of the overseas employment program.  Salaries, of course, would have to be high 
enough to really attract the best and brightest into government service—and to curb 
temptations for private gain at the expense of public good.  Once established, these 
programs might also attract students from other migrant sending countries and employees 
at agencies such as the POEA looking to improve their skills and credentials.  As mentioned 
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many times throughout this thesis, the overseas employment program is unique and 
complex so it stands to reason that like any complex field some specialized training would 
be beneficial.  It might be easier for the universities mentioned above to start out by 
offering a few courses toward these ends, eventually working toward creating a certificate 
program or degree minor emphasis in overseas employment administration. 
The above educational improvement recommendations are targets specifically to enhance 
the capability of government workers destined for or already employed within the large 
overseas employment program bureaucracy.  As discussed in Chapter Two, the Asian Tigers’ 
various planning bodies consisted of elite professionals educated at top schools from 
around the world.  If NEDA is to be more effective at filling its mandate as the central 
development planner, it will need to provide competitive salaries in order to attract the best 
and brightest.  The development agencies in Korea, Japan, and Taiwan not only got the best 
and brightest to work there, but they paid them accordingly to keep them.  The best and 
brightest will not continue working at NEDA for long if they are underpaid, and all their 
recommendations and plans are ignored.  This is where close coordination with the 
President could pay dividends by elevating the status of NEDA from an often-ignored agency 
to the center of a new development-focused government philosophy and program.  If a 
restructuring of NEDA is not possible because of territorial intransigence, or if other 
considerations prohibit such a reorganization, then a new entity should be created and 
staffed from the ground-up, bringing in only the best and brightest.  This step will be a 
crucial one as the country’s future will be put in this planning authority’s hands and they 
must be worthy of that trust.   
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A third recommendation is one that has come from the recruitment industry themselves.  In 
the course of interviews, several key leaders expressed a desire for the creation of degree 
programs in business management with an overseas employment emphasis.  Much in the 
same way that there are specializations available at business schools and within business 
curriculum it seems appropriate, considering the size and importance of the recruitment 
industry, to create degree programs that cater to the industry’s special needs.  Once these 
programs are started it might be possible at some future date to make formal training 
(including ethical training) a prerequisite for any person wishing to obtain a license to 
operate a recruitment agency.  Improving the level of industry specific education would 
benefit the industry, its relationship with government, and potentially reduce the frequency 
of illegal or unethical violations committed by licensed recruitment agencies.   
It should be noted that teaching ethics to students of public administration and business will 
only go so far, and is in no way a substitute for better regulation and for punishment of 
wrongdoers.  This recommendation would not solve the illegal recruitment problem, but 
could possibly raise the ethical bar somewhat for those participating in and overseeing the 
industry.   
New focus on International Relations 
A prudent next step would be to find new ways to focus on improving the relationships the 
Philippines maintains with destination states that host large numbers of OFWs.  As 
explained in Chapter Six, this effort is to some extent already underway, but more effort and 
emphasis must be placed on formalizing sending and receiving arrangements among states.  
Evaluations of the impact of the already functioning BLAs can be used to convince 
destination states of the many advantages that can be achieved through formalizing the 
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sending and receiving process.  This does not necessarily have to mean a pure government-
to-government arrangement as is being utilized in Korea, but instead a structural 
arrangement that can result in cost and time savings to all parties involved in both the 
sending and receiving state.  The DFA does remarkable work for the nation and for OFWs, 
especially when one considers the enormous tasks that they are asked to accomplish and 
the resources they have available to accomplish them.  Interviews with DFA officials, 
however, reveal that they often feel unqualified for the labor-related responsibilities that 
they are asked to cover.  The sheer quantity of OFWs in some states can also be 
overwhelming for DFA officials.  If the number of program players was reduced, and the 
Department of Overseas Employment was created, the DFA could partner closely with them 
in managing destination services as well as in forging new BLAs.  There even could be cross-
training for individuals qualified in diplomacy/ foreign affairs and overseas labor migration 
management (perhaps from one of the new academic programs recommended above).  By 
enhancing cooperation and reducing the number of government “participants” in the 
management process, improved efficiency would be achieved and better service will be 
rendered for and on behalf of OFWs.  By transferring some of the DFA’s OFW-related 
responsibilities at foreign posts to representatives from the Department of Overseas 
Employment, the DFA could better pursue its mandate and traditional responsibilities. This 
would include aggrieve pursuit and negotiation of BLAs and more binding treaties and 
agreements. 
Worker Welfare and Future Research Directions 
While there is significant scholarly expertise on issues related to overseas labor migration 
from the Philippines, very little of it extends beyond documenting the overseas employment 
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program’s many flaws and the numerous cases of abuses of workers.  In other words, the 
issue of worker welfare has dominated migration scholarship in recent years, particularly in 
regard to migration from the Philippines.  Upon careful reading of this thesis one will find 
that the central importance of worker welfare has never been questioned and at many 
points emphasized emphatically.  This study was not intended to belittle or diminish the 
importance of welfare issues.  These issues have been, and hopefully will continue to be 
explored by both academics and civil society groups alike.   
Explaining the traditional emphasis of academic studies on overseas labor migration 
Lindquist explained that: 
Labour recruitment, and the migration industry more generally, has often 
been overlooked by researchers who have tended to focus attention on 
migrants, their families, and communities, rather than entrepreneurs and 
brokers.…However, if we are to grasp the changing structure of 
contemporary forms of transnational labour migration it is critical to consider 
the infrastructure, or “migrant institutions,” which allow people to move.  
This perspective suggests a shift of attention away from – without denying 
the importance of – the emotional experiences of migrants and the often 
predictable forms of injustice they face in destination countries to the 
brokerage systems that move them from one place to another.17   
Instead of focusing specifically on the immensely important “worker welfare” aspects of the 
overseas employment program, this study has focused on big picture political, economic, 
and relational questions that have been overlooked in previous investigations into the 
overseas employment program from the Philippines.  If the Philippines is truly going to face 
reality and embrace the overseas employment program as a component of its national 
economic development strategy more scholars must investigate the convergence and 
complementarity of migration and development.  Internationally, there is a great deal of 
                                                          
17
 Johan Lindquist, “Labour Recruitment, Circuits of Capital and Gendered Mobility: Reconceptualizing the 
Indonesian Migration Industry,” Pacific Affairs 83, no. 1 (2010): 117. 
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scholarship combining these two areas, but only a few scholars in the Philippines, such as 
Tigno and Go, are looking at migration issues beyond the welfare approach.   
While conducting archival research for this thesis in 2009 and 2010, two areas of statistical 
data deficiency began to stand out as a serious problem.  The first was the serious lack of 
information on the recruitment industry as a sector of the economy, and the second was 
the spotty nature of data related to the tracking of returned OFWs.  A healthy amount of 
data exists on remittances, deployments, contract processing, and other aspects of the OFW 
deployment process but when it comes to returned OFWs or data related to the recruitment 
industry there is almost no data available at all.  The Bureau of Labor and Employment 
Statistics (BLES), contained within DOLE, is chartered to track vital statistics on labor and 
employment issues in the country.  While BLES captures statistical information across all 
major sectors of the economy, no data has been captured on the recruitment industry—
despite its major contribution to the national economy through the remittances that come 
in as a result of their facilitation of OFW deployments.  When asked about the lack of 
coverage, the archivists at BLES concluded that the recruitment industry was not considered 
a “sector” or “industry” in the same way as agriculture and manufacturing.  Consequently, 
no data were available.  Recruitment industry data are essential for proper economic 
analysis of the Philippines.  Even if policy makers in the Philippines choose not to embrace 
the overseas employment program as a permanent fixture of the Philippine economy and 
an integral component of the national economic development strategy, these reasons do 
not justify the wholesale discounting of an industry that employs literally thousands of 
Filipinos domestically.  Recruitment industry leader Victor Fernandez argued that the lack of 
data was the result of a combination of embarrassment and shame.  He explained that “it 
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would be disgraceful because it will show to the entire world that our economy is 
dependent on overseas remittances and that is the issue”.18  While this may be true, similar 
to the discussion above about the national reluctance to embrace the overseas employment 
program openly, additional statistics on the recruitment industry itself would add to the 
collective understanding of the program as a whole.  It would not demonstrate the 
Philippines’ reliance on overseas migration any more starkly than the ratio of remittances to 
GDP already does. 
Likewise, on the second data deficiency issue, whether the responsibility falls with the 
Department of Immigration or the POEA itself, more effort must be put into tracking the 
return of OFWs back into the country.  If the skills, experiences, and financial resources of 
returned OFWs are to be more effectively utilized for the developmental benefit of the 
country, it is essential to put in place a mechanism implemented to track their return and 
remain in contact with them regardless of whether they decide to stay home or to re-deploy 
abroad.  A secondary benefit of tracking the status and intentions of returned OFWs would 
be to show the ongoing flows in and out of the country, the ratios of which might offer 
insight into what effect the overseas employment program is having on the workforce and 
population generally. 
Final thoughts 
By researching the major questions and themes brought forward through the lens of the 
government-business framework, this thesis has provided insight into how key relationships 
have shaped policymaking and often get in the way of meaningful progress toward 
improving the program—or even simply making it more efficient and beneficial for all 
                                                          
18
 Victor E.R. Fernandez Jr., President, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), interviewed by 
author Mandaluyong City, Philippines, November 7, 2009. 
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involved.  If improvements to the program are ever going to be made, the recruitment 
industry has legitimate grievances and must be accepted as a partner with government 
rather than a frequent enemy.  Likewise, the recruitment industry, with the help of 
government, needs to do whatever it can to stamp out the things that stain their reputation.  
Exactly what those things are will no doubt have to be determined by the industry itself and 
the POEA which directly oversees it, but the large size of the industry and the sheer number 
of participants will make meaningful reform difficult.  Recruitment industry leaders assert 
that they are perpetually blamed for all the program’s woes.  While wholesale blame of the 
recruitment industry for all program and OFW woes is unjustified, some of the industry’s 
problems are inadvertently self-inflicted, as was the case with RA 10022.  As described in 
Chapter Five, when they recommended the idea for liability insurance to legislators they 
received a bill that mandated insurance but to a far greater extent than they were prepared 
for or desired.  This created a situation where the insurance they had pursued so vigorously 
ultimately became a burden rather than a benefit. While in the end industry leaders 
justifiably blamed Congress, the Senate in particular, they should have expected that their 
original proposal would not remain unaltered considering the track record of the legislature 
and the pattern of behavior that Congress has demonstrated on previous overseas 
employment program related legislation, particularly RA 8042.  Despite all this, it is clear 
that once accepted at the negotiating table as a partner rather than enemy, the will exists 
within at least some leading figures in the recruitment industry to make meaningful changes 
to industry practices and the program at-large that will benefit all parties involved.   
As mentioned in Chapter Three, the government’s perpetual framing of the overseas 
employment program as temporary has led Rene Ofreneo to dub the program “permanently 
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temporary”.19  This apt characterization illustrates in a single catchphrase many of the 
reasons why the program has persisted and grown from something originally intended to be 
temporary, into something permanently fixed in the Philippine economy.  Indeed, the 
economy reached the point where it can no longer function without it.  The dependency of 
the Philippine economy on the overseas employment program and the resulting remittances 
is now permanent; it is far past time that leaders and policy makers admitted this reality 
that everyone knows to be true but that some do not want to admit.  Not only is the 
Philippine economy unquestionably reliant on remittances for its ongoing survival, but over 
the nearly 40 year history of the program overseas labor migration has forever changed 
Philippine culture.  In the modern Philippines it has become more fashionable to work 
abroad, and be paid in dollars or another international currency than to work domestically 
for pesos.  This issue was illustrated in 2009 while attending a job fair at the Tinoma Mall in 
Quezon City.  The job fair was divided in half with domestic companies seeking workers for 
good paying jobs in the Philippines on one side, while foreign employers or recruitment 
agencies seeking qualified persons for jobs abroad on the other side of the fair.  While a few 
dozen prospective workers mingled about on the domestic side of the job fair, the line for 
the international side wrapped around the central atrium several times with perhaps 
thousands of prospective workers waiting patiently for their turn.      
The time has come for the Philippines to chart a new course for itself, and the overseas 
employment program is positioned to be a central plank in the strategy that will put the 
nation on a sustainable path toward economic prosperity.  There is a critical need for the 
program to be first acknowledged as vital to the country and then placed within a larger 
economic development strategy.  This strategy, as explained in Chapter Two and again 
                                                          
19
 Ofreneo, “Migration and Development,” 264. 
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above, will require a central planning authority with the right mix of authority and know-
how to develop a sustainable long-term economic development strategy and then resolve 
to stick to the plan—making any necessary adjustments, of course, as time goes on.  If policy 
makers and leaders do not wish to acknowledge the permanency of the overseas 
employment program then they must ask this newly empowered economic development 
planning authority to utilize the program now while at the same time pursuing other 
supplementary strategic development plans and objectives.  Korea, as described in Chapter 
Seven, utilized their overseas employment program as one element in a much larger 
strategy that was primarily focused on the enhancement of domestic industry and 
manufacturing.  Once those efforts reached a certain level of profitability and growth, the 
Korean overseas employment component of the development strategy was no longer 
needed and could be discontinued.  This could certainly happen in the Philippines but not 
until a great deal of progress is made in developing whichever “other” strategic efforts are 
made in conjunction with the overseas employment program.  Once they are ready, like 
Korea, the Philippines could phase out its “temporary” overseas employment program and 
Filipino workers would then only have to go abroad to find work if they really wanted to.  
With proper coordination and proper planning, there could come a day in which overseas 
labor migration is a supplement rather than the centerpiece of Philippine economic growth.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Philippine Bilateral Labor Agreements 
  
Country Status 
Year 
signed Title 
Implementing 
agency 
Great Britain, 
for North 
Borneo Unknown 1955 
Agreement…migration of 
Filipino labor employment in 
British North Borneo 
National 
Employment 
Service 
Great Britain, 
for North 
Borneo Unknown 1955 
Sample contract of 
employment for 1955 Borneo 
Agreement 
National 
Employment 
Service 
United States 
Superseded by 1985 
agreement below 1968 
Agreement, employment of 
Filipino Citizens by US 
military in US military bases 
in the Philippines DOLE 
Libya Unknown 1979 
Agenda for Cooperation in 
the Field of Labor, 
Employment and Manpower 
Development DOLE 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Expired, according to 
"Philippine Bilateral 
Agreements" by 
DOLE (2006) 1979 
MOU in relation to the 
Employment of Filipino 
Citizens for the Performance 
of Duties Under and 
Employment Contract as 
Non-Citizen Contract 
Employees in the State 
Services…PNG POEA 
Jordan 
Expired, according to 
"Philippine Bilateral 
Agreements" by 
DOLE (2006) 1981 MOU POEA 
Iraq 
Expired, according to 
"Philippine Bilateral 
Agreements" by 
DOLE (2006) 1982 
MOU Relating to Mobilization 
of Manpower 
DOLE, POEA 
(Focal 
implementing 
agency) 
United States Unknown 1985 
MOU amending May 27 1968 
agreement DOLE 
International 
Catholic 
migration 
Commission Unknown 1988 MOU na 
Jordan Unknown 1988 Agreement of manpower POEA 
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United States Unknown 1989 
Agreement between the US 
and the Philippines relating 
to the employment of the 
Philippine nationals in the US 
military bases in the 
Philippines. (MOA amending 
agreement of 1985 and 27 
May 1968) DOLE 
Canada Unknown 1991 
MOU concerning National 
Commission on the role of 
Filipino Women na 
Cambodia Unknown 1995 
MOU on rural Health 
Development Cooperation DOH 
Canada unknown 1996 
MOU concerning National 
Commission on the role of 
Filipino Women na 
Bahrain Unknown 1997 
MOU on the establishment of 
joint commission on 
manpower, economic, 
commercial, educational, 
cultural and technical 
cooperation na 
Kuwait In force 1997 
MOU on Labor and 
Manpower Development POEA 
Qatar In force 1997 
Agreement Concerning 
Filipino Manpower 
Employment in the State of 
Qatar 
DOLE, POEA 
(Focal 
implementing 
agency) 
Myanmar Unknown 1998 
MOU on the package of 
assistance for Human 
Resource Development for 
the Union of Myanmar na 
Taiwan Replaced  1999 
MOU regarding Special Hiring 
of Workers 
DOLE, MECO, 
TECO, POEA 
Norway 
Expired, according to 
"Philippine Bilateral 
Agreements" by 
DOLE  2001 
Agreement on Transnational 
Cooperation for Recruiting 
Professionals from the Health 
Sector to Positions in Norway POEA 
Taiwan Replaced 2001 
MOU on Special Hiring 
Program for Taiwan 
DOLE, MECO, 
TECO, POEA 
Switzerland In force 2002 
Agreement, exchange of 
professional and technical 
trainees 
DOLE and 
Department of 
Justice through 
Bureau of 
Immigration 
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Switzerland Unknown 2002 
Agreement between RP and 
the Swiss Confederation on 
the Readmission of Persons 
with Unauthorized Stay DFA 
United 
Kingdom Unknown 2002 Recruitment Agreement POEA 
Bahrain 
For ratification, 
according to 
Philippine Bilateral 
Agreements by DOLE 
(2006) 2003 MOU on technical education TESDA 
Indonesia Unknown 2003 
MOU Concerning Migrant 
Workers 
DOLE, OWWA 
(Focal 
implementing 
agency) 
Taiwan Replaced 2003 
MOU on Special Hiring 
Program for Taiwan 
DOLE, MECO, 
TECO, POEA 
United 
Kingdom In force 2003 
MOU, Health Care 
Cooperation DOLE, DOH 
United States Unknown 2003 
Partnership for distressed 
Filipino nationals in the 
United States of America 
seized between the 
Department of Foreign 
Affairs and the National 
Federation of Filipino-
American Bar Association of 
Greater Washington DC DFA 
Italy In force 2004 
Agreement on the Assisted 
Return and Readmission of 
Persons 
Department of 
Justice 
Korea replaced by 2006 EPS 2004 
MOU on the Sending of 
Workers to the Republic of 
Korea 
DOLE, POEA 
(Focal 
implementing 
agency) 
Lao For ratification 2005 2005 
MOU on Technical 
Cooperation on Labor and 
Employment DOLE 
Saudi Arabia In force 2005 
MOU For Cooperation in the 
Field of Technical Vocational 
Education and Training TESDA 
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Canada, 
Sasketchewan In force 2006 
MOU between RP (DOLE) and 
her Majesty the Queen in the 
Right of the Province of 
Saskatchewan as represented 
by the Minister Responsible 
for Immigration and the 
Minister of Advanced 
Education and Employment 
(hereinafter referred to as 
AEE) (2006) 
DOLE, (and will 
include attached 
agencies: 
(i)POEA, (ii) 
OWWA, (iii) 
TESDA, and (iv) 
PRC) 
International 
Organization 
for Migration Unknown 2006 MOU na 
Korea in force 2006 
MOU on the Sending  and 
Receiving of Workers under 
the Employment Permit 
System 
DOLE, POEA 
(Focal 
implementing 
agency) 
Libya In force 2006 MOU POEA 
Spain In force 2006 
MOU on Cooperation for the 
Management of the 
Migratory Flows POEA 
Taiwan Replaced 2006 
MOU on Special Hiring 
Program for Taiwan 
DOLE, MECO, 
TECO, POEA 
Bahrain In force 2007 
MOU on health services 
cooperation DOH 
France unknown 2007 
Joint statement between the 
ambassador of the Republic 
of the Philippines and the 
Secretary General of the 
Inter-Ministerial Committee 
on Immigration Control of 
the Ministry of Immigration, 
Integration, National Identity 
and co-development of the 
Republic of France na 
Northern 
Marianas 
Islands Unknown 2007 MOU 
DOLE, POEA 
(Focal 
implementing 
agency) 
United Arab 
Emirates In force 2007 
MOU in the Field of 
Manpower 
DOLE, POEA 
(Focal 
implementing 
agency) 
United Arab 
Emirates In force 2007 
Implementation of the UAE 
Employment Agreement for 
Domestic Workers and 
Sponsors 
DOLE, POEA 
(Focal 
implementing 
agency) 
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Canada, Alberta In force 2008 
MOU Concerning 
Cooperation in HR 
Deployment and 
Development 
DOLE, (and will 
include attached 
agencies: 
(i)POEA, (ii) 
OWWA, (iii) 
TESDA, and (iv) 
PRC) 
Canada, British 
Columbia In force 2008 
MOU Concerning 
Cooperation in HR 
Deployment and 
Development 
DOLE, (and will 
include attached 
agencies: 
(i)POEA, (ii) 
OWWA, (iii) 
TESDA, and (iv) 
PRC) 
Canada, 
Manitoba In force 2008 
MOU Concerning 
Cooperation in HR 
Deployment and 
Development 
DOLE, (and will 
include attached 
agencies: 
(i)POEA, (ii) 
OWWA, (iii) 
TESDA, and (iv) 
PRC) 
Japan In force 2008 
Economic Partnership 
Agreement na 
New Zealand Unknown 2008 MOA on Labor Cooperation DOLE 
Qatar In force 2008 
Additional Protocol to 1997 
Agreement POEA 
Taiwan Replaced 2008 
MOU Between TECO and 
MECO (Joint Implementing 
Guidelines) 
DOLE, MECO, 
TECO, POEA 
Jordan In force 2010 MOU on Labor Cooperation DOLE, POEA  
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Appendix 2  
Recommendations from the Final Report of the Investigating Mission of the Committee on 
Overseas Workers’ Affairs (COWA) to Saudi Arabia, January 9 – 13, 2011 
1. Decertify Saudi Arabia as a country fit to receive domestic workers in accordance with 
Section 3 of Republic Act 10022, which states that “the Department of Foreign Affairs, 
through its foreign posts, shall issue a certification to the POEA, specifying therein the 
pertinent provisions of the receiving country’s labor/social law, or the 
convention/declaration/resolution or the bilateral agreement/arrangement which protect 
the rights of migrant workers.” 
2. Urgently press the Saudi government to negotiate a bilateral labor agreement with the 
Philippine government that would secure respect and iron-clad protection for the rights of 
all classes of Filipino overseas workers. This recommendation of the earlier mission to Saudi 
Arabia consisting of Reps. Rufus Rodriguez, Luz Ilagan, and Carlos Padilla (Nov 2009) is one 
that our mission strongly reiterates. 
3. Coordinate with other labor-sending countries such as Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and India to 
gain leverage vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia in order to secure respect for overseas workers’ rights. 
4. Upgrade the Pre-departure Orientation Seminars (PDOS) to familiarize OFWs headed to 
Saudi about the conditions—both good and bad—they are likely to face in that country. 
5. Urge members of Congress to work with LGUs in launching information campaigns to 
dissuade people from going to Saudi to engage in domestic work and related occupations 
such as “washers” and “beauticians.” 
6. Prosecute recruitment agencies that have a record of deploying domestic workers to 
households and establishments that maltreat workers. 
7. Prosecute recruitment agencies that are party to substitute contracting and similar 
activities under the Anti-Trafficking Act. 
8. Ensure that the budget for Assistance to Nationals and the Legal Assistance Fund is not 
reduced and, if possible, increased. 
9. Increase efforts to secure the release of death row victims as well as other nationals 
currently detained in Saudi jails on various charges. 
10. Pressure the Saudi government to agree to a bilateral agreement that would normalize 
the situation of children born of Filipino or mixed parentage in Saudi Arabia and facilitate 
their repatriation to the Philippines. 
11. Increase the personnel complement of the Embassy, Consular, and POLO staffs to 
reduce overwork and meet growing demands. 
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12. Conduct an aggressive information campaign among OFWs in Saudi Arabia regarding the 
benefits they can get from different government welfare programs such as Pag-IBIG and 
Philhealth. 
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